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I NTPOD'?C T I.O:d. 
1. .pim and Scope. 
The Eim of this study is to describe the course of thought 
during the first three centuries or so of Islam upon the 
cuestions of Predestination and Free Will, end. to try to mske 
clear the greet underlying principles end influences in men's 
hearts and minds , and the manner in which these ere derived 
from the original intense reslizetion of God. 
In order to achieve this aim it is necessary to rid our- 
selves a,s far as may be of the preconceptions and prejudices of 
Western thought of the 19thpand 20th centuries. There are 
certain similarities, for instance, between the views of the 
vTu'tazile End our so-celled "liberal" thinkers , but to identify 
the two and call the Muctezils the "liberel theologians of 
Islam ", es Horten did,L is definitely misleading. 
The very title of this study, though the most satisfactory 
to convey to an English reader the scope of the discussions, is 
also to some extent misleading. The conception of Free Will, 
in the strict sense, does not occur at all in thought, 
but is replaced by the slightly different conceptions of man's 
power to act end to deter;ine the course of events. The con- 
ception of Predestination does occur, but not so often as might 
be supposed; the Muslim is much more interested in whet God is 
doing in the present then in whet He did in the pest. The 
debate about Predestination and Free Will thus becomes E discuss- 
ion of the respective share of God end men in determining the 
1.1. 2. 
course of events in the present. It will be seen in due 
course that this is also far removed from the modern discussion 
of Free Will end scientif=ic Determinism. 
Above all, then, E fresh and open mind is requisite in ap- 
proaching this subject. Since complete impartiality is imposs- 
ible, the best I can do is to make explicit the position I myself 
hold. In ray opinion, then, this question of Free Will and 
Predestination or of the relationship of human and Divine power 
is one where there are two opposing yet complementary truths, 
which at the present stage of man's intellectual development 
cannot be wholly reconciled with one another, but which must 
nevertheless be held. together. As a standard Anglican 
theologian writes: 
"Scripture holds before us two reet counter -truths - 
first, God's absolute sovereignty (cp.Pom.9,20ff.) , and 
secondly, man's responsioility. Our intellects cannot 
reconcile them. So far as we can reconcile them at all it 
is by right action and vigorous morel life. 
Various syntheses have been attempted , but they have always been 
only partial, and have not proved stable. Islam - or perhaps 
one should rather say, the Fast - has tended to overemphasize 
Divine sovereignty, whereas in the West too much influence has 
been attributed to men's will, especially in recent times. 
Both have strayed from the true path, though in different direct- 
ions. The West has probably something to learn of that aspect 
of the truth which has been so clearly apurehended in the Tast. 
The precise scope of this study is limited in various ways. 
For the most pert it is restricted to those theologians who come 
within the purview of the heresiographers , that is, those who 
I.1. 3. 
flourished between the years 80 end 330 P.H. or so; but I have 
also included views explicitly attributed to perticular fen or 
sect belonging to that period, where such material was available. 
Whet I have not attempted is to discuss Qur >2n Pnd Trad- 
itions for their own s eke . There is much of interest and 
velue in this field, but an adequate disdussion would require 
volumes and would probably contribute but little to the present 
subject. It would not greatly affect my argument if it were 
proved that the Qu.r'rn becomes more deterministic in its later 
passages. And even if, from the material of biographical 
notices and the isnád's of Traditions, we could make clear the 
exact "tendency" of each try di.tionist of the second End third 
centuries and could. isolate the various strains within or. thodoxy , 
we should probably add little to our knowledge on this question 
of predestination end free will . In chapter II , therefore, 
I have briefly considered the QurlFn a.s e whole and the Trad- 
itions es a whole, end have used them mainly es evidence for the 
existence of two great opposing trends within Islam. 
Likewise I have not attempted to ferret out the external 
"sources" of doctrines propounded by Muslim theologians. 
There certEinly were external influences at work, but they were 
never the sole cause. Father they were the stimulus to which 
Islam responded; end. whet matters most is not the cherecter of 
the stimulus but the quality of the response. The centre of 
interest in the present study is what is specifically Islamic. 
The quest is, through and behind ell the bewildering variety of 
the phenomena, for that elusive reality which may be called the 
essence of Islam. 
I. 4. 
2. The Sources. 
c) The Books of Sects. 
These constitute the prim erT7 sources for the mein body of 
this study, chapters III, IV end V. While they closely re- 
semble one Enother in the generrl picture they give of esrly 
iuslim theology, they ere of vsrying merits in perticulE r 
cuestións . 
Undoubtedly s1 -i s Lt r. ï's _ïa.o7.1 -t E1 -Isl .miyin, es it is the 
fullest, is also the most trustworthy of them. There Ere 
indeed many gaps in his sccount, which may at times be positively 
rnisleed.ing.= On the whole, however, so far Ps he himself is 
concerned, he seems to hsve recorded the views he describes with 
complete objectivity; but sllowence hEs slweys to be ms de for his 
repetition of whatever biss there wss in his sources, such se 
Abu ,l- iudha it's csriceture of the anthropomorphic views of 
Hishrm b. al- Hsksm.± I have throughout made the Mec717t the 
basis of my work, and brought in the others only se supplements. 
(This is perhaps the piece to state that I have neglected the 
distinction in the .7717-t between "So-end-so" r Ad "the t ssocistes 
of So- and -so (as1).2b) ", since el- r}sh`er.i himself sometimes refers 
a view both tb e man a.nd., to his followers. _) 
Al- Shehrestr nPP s Kitrb el-Milel we-' l- HitLel is good in many 
ways. His logical mind helped him to understand the inner 
connections end structure of the systems he described, and he 
enables us to piece together the scattered details of el- Ashtart. 
In the case of the smeller sects, however, he is too anxious to 
classify them and assign them to one side or other of the line 
in respect of the çuestions that interested hire; cp. his account 
 . la, . 5. 
of the Shuteibiye . 
"The Shu eibïye are the followers of Shut ib b. Alutiammed , 
who with Ma imiln belonged to the compeny of the tA.jr ridgy , but 
dissociated himself from him when he proclei ied tree doctrine 
of Q der. Shuceib asserted- th2t God is the crestor of the 
acts of men end man the ' acouirer' (muktasib) of them in re- 
spect of power and will. Men is responsible for the good 
and bed in them, end is rewarded end punished. accordingly. 
There is no-Ling in existence except by the volition of God. 
He held the heresy of the Khewrri j about the imamate and the 
threat, and the heresy of the cI. j7rida about the judgement 
of children, the judgement of those who "sta:r et home ", and 
associating and dissociating. "2 
There is Little in this that could not have been deduced from 
the story of Shuta.ib and ieimvn in the F c 1 t,7 bit the fact 
that the argument turned. on the use of in shy'a: 711Th is omitted -' 
nd instead we hove some of the stock phrases of Teter disputes; 
cauktesib, for instance, refers to s conception v nich, ES will be 
seen in c iepter V, did not make en eppepra-.nce till about e 
hundred yeErs after Shu'sib. 
Al -Ba hd di's P1 -Ferq bein al-Fir. ao is si ailer in many ways 
to the Milal, but the author had. not the aerie philosophical in- 
sight as El- Shahrsstrni., and was less objective. Nevertheless 
;en 9-+e 
important details Pre often to be found or both of these. 
A 
The ennoteted_ trensletion of the second half by Dr.I.S.Helkin, 
under the title of Moslem Schisms and Sects, Pert II, is s 
scholarly piece of work and has many valuable references. 
The more recently published Tanbih of al- vialst3 contains 
much of e. book on sects by A_ba t7sim- Khusheish b. i sram. 
This is of great imports nce in that it is half e century to e 
century earlier than the M&árlTt and contains many details not 
in any other printed source. The descriptive part is actual- 
ly quite short, as most of the work consists of refutations, on 
I.2,e. 6. 
tienlbeli principles , of the views Gies cribed . The T_r.nbïh 
also contains some descriptións of sects from another source 
which ere likewise of velue, since they seem to reflect a 
non -Mu 'ta.zili tradition. 
The book commonly known as the Munye , which is really the 
chapter about the ißi `ta.zile from P. longer tork entitled Kitñb 
al- úiunya we.- ,1- r'scia:1 by Ibn L- urted7 (d.340,1437) , published 
by Sir Thomas J =rnold under the title of Ill- Mu`ta.zils.h, is 
valuable so far es it goes. It hes Practically nothing about 
theological end philosophical doctrines, but is full of bio- 
graphical and chronological matter, some of which is not found 
elsewhere. This mainly concerns chapter IV, of course. 
The Kit .b el -Intis r of al- ithaiyrt is not e heresiogrephy, 
but is itself pert of the controversies described in the books 
of sects, being e reply to assertions of Ibn el- Erwend3, e 
renegade from the Idu (ta_zils . It is thus a unioue source of 
information about certain aspects of the theological arguments 
of the third century. Dr.Jyberg's introduction and notes 
in ',rabic) ere also useful. 
Some other books of this type occasionally referred to 
will be found in the Bibliography. 
b) Sources for el- Ashta.ri. 
The main sources for cl- Ish`eri's views about predestin- 
ation ere the creeds in the Meorl't and the Ibrne ,g and the 
body of the latter work, whose full title is Il -Ibrna tan TT ül 
el- Divrna. The creeds are very similar to one another; 
they ere described es the beliefs of the "Ihl el -}I dïth wa -)l- 
I.2,b. r, 
Sunna." r_..nd the ".ß.hl s l -i s o o we - 1-Sunna" respectively, but ss 
this is presumably el- A_shcsri)s neme for the party to which he 
himself belonged, there is no reason for doubting that the views 
in them are his own. (They are not necessarily the whole of 
his own beliefs , however, for there is nothing about the attrib- 
utes of sod, for example.) The Ib7 ns is a work whose im- 
portance can hardly be rated too highly, and which will rise in 
our estimation ES our spprecietion of el- llshtsrï's position 
deepens. More will be said bout it in chepter VI. The 
translation by Dr Welter C. Klein is very helpful, but there ere 
certain slight feu.lts , es is pointed out in the review by 
Prof. W. Thomson in The Moslem World ,= end reference to the 
text is usually also necesserv. 
The portion of el-J hta_rï's LitT b l -Lams ̀  tr_ e nsleted by 
J. Hell 
io 
deals with some of the topics with which this study 
is concerned; but there seem. to be no. essential differences 
from the IbFns., End, as the text is et present inaccessible, I 
have made little use of it.. 
á.l- Baghd2.di hes only the slightest references to the views 
of` e.l- Asilterï as distinct from those of the - orthodoxy of his 
own dey. Al- Shehrestrnï hes e section about the Asih`srlye, 
which distinguishes between the views of the master end those 
of his followers , and eppeers to be sound; but in respect of 
predestination it tells us prectice.11y nothing about el- Ishrerì's 
own views. 
I.2. 8. 
c) Sources for the 1Ianafiya. 
For some reason which remains obscure to us - it may have 
had something to do with geographical distribution or with the 
rivalry of the followers of al- Shrfi`! - the followers of Ab1 
Hanifa are almost completely boycotted by the books on sects, 
and therefore we have to turn to other sources. Fortunately 
several early Hanafi documents have been preserved and are now 
easily accessible. Three important creeds have been translated 
and commented upon by Wensinck in The = 'uslim Creed, and I have 
little to add to what he has said except to draw attention to the 
point that these are distinctively Hanafi productions, representing 
the views not of all orthodoxy, but only of a section. 
(1) The first of these, Figh Akbar I, is found, among other 
places , in the Sharti al -Filth el -Akbar ascribed to al- Ivi,turTdi 
(discussed below). Wensinck has argued convincingly that this 
creed, "though not composed by Abi Hanifa, is proved to be derived 
from genuine utterances of the master, with the possible exception 
of article 7.4% The creed as a. whole has a Yurji'i colouring 
which fits in well with the reports in various reliable sources 
that Abil Hanifa belonged to the more moderate groups of the 
Murji'a.1 Wensinck's doubts about the importance of the Ghassánï 
ya in connection with the importance of the article about Moses 
and use Jesusi a.re less cogent when it is realized that GhassFn 
was a pupil of Abü Hanifa,tr of whose views the master may have 
disapproved. Article 7, too, states a. belief characteristic 
of the Ash-ft al Ra.'y, who are usually closely associated with 
Abú Ha.nifa.. Thus Fia,h . Akbar I cab. safely be regarded as an 
accurate account of certain of the main beliefs of Abí1 Hanifa. 
I.2,c. 9. 
and some of his immediate followers, and might be dated about 150. 
(2) The Wa.siyet Abi H2nifal was printed at Hyderabad in 
1321 A.H. along with a. commentary by Millie ;7usein b. Iskandar 
al- Hanafi, in the same volume as the Shari el -Fich a1 -Akbar and 
a1- AshCari's IbE na.. It is a. peculierit.y of the Hanafiye. that 
they seek anonymity by ascribing many of their works to Abü Hanifa 
himself - to the perplexity of modern scholars. The Waçiya 
is clearly not the work of the master; according to Wensinck it 
"seems to have originated in a period. between Abü iianifa and 
Ahmad b. Hanbal, and probably belongs to the latter part of that 
period" - that is, to about 200 A.H. =6 (The relationship of 
the author or authors to various sects is discussed below in 
ch.V sect.6.) 
(3) The Figh Akbar II is printed in the same volume as the 
above with a commentary by Abu 21- Tuntahá.. Wensinck's con- 
clusions about date and authorship are not altogether satisfactory, 
since he has not allowed for the opposition within orthodoxy be- 
tween al- Ashtari and the school of J0bü Hanifa.. Thus, while 
he remarks that "it would appear that we do not possess sufficient 
data to ascribe it to himself (se. to al- Ash`a.r3), "2 the truth 
is that we have quite sufficient data for saying definitely that 
it is not al- Ash'arl's. The ascription to Abv_ Hanifa is 
itself a presumptián in favour of connecting it with the school 
which professed to follow him; and an examination of the Erticles 
in detail shows that they differ in several salient points from 
those of al- Ashtar3 and his followers. The actual contents, 
however, are best discussed in connection with two other 
I.2,c. 10. 
documents closely related to it. 
The first of these is the creed of al- Tahäwi, printed et 
Halab in 1344 under the title of BayKn al- Sunna wa- 11- Jamä.`a, 
and translated into both German and English. 1! It claims to 
be the creed of the Ahl al -Sunna wa- 11JamRca according to the 
position of Abia Hanifa, Abiz Fasuf and Whammed b. al-Hasan al- 
Sha.ibmnT.1 As al- Tahawi (according to the biographical note 
appended to the Ba.ygn) was born in 230 and died in 321, the creed 
is probably to be dated somewhat before 300. (On the title - 
page he is called Ahmed b. Jatfar, but from the note and other 
sources it appears that he was Ahmed b. Idna.hamma.d b. Salema Abú 
Je tfar. ) 
The other is the Shar4 al -Fish al- Akbar. In the Hyderabad 
print of 1321 it is ascribed to al- Mgtii.rid3, but a manuscript of 
it in Cairo has Abu '1 -Lsith sl- Sama.rg %andï as the author.= 
Wensinck rejects the authorship of al- 1VlTturidi, but admits that 
it is the product of his school. =) This conclusion seems to 
be justified., though one of the grounds he gives, the fact that 
al- Nl.turidi is mentioned by name in the work, is not completely 
decisive, since authors of this period sometimes referred to 
themselves by name in their own works ._1- Nor is it absolutely 
necessary that the "doctors of Samargand" on p.22 should be "the 
spiritual progeny of al- MKturidi. " But the references to the 
J\sh'arlya as a, party, and the fact that the doctrines ascribed 
to them, while largely those of the al- Ash`a.r.i we know otherwise, 
are slightly developed beyond them, argue for a date about a 
generation after al- Ash`eri's death. On the other hand, I am 
I.2,c. 11. 
inclined to think that this book cannot be much later than that; 
it uses early names of sects, like tAdliya , Mujbira. and Shakkák!ya, 
which later died out; and it seems to regard the Ashsarlya as a 
sect quite distinct from the orthodox Ahl el-Sunna wa.- 'l- Ja.má,`a. 
It is impossible to form any definite conclusion without consider- 
ing the readings of the various manuscripts, Which are not at 
present accessible, but I rather expect that it will be found 
that the author is a pupil of al -1V .turidi of the first or second 
generation. For convenience I have referred to him in ch.VI, 
section 4 as "al -M turidi" (in inverted commas). 
These three Vanafi documents, the creed of al -Tali w , the 
Fiqh Akbar II, and the Sharp al -.'ich al- Akbar, agree in various 
distinctive points, of which the chief are the rejection of 
extreme predestination or Jabr, and the assertion that the 
"active attributes" of God are eternal (sif +.t fiLliya) . Al- 
Ts. i wi is presumably the earliest, since he uses no technical 
terms in making the latter point, but simply says God was creator 
before He created, and so forth;s on the question of man's utter- 
ance or writing of the Qur.'än, he is even more conservative 
than the Was ïya..' 
There are several slight differences between the Fiqh Akbar II 
and the Sharp al -Fish al -Akbar which rather indicate that they 
come from different groups within the Hanafiya. Thus the 
creed says that prophets are preserved from both light and grave 
sins, but may commit errors, while the commentary allows that 
prophets may commit slight sins, but adds that "some of our 
associates" hold that they may not commit slight sins but may 
I.2,c. 12. 
commit errors, and uses the word for "errors" used by the creed, 
zi1101 Their views on whether man's utterance of the Qur'än 
is created are different, but both are opposed to the views of 
the creed in the Maealat and of the Ash`eriya. ; The presumption 
is that the Fiala Akbar II hE s some connection with the group 
referred to as some of) our associates ", and that it is the 
earlier of the two. 
Most of the statements made in modern works about the views 
of al -l'v tur3di are derived from Al- Raw.at al- Bahiya by Abü `Udhba., 
written in 1125/'1713 and printed in Hyderabad a year after the 
volume containing the Ib2.na.17 It is a. discussion of the dif- 
ferences between the Ashts.rTya and the 1v turidiya, but it is by 
no means confined to the views of the masters. Several of 
their followers during the next few centuries are mentioned and 
quoted; many of the views of the M turidiya, however, are simply 
given the customary ascription to Abü tanifa . The aEturidiya 
are explicitly referred to in question 7 of Part I (about kasb) 
and question 2 of Part II (on whether God is known by revelation 
or by reason) ; al-M75turIdi himself is mentioned, rather incident- 
ally, in the latter section, and more fully in the following two 
questions, on the active attributes and on whether what is heard 
is the uncreated word of God. 
Abú 'Udhba is quite a competent and intelligent scholar, 
albeit too anxious to minimize the differences between the schools. 
Yet he is to some extent aware of these differences; thus he 
suggests that the view that the active attributes of God are 
eternal was not held by the Ha.na.fïya before the time of al- 
I.2,c. 13. 
Mgturidï (which is on the right lines, but not quite correct, 
since it has just been noticed that al- TahTwi, whom he mentions 
as not holding the doctrine, does in fact hold it, though in non - 
technical language) ; and on pp.67f. there is a discussion of some 
differences between al Ash(ari and his followers. The fact 
remains, however, that Abü `pdhba. is not so very much nearer the 
times of which he writes than we axe, and probably had much the 
same sources available to him. He quotes the Waaiya., the Filth 
Akbar (presumably II) ,17 and he has passages which are based on 
the Sha.r}ti al -Filth al -Akbar or some very similar work.17 
The conclusion is therefore forced upon US that in general 
there is little to be learned. from Abú `TTdhba., especially about 
the early period. There is the one possibility that he may 
occasionally quote from a book not now accessible to us. The 
one instance I have noticed in which this possibility is realized 
is on p.44 where he quotes from the KitT.b al- Tawhïd of al -M' turidi 
about the word of God; but this is not relevant to the present 
study. It also follows from this that all statements about 
al- MUturidi in modern works are to be received with the utmost 
caution where no reliable Arabic sources are quoted. 
ZS . 
d) L:od.ern Works. 
Little need be seid about these. Jy greet indebtedness to 
The Lúslim Creed by A.J.Wensinck will everywhere be obvious. 
Besides trsnsla.ting and commenting on the 'Tenet! creeds , he is s 
mine of information about the treatment of the various points in 
Tradition. If I have ventured to criticize, it is mainly by 
way of addition to whet he hes said. The work of Dr. H. S. Nyberg , 
especially his article on the Muttszile in the Encyclopedia of 
Islam, is also of quite fundamental importance for the subject- 
matter of chi Ater IV. 
Of more general works Goldziher's Vorlesungen eber den Islam 
second edition) holds the leading piece, but Professor D.B.ilac- 
donald's Development of Muslim Theology, etc. is still useful, 
though our knowledge has expanded considerably since it was written. 
Horten's Die philosophischen S7steme der spekulativen Theologen im 
Islam elms at being s. dictionary of the various theologians which 
brings together under each neme the relevant quotations from al- 
Baghd2d7.'s J ?srq , sl- ShshrestTnl's Ibn El -Aarted2's i;Tu.nye , 
Ibn Tazrn's PiQal End other works. TTnfortunately the work is 
careless and inaccurate with regard to references, end hes many 
idiosyncrasies, but it is still helpful et times. 
Spitte's book on el- A..sh(ari is still the best. Mehren's 
Expos4, published ls.ter but composed sbou.t the same time as Spitte's 
work end without knowledge of it, is little more then e translation 
End summary of Ibn CAs'kir (slso used by Spitta), but contains much 
of the text and gives the list of si-J sh`rri's followers omitted by 
Spitte. The essays of Steiner and Gellend on the Muttezila are 
now quite superseded. (See also the Bibliogrephy.) 
THE OPPO S I NG TRENDS IN ISLAM. 
The primary basis of Islam is the vivid realization of the 
power and majesty of God which came to Muhammad. This experience 
is crystallized in the QuriTn; and the history of the interpretation 
of the Qur' n reflects the growth and development of Muslim thought." 
This applies to the period under consideration as much as to any 
other, but it is obscured by the fact that most of our information 
is only about the conclusions of the arguments and not about the 
arguments themselves. 
The Qur. cTn, however, is not the only basis of Islam, as Muslims 
themselves early recognized. Tradition or Sunna is another basis 
of the same sort, allegedly going back likewise to the experience 
of the Prophet, but being his own inspired sayings end not direct 
revelation. 
From these two the theologians of Islam wove a more or less 
harmonious whole. But if, abandoning the Muslim standpoint for 
thet of the West, we look at them es objectively as we can, and take 
words at their face value, a profound difference is to be traced, 
which it is important for the purposes of this study to make clear. 
1) The Qur'7n. 
In the Qur37,n, regarded as a unitary whole, are to be found both of 
the complementary ideas of Divine s overgnty and human responsibil- 
ity. As Wensinck concludes, after illustrating this "dual aspect 
of the matter", "the advocates of predestination, as well as those 
of free will, could claim a scriptural basis for their view. "= 
a) Human Responsibility. The conception of the Lest Judge- 
ment, which is so prominent, especially in the earlier SUres, would 
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be meaningless ^pert from the presupposition of human responsibility 
p. men must be responsible for what he does, et least in the sense 
that he may justly be rewarded or punished for it. The wernings 
uttered by the Prophet, end his call to repentance, imply in his 
hearers the capacity to respond. 
"And say: 'The truth is from your Lord; so who wills let him 
believe and who wills let him disbelieve'; verily We have pre- 
pared for the wrongdoers a Fire ... But those who have be- 
lieved and done the works of righteousness - verily We do not 
allow to go lost the reward. of any who do well in deed. For 
these ere Gardens of Eden ..." (Q.18,28-30). 
We shall place the balances - justice - on the dey of resur- 
rection ead no one will be wronged at ell; if it be but the 
weight of a grain of mustard -seed We shell produce it." (21,48) . 
"Now today (so. the DE;y of Judgement) no one will be wronged 
at all, nor will ye be recompensed except for what ye have been 
doing." (36,54). 
Thus not only is human responsibility the underlying assumption of 
a. large pert of the C;ur' .n, but it is sometimes explicitly stated - 
Es in the first of these passages. What a men does is his own 
deed and will go on one side of the balances or the other to his 
account. In 21,46f. even tree people who are described as deaf 
to the warning (as if it were not their fault) later admit their 
responsibility for their actions - "0, alas for us : We have been 
wrongdoers." Thus in the Qur' 7n man is clearly presented as a 
responsible agent. 
b) Divine Omnipotence. dust as clearly God is presented 
as the almighty Lord of the Worlds. His omnipotence is based 
on His power of creating. Perhaps the most succinct expression 
is in 42,48f.: 
"To God belongs the sovereignty of the heavens and the earth, 
IIe createth what He pleaseth, giving to whom He pleeseth females 
and to whom He pleaseth males , or conjoining them males end 
females, and He maketh whom He pleaseth barren; verily He hath 
knowledge and power." 
17. 
Men are completely subordinate to this overruling power of God. 
They cannot do anything unless God wills it, Pt least in the sense 
of permitting it. 
"Verily, this (sc. the Qur.n) is P. reminder, and he who wills, 
chooseth to his Lord e way. But ye will not will except it 
be that God willeth , verily God is knowing, wise . " (76 ,29f . ) 
"If thy Lord so willed, aß.11 those in the land would believe 
in a body ... It is not for any person to believe except by 
the permission. of God..." (7.0 , 99f . ) 
"It (sc. the revealed message) is nothing less then a Reminder 
to the worlds , to whoever of you wills to act straight; but ye 
will not so will except it be that God, Lord of the worlds, 
willeth. " (81,27ff. ; cp. 76,291. , 74, 54f. ) 
.At times the statement of the aspect of Divine sovereignty is given 
an extreme form, in which human responsibility appears to be com- 
pletely eclipsed; e.g. in the account of Lot: 
"So We delivered him and his household a'11 except his wife, 
whom We decreed to be of those Who lingered." (27,58) 
c) Beside the primary conceptions of human responsibility 
nd Divine omnipotence, there is P whole series of subordinate ones, 
falling under headings like Guidance, Favour. , Succour, Leading 
Astray, Abandonment, which play a pert in later. discussions. 
.iuha.mmad was greatly concerned that many of those who heard his 
warnings paid no heed to them and did not believe in. God, and. much 
of the Qu.ra :n deals with this problem of belief and unbelief. 
Some passages emphasize the Godwerd aspect. 
"If God will to guide anyone He entargeth his breast for Islam, 
but if He will to send him astray He meketh his breast narrow e nd 
contracted as if he were climbing up into the heaven; thus doth 
God ley the abomination upon those who do not believe." (6,125) 
"Then when they (sc. the people of Moses) swerved, God caused 
their hearts to swerve; God. guideth not the people who are 
reprobates." (61,5) 
"If God had so will , He would have made you one community; 
but He leadeth astray whom He willeth and guideth whom He willetf 
and assuredly ye will be asked about whet ye have been doing." 
(1 L 
1.8. 
"If God help you, no one can overcome you; but if He abandon 
you, who will help you after Mini? Typon God let the believers 
put their trust." (3,154) 
"Had it not been for the bounty and mercy (fall, rahme) of God 
towards you, ye would have followed Satan, except e few." (4,85) 
"Whom God guideth, he is the (rightly) guided ; whom He sendeth 
astray, thous wilt not find for him a patron to set him right." 
(18,16) 
"Had it not been for the bounty End mercy of God towards you, 
not one of you would ever be pure, but God purifieth whom He 
willeth. " (24,21) 
On the other bend, there ere many passages where it is made 
clear that God's guidance and leading astray follow upon men's acts 
of belief end righteousness or unbelief and wickedness, and that 
God's guidance is only effective when men believe in God end ere 
willing to receive the guidance. It is even suggested in the 
first two of the ebove pessages that being led astray by God is s 
sort of punishment for unbelief. Cp. the following verses: 
"As He began you, ye will come egain, He having guided e pert 
end a pert heving justly incurred the penalty of going estrey." 
('7,28) 
"How will God guide e people who have disbelieved after hav- 
ing believed, end. (after) they have testified that the messeng- 
er is true end that the Evidences have come to them? God 
dote not guide the people (who ere) wrongdoers." (3,80) 
"Thereby (sc. by His use of similes) He sendeth many astray and 
guideth many, but He doth not send astray any but the reprobate." 
(2,24) 
"So as for him who gives and shows piety, and counts true the 
best (reward) , We shell assist him to ease. But es for him 
who is niggardly, and prides himself in wealth, and counts false 
the best reward) , We shall assist him to difficulty." (92,5 -10) 
"We wronged them not (sc. those who were punished) but they 
wronged themselves." (11,103) 
"But verily I em forgiving to whomsoever repents and believes 
and acts uprightly, and lets himself be guided." (20,84) 
"Verily those who do not believe in the signs of God., God will 
not guide, and for them is (in store) F. punishment painful." 
(16,106) 
d) The Sealing, etc. The condition of blindness or in- 
ability to comprehend the warnings of God, in which men find them- 
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selves when God has led them astray or abandoned them, is sometimes 
described by saying that God has set e seal or e. lock upon their 
hearts, or by some similar metaphor. Sometimes this. is spoken 
of merely as an exercise of Divine power, but at other times it is 
said to be the outcome of men's unbelief. The following 
passages illustrate this conception. 
"1!s for those who have disbelieved, it is all one whether 
thou hest warned. them or not; they will not believe. God 
teeth set a. seal upon their hearts, and over their hearing end 
their sight is a covering; for them is (in store) a punishment 
mighty." (2,5-6) 
di 
"On that /tWe shell set Gehenna for the unbelievers in array, 
whose eyes have been blindfolded from the remembrance of Me, 
and who were not capable of hearing." (18,100f . ) 
"We never sent E propjet to any town but there overtook the 
people of it bad times and dearth, that meyhap they might humble 
themselves... Had the people of the towns believed and shown 
piety, We should have opened up to them blessings from the 
heaven and the earth, but they counted (the message) false, so 
We seized them for what they had been piling up... has it 
not come home to those who inherit the land after the people 
thereof, that did We so will, We should smite them for their 
sins? But We out e seal upon their hearts so that they do 
not hear. These towns We recount thee the stories of; their 
messengers came to them with the Evidences, but they were not 
such as to believe, because of the disbelief they had previously 
been guilty of; thus does God put e seal upon the hearts of the 
unbelievers." (7,92 -99). 
e) The Term. God, as the Lord of life and death ,3 is 
particularly thought of as fixing the date of a. man's death, or, 
as it is usually celled, his "term" (aja.l) . 
"He it is Who created you of clay and then fixed a. term - 
and a term is stated in His keeping - yet after all ye are La 
doubt." (6,2) 
"Every community ha.s its term, and when its term comes they 
will not stay an hour behind nor will they go in advance." (7,32) 
"God will not defer (the death of) any person when his time 
(a.jel) comes; God is well -informed of what ye do." (63,11) 
f) Sustenance. Sustenance, or God's provision of nourish- 
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ment for His creatures (riza) , is one of the topics commonly dis - 
cuseed by ,,iuslim theologians in connection with predestination. 
So fer es this conception is C;ur'Tnic it is mainly based on the 
verse: 
"There is not a beast in the earth but God is responsible 
for its sustenance; He knoweth its lair end its resting -place; 
everyone is in e. clear book." (11,8) 
These, then, arethe Qur'Tnic conceptions of Divine omnipotence 
and human responsibility, alone with varions subordinate matters. 
The quotations ere, of course, by no means exhaustive, but they ere, 
I think, genuinely represeútstive of the spirit of the Qur'a:n. 
2. The Traditions. 
A survey of even e smell pert of the field of the Traditions 
soon reveals that they contain much material end many conceptions 
which are foreign to the Qur'an. The present section does not 
attempt an exhaustive investigation, but simply gives some illustre- 
tiens , relevant to predestination, of these non- ur'T nic elements. 
a) The Heavenly Decrees - The Pen. A very common idea 
is that everything that happens in the world was written down in 
the distant pest. Sometimes this is seid to be the direct work 
of God, sometimes it takes place through e Pen writing on a Pre- 
served Table.(lewh mahf T) . 
"God wrote down the debrees regarding the create d world fifty 
thousand years before He created the heavens and the earth. "¢ 
"I heard the Apostle of God say (47b2da b. el- SFmit is reported. 
to have said): The first thing God created was the Pen. He 
seid to it: Write. It asked: Lord, whet shell I write? 
He answered: Write the destinies of all things till the edvent 
of the hour. my son, I heard the Prophet of God say: Whoso 
dieth with e belief differing from this , he belongeth not to me. " 
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b) The Things written by the Angel. Another common 
conception, but cuite distinct from the shove, is that while the 
embryo is in the womb certein things ere decreed for it end written 
down by the Engel. In whet is possibly the most primitive form 
there are four things: its sex, its sustenance, its term (or the 
date of its death) , and whether it is to be miseri ble or happy 
(that is, as commonly understood, its eternal destiny - Hell or 
Paradise) . 
"When the embryo has passed two end forty deys in the womb, 
God sends en eagel, who gives it e form end crestes his hearing, 
sight, skin, flesh end bones. This having been 'done, the 
engel asks: 0 Lord, shall this be male or female? Then the 
Lord decrees whet He plesseth, and the angel writes it down. 
Then he esks: 0 Lord, whet shell be his term? Then the Lord 
will say what He pleeseth, and the angel will write it down. 
Thereupon the letter will go away with the scroll_ in his hand, 
and nothing will be added to or subtracted from the decree." 11 
"The Prophet seid: Verily, one of you is gathered together 
in his mother's womb forty days, then he is e clot of blood the 
ser_re time, then en angel is sent to him and four things are 
ordained: his sustenance, his term, whether he is to be 
miserable or happy, (< nd his work) ... "a 
c) The Lest Acts are what matters. 
The Prophet said of so- and -so that he belonged to the people 
of Hell. Some of his followers disbelieved, since the roan 
was fighting in tue thickest of the bottle and covered with 
wounds. But at length the raen could beer the pain no longer, 
and took his spear end put an end to his own life. The 
Prophet said: No one enters Paradise except e believer. 2. 
(The Prophet said:) "A men me. perform the works of the 
dwellers in Paradise for a long time, yet his work may receive 
finally the stamp of that of the dwellers in Hell. Likewise 
a. men may perform the works of the dwellers in Hell for e long 
time, yet his work may finally receive the stamp of that of the 
dwellers in Paradise... The works ere judged only by the 
final ones . "g. 
In line with these thoughts is e. passage usually added to the 
tradition about the things written by the angel. 
(The Prophet said:) "It may be that one of you -performs 
the works of the people of Paradise, so that between him end 
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Paradise there is only the distance of en arm's length. But 
then his book overtakes him end he begins to perform the works 
of the people of dell, the which he will enter. Likewise 
one of you may perform the works of the people of Hell, so that 
between him end Hell there is only the distance of en arm's 
length. Then his book will overteke him end he will begin 
to perform the works of the people of Yeredise, the which he will 
enter. "42, 
d) Whet reaches you could not possibly have missed you. 
(icbn El- Deile.mi said:) "I visited ?Ybeiy b. Kerb and said. to 
him: Doubts concerning predestination heve arisen in my heart. 
Possibly God will make them to vanish if you communicate to me 
e tradition on this subject. He enswered: If God should 
punish the inhabitants of His heavens and His earth, He would 
not thereby do injustice. find if you should spend in the path 
of God an amount larger than mount ?Thud, He would. not accept it 
from you unless you believe in the decree and acknowledge that 
what reeches you could not possibly have missed you, and whet 
misses you could not possibly heve reached you. And if you 
should die in e different conviction, you would go to Hell... 
Then I went to t bdell h b. Mes ̀ üd end heerd the seme from him, 
and likewise from Hudheife b. el- YEmTn. Then I went to Zeid 
b. Thy =bit, who communicated to me similar tradition on the 
eutioritj of the Prophet. "1-- 
e) AO.P.01 and Moses. 
ivloses accused A.dcm, es our fether, of being the cause of our 
expulsion from Paradise. Aden' replied that he had not had 
the favours Moses he d had; would Moses blame him for whet God 
necr fore -ordained (c.eddere) for him before he Was created? 
So Adam preveiled.A. 
3. The Contrast between Qur'Fn and Tradition. 
These tWo sets of cuotetions are sufficient to show that in 
both Qur'gn end Tradition there is something that might be labelled 
"predestine.rien view". Yet when they are examined a little 
more closely, it is clear there is e considerable difference between 
the predestinarian views of these two basses of Islamic thought. 
The distinction, briefly stated , is that in the Qi.zr'rn the 
centre of interest is the majesty and. omnipotence of God, and to 
e lesser extent aan's subordination to this me jestic being; whereas 
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in the Traditions it is the predetermined cher.ecter of men's life 
which is in the forefront, end little attention is given to the 
agency through which the predetermination takes plsce. The 
Qur' T n is through and through theistic ; it is dominated by the 
faith that the course of the world and of human life is controlled 
by s righteous an compassionate Lord, even if His ways are some- 
times inscrutable. The Traditions, though they mention God, 
st times tend to be atheistic. The outstanding fact is that 
human life is controlled and fixed ; the controlling forces are 
mostly thought of as vague, mysterious end impersonal, like the 
Pen and the Book; and may even remain unmentioned, as in the 
statement that "whet reaches you could not possibly have missed 
you. "= 
I want to suggest that the explanation of this is (1) that 
these impersonal_ rnd rather atheistic conceptions belong_ to the 
system of ideas current among the firebs an the surrounding peo- 
ples before the coming of Islam, and (2) that, despite the de- 
nunciation of similar ideas in the Qur'r n, these conceptions con- 
tinued to be held by . uslims, and even, imperceptibly, mEde their 
way into orthodox teaching. 
A thorough -going proof of the first pert of this suggestion 
is beyond the scope of this study; but perhaps such a. proof is 
hardly necessary. As Wensinck puts it: 
"The orthodox doctrine of the heavenly decrees ... has e: 
broad Semitic basis, as is proved by 
. 
Babylonian and Israel - 
itic religious tradition, which regards not only the ways of 
men, but the course of the world as the replica of what had 
been recorded long before in heavenly books or on heavenly 
tablets. ".+ 
A detailed examination, particularly of the views of the 
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_oe-is wes ráß deiin 1881 by young Germn etuderit. LF He traces 
Arab fE- Llism to its root in the conception of Time. 
of the words for "time ", End especially drhr, have the connot- 
ation of "fate". De hr properly means time, he se.:js, 
"yet almost always in such e. way that it is thought of as 
exhibiting a cer_tein power; re rely is it mere Ttme, Time in 
and for itself ... but f.:_lmost without exception it is person- 
ified es. cE.using good or elso bad fortune, es controlling the 
existence of men end doing so in such a way that it is im- 
possible for them to escape from what is in store for them. 
Is not the t 'des tiny' T":" 
Much of this is repented ? nd e1eboreted by no less e person then 
Theodor Nöldeke:2 
"Time in the Ebstrect was popularly imagined to be the 
cruse of all er rthiy happiness end especially of all earthly 
misery... The poets are continually eliuding to the action 
of Time (d ehr, zamgn) , for which they often substitute the 
deys" or "tie nights ". Time is represented as bringing 
misfortune, cc- us ink; perpetuel che.nge , &s biting, wearing 
down, shooting arrows t_ et never miss the merk, hurling 
stones and so forth. In such ceses we are often obliged 
to render "time" by "fate ", which is not quite correct, since 
time is riere conceived PS the determining f 'ctor, not es 
being itself determined by some other power, least of ey.e by 
8, conscious egent. But it must be edmitted that the rrsbs 
themselves do not eiweys clearly distinguish the power of 
Time from that of Destiny pure end simple... The fetelism 
of the poets, es we might expect, is neither clearly formul- 
ated nor consistently cerried out. Rigid dogmas on the 
subject of determinism and free -will were quite out of the 
ceuestion." 
This conception of e.n impersonal Time or Fete, it must be 
edmitted, is not exectly whet we find in the Treditions, yet it 
is thoroughly in line With much of the Traditional me.teriel. 
The ides. in the Traditions of e. predetermined and ineluctable 
course of events is very near to the der of the pre- Islemic 
poets. The fact that the letter conteetion is explicitly 
61,6 -bt terrr..e !f 
denounced in the Qur /Fn might eccount for thenebsence of the 
term in generally accepted Treditions: 
"They say: 'There is nothing but this present life of ours; 
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we die and we live, and it is only Time (daiir) which destroys 
us.'" (45,23). 
The contra.st between the theistic predestinarian views of 
the Qur, á.n and the pre -Islamic conception of en impersonal Time - 
Fate is more clearly understood wherfit is seen in the light of 
the whole range of the conflict between the religion of :vTunt+mmed 
a-_nd the outlook of his contemporaries. In the opening chapter 
of his MutiammedanischeAStudien, Goldziher designates the oppos- 
ing attitudes by the words Muruww (ma.nliness) and vin (religion). 
Though they agreed in some particulars, such es sincerity end. 
truthfulness, for the most part their conceptions of virtue were 
contrcry to one another. The Arabs believed in retribution, 
with 
in paring back evilAORM evil, but ivAih mmr.d preached forgiveness; 
he plc.ced limitations on their use of wine end women; he instit- 
uted prayers, which they considered unmanly. But right in 
the forefront of his account of Muruwwe Goldziher sets e de- 
it 
scription of the world-view on whichAwes based: 
"Tile warrior of central í r.abie glories in his high courage 
end the bravery of his companions; it does not occur to him 
to be grateful to higher powers for his successes - though he 
does not completely exclude the recognition of their domin- 
ation. Onli the thought of the necessity of death, the 
result of da:)r to day experience which he cannot shut out from 
his mind, stirs up in him grim thoughts of the Me nU ys. or 
Mani na, the.t is, the powers of Fete, which, oper.eting blindly 
End wi .hout consciousness of their goal, yet with inevitabil- 
ity, are able to bring to nought all the plans of mortals; 
good fortune increases his egoism end heightens his self - 
confidence, but is not in the least suited to leed him to 
religion. "4 
The context of thejpessage 6f the Cur' n already quoted makes 
it quite clear that whet is being attacked is not merely e. theory 
about the cause of death, but the whole way of life based on the 
denial of the Judgement and the future life. 
"Or do t..ose who have le-id evil deeds to their account 
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reckon that We shall make them ES those who have believed end 
wrought the works of righteousness, alive their life end their 
death? BEd is what they judge: 
God hath cre ted the heavens and the eerth in truth, End 
that each one may be recompensed for whet he nes piled up; and 
they will not be wronged. 
II..s one considered him who hes taken as his god his own 
desire end whom God hath sent astray on the basis of knowledge, 
End upon whose hearing and hea-.rt He bath set a. seal, and over 
whose eyes He he.th placed r, covering? So who will guide 
him after God (ha.th given him up) ? Will ye not then be re- 
minded? 
They sey: 'There is nothing but this present life of ours; 
we die end we live, end it is only Time which destroys us.' 
They heve no knowledge in regard to thet; they only form opin- 
ions. 
.And when Our signs are recited to them es evidences , their 
only & rgument is: 'Produce our fathers, if ye speak the truth.' 
Say: 'God giveth you life, then He causeth you to die, then 
He gathereth you to the day of resurrection, of which there is 
no doubt. But most of the people do not know.' 
To God belongs the sovereignty of trie heavens and the earth, 
nd on the day when the hour arises, then shall lose the work- 
ers of vanity. 
And one will see er ch community kneeling, each community 
called to its Book: ' Todey ye will be recompensed for wfzat ye 
have been doing.'" (45,20-27). 
What is here denounced is the attitude, by no means restrict- 
ed to Arabia, of "Let us eet, drink and be merry, for tomorrow we 
die." It is to this whole prEcticel end religious ettitude 
thet the term "fatalism" is properly applied, and not simply to 
the theoretical view thet the course of events is predetermined. 
When e man believes thet everything in his Life is fixed sireedy, 
or at least all the importent things , he lies little incentive to 
make any strenuous efforts for anything. He will drift along, 
following whichever impulse happens to be uppermost et the moment, 
taking the wary of pleasure end of avoidance of pein; he will choose 
the easier path, end will not even attempt the difficult or incon 
venient things, because he hes no belief in their possibility. 
his resignation to fate will include acceptance of much that is 
by no mares inevitable. 
Whatever about the predestine tien views of may be thought 
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the Qur' Tn, there can be no doubt that it is firmly set against 
this attitude of fatalism, witn all its excuses for evading the 
duties imposed by the Divine law. 
"When one says to them: `Contribute of what God hEth provid- 
ed you with,' those who have disbelieved say to those who have 
believed: 'Shall we feed. him whom if God willed He would feed? 
You are only .in manifest error.'" (36,47) 
Then the judgement upon stitch wrongdoers is described. The 
Qu.r' nic insistence on the majesty, might and inscrutability of 
God does indeed lead to a practical attitude, but it is one that 
would be best described. as a sense of creotureli'ess, of absolute 
dependence on a Being fe r transcending oneself. He is God. 
with Whom one can tote refuge. =° 
"If God touch thee with harm, no one can lift it sway but He, 
end if He intends (to give) thee good, no one can turn back His 
bounty; He causeth it to fall upon whomsoever of His servants 
He willeth. He is the Fo.rigving, the Compessione-te . " (10,107) 
But this sense of dependence can never leed to inactivity, since 
God has also imposed duties upon men and has mede them known to 
men through His prophets. 
These considere tions give plausibility to the suggestion made 
shove that the impersonal and atheistic conceptions of the prede- 
termined mature of human life found in the Traditions belong to 
the system of ideas current in 1AAra.bia. before Islam. For the 
suggestion to be true it is not necessary tha=t the materiel in the 
Traditions should be found in exactly the some form before the time 
of _Huhammed. It m. y be - in some cases probably is, I think - 
an expression first given to the pre -Islamic or fatalistic attitude 
in an Islamic environment. We must therefore examine the Trad- 
itions to see whether they approve or disapprove of fatalism. 
It is perhaps not very surprising that what we actually find is 
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very considerable divergence. 
There are many Trditions which L.re ellite definitely fatal- 
istic in their tendency. The story of the dispute between Adana 
end. lvioses (in section 2,e above) commends sheer fatalism rid the 
denial of all human responsibility. The conception of the 
heavenly decrees (2,e) rather tends to foster fatalism, though 
this tendency is somewhat modified when they ere regarded as the 
work of. God. Himself and not of the impersonal Pen; this is presum- 
ably a. case where Islamic thought accepted end attempted to trans- 
form whet it could not wholly erad ica.te . In view of the imper- 
sonal forni of expression the statement thet "what reaches you 
could. not possibly have missed you ..." (2,d.) would seem to belong 
to the fatalistic system of ideas, and in some versions is not 
even attributed to the Prophet himself,s! yet it is a statement 
that can easily be given an Islamic connotation, and indeed it wes 
to 
incorporated i& several orthodox creeds.2 There is e distinct- 
ly fatalistic background . to the Traditions about e man being over- 
taken by his book (2,c) , like the man who appeared to be e good 
Muslim warrior but who forfeited. Paradise through taking his own 
lìfe;but these have probably also another purpose, which will be 
discussed presently. 
That covers four of the divisions of section 2. In co trast, 
the rem.sining one (g,b) rather presents a modified fatalism. 
According to this, not everything that a man does is [redetermined, 
but only the date of his death and the outcome or general effect 
of his activity, namely, his happiness or miserfy. Such a 
modified fatalism probably corresponded most closely to the out- 
look of the average "warrior of central Arabia ". He did not 
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doubt Luis owl power to act; but he ,P5 7i.reltnet frecuditry, 
through no apparent f iiure or deficiency on his pert, his schemes 
did not come to fruition; end he sew now deth put en end to cil 
his schemes. tie could indeed do meny things, but certe in high- 
ly important things were fixed, end no action of his could c lter 
them. 
A difficulty i connection with these Traditions about 
the things written by the angel while the child is in the womb is 
that they mention the future life apparently, c.lthough it wes char - 
acteristic of the fatalists denounced in the Qur'.n that they held 
there wee nothing beyond this life. It is certainly conceiva.bie 
that the words "whether he is toAmisereble of happy" were origin - 
ally interpreted in the way in which a Auslim would naturally 
interpret them, as referring to Hell and Paradise; it is no pert 
of my brief to prove that all Traditions ere fe.telistic. But 
there is also nothing to prevent a. person who did not believe in e. 
future life from interpreting the words es referring solely to this 
life. That is to say, these Traditions mey ou.ite possibly con - 
tein -ore -Islamic materiel edepted to Muslim id.ees.4., The words 
"end his work", w rich occur in some forms of the Tradition, might 
also be an adaptation to Muslim conceptions of the Judgement of 
a man's actions. 
The Traditions collected under the title "The last eats are 
whet matters" (2,c) imply acceptance of the conceptions of the 
Judgement and of the future life, a.nd are perhaps to be regarded 
as a fusion of ;Muslim and pre -Islamic ideas. They cling to the 
pre - 
idea that a man's eternal destiny is irrevocably peeterl fined, but 
his assignment to Paradise or Hell is justified by the acts which 
11.3. 3 . 
which he himself has performed towards the close of his life. 
Whet is predetermined is prime rily the final acts of his life; 
the rest follows from that. The net effect is fatalistic, but 
lip- setvice is paid to the Muslim conception of human responsibil- 
ity. (It is worth noting that the idea of eternal punishment 
for e single gmftumn grave sin is in line with the doctrines of 
the Khe.wEri j . ) 
There is another Tradition, apparently in accordance with the 
sarrrdline of thought as this one, in which the Çur'2.nic conceptions 
tint God guides men and leads them astray ere adapted to the 
fatalistic outlook. 
"A man said: 0 Prophet of God, do you know the people of 
Paradise from the people of Hell? The Prophet said: Yes. 
The man seid; And why do people act? The Prophet said: 
Tveryone ects according to whet has been creeted for* him or 
made easy for him."22- 
This is still essentially fatalistic, for men is regarded as hav- 
ing no effective control over his acts; yet sage attempt is made 
to find a place within the deterministic scheme for the perform- 
ance of the duties imposed by God. 
A somewhat similar Tradition comes nearer to the abandonment 
of fatalism. 
"Then the Apostle of God seid: There is no living soul for 
which God has not appointed its place in Paradise or Hell, and 
the decision of happy or unhappy has already been taken. Then 
a man said: 0 Apostle of God, shall we not then leave all to 
our book and give up works? Milammad answered: Whosoever 
belongs to the people of happiness will come to the works of 
the people of happiness, and whosoever belongs to the people of 
unhappiness will come to the works of the peQle of unhappiness.- 
Then he said: Perform works, , for everyone is guided, the peo- 
ple of happiness are guided to the works of the people of 
happiness, and the people of unhappiness to the works of the 
people of unhappiness. Thereupon he recited: 'So es for 
him who gives and shows piety, and counts true the best (re- 
ward) , We shell assist him to ease; but es for him who is nig- 
gardly, prides himself in wealth, and counts false the best 
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(reward) , We snail assist him to difficulty.' " x 
The first pert of this is fatalistic, but time co Lland. "Perform 
works" attempts to steer men sway from the moral consequences of 
deterministic theory. The motive suggested, however, which might 
be paraphrased ES: "since works are a sign of the lot predetermined 
for a man," still does not fulLy admit human responsibility. 
The verses of the Qur'an, "which are anti-fatalistic, are thus 
twisted end made to fit in with semi -fatalistic conceptions. 
21.nother Tradition of the carne family, however, cuite definitely 
rejects the inactivity associated with fatalism, and does so on 
less suspect grounds. 
"The Prophet said: There 
Paradise is not written. 
red.ign ourselves (so. and do 
that. Everyone is helped. 
who gives and shows piety, a. 
We shall assist him to ease 
is no one whose sect in Hell or 
Someone said : Shell we not then 
nothing) He seid: Do not do 
And he recited: 'So se for hire 
ad counts true the best (reward), 
... "a7 
There is doubtless e fatalistic ring about the opening sentence, 
though it might also be merely descriptive. But the command 
"do not do that , wver,fone is helped ," implies that the future is 
still in some sense open, and therefore activity meen4Lful. 
Though Wensinck's assertion thet "Tradition has not preserved 
c. single giedith in which liberum arbitrium is advocated" is true 
in the main, it is almost certainly too sweeping. Consider 
the saying of the Prophet reported by al- BukhErT : 
"There is no 'caliph' who does not have two courtiers , one 
ordering and inciting him to good, and tkm one to bed; and the 
protected is he whom God protects. "=F 
The purpose of this Tradition, as of the Çur'.ni.c conceptions of 
God's favour, protection, and the like, is not theoretical but 
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are forces _:Zt in tie .universe assisting them, <;.nd that 
therefore their .lora1 striviïl; is not fruitless. 
Al --Bukh .ri)s section on Qader also contains two Traditions 
in which consolation and comfort of an anti- fet_:.iistic sort are 
derived from the fact that all things ere determined by God. 
"There carne to the Prophet the messenger of one of his 
daughters with word that her son was at the point of death. 
The Prophet sent the message : What God took is His own, and 
what God gave is His own; each according to His term; so let 
her bear patiently and endure." 
"The Prophet, on being asked about the plague, said: God 
sent it as e punishment to whom He would , end He made it 
blessing to the believers; ; for any servant (sc. of God) in any 
place who re:rolned there and was patient, reflecting that only 
What God he.s written will befall him, will teceive the like 
reward as for martyrdom. "A° 
The trust in an almighty and compassionate Lord, expressed espec- 
ially in the second of these, is poles spart from the hopeless 
resignation that accompanies belief in an impersonal fate. 
This examination of Muslim Traditions in respect of their 
approval or disapproval of fatalistic tendencies yields interest- 
ing results. The predominant tendency is to uphold. not merely 
the view that human life is predetermined, but also the whole 
fatalistic outlook on life current among the Arabs of the J -5.hiliya, 
but stigmatized by Muhammad. There are also traces of attempts 
to harmonize the antagonistic outlooks, but the fatalistic tones 
remain mdst noticeable. Finally there are a few Traditions 
which support the Qur)ffnic position and more or less resolutely 
oppose the inactivity and drift of fatalism. 
When we find that Tradition provides strong advocacy for the 
very fatalism so vigorously attacked in the Qu.r' in, it is diffic- 
ult to resist the conclusion that the religious thinking of many 
,uslims continued 
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in its fatalistic mould long after they had with their lips con- 
fessed t ±lr?.t there is no god but God and that jniharimed is His Fraphet. 
What makes the problem harder, however, is that prominent Muslims 
of unexceptionable orthodoxy accepted these fatalistic Traditions 
as genuine. Yet even so the conclusion forces itself upon us. 
Perhaps as this study progresses it will throw some further 
light on the question. At any rate the stage is now set. In 
the pattern of Islamic theology, to vary the metaphor, we have to 
trace two interwoven sets of strands: (1) the contrast between 
the Qur'Emic conceptions of Divine omnipotence and human respons- 
ibility, and (2) the contrast between the religious and moral 
attitudes of pre -Islamic fatalism and the Qur'2.nic sense of creat- 
ureliness or dependence on God. 
(NOTE. It has to be ¿admitted that there are pE s sa ges in 
the Qur'n which embody conceptions very similar to those which 
have been held to be characteristic of Tradition - notably those 
in sections 1,e and 1,f about the Term and Sustenance. But 
these do not really contradict the thesis that has been maintained. 
In the first place, these conceptions do not imply that the 
whole of a man's life is predetermined, and therefore do not make 
the fatalistic attitude necessary.' They mar in some cases lead 
to a certain degree of fatalism, but they do not necessarily do so; 
on the contrary the; are quite compatible with a truly Islamic (or 
indeed Ciaristian) sense of dependence on God and submission to his 
will. 
just as 
Then, in the second place , nreligious truth can come to a men, 
in s0 
-+- -p.ap apt.. onlyne language that he knows, loctpcleo xmkr it can come 
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to him only in, terms of conceptions with which he is familiar. 
In order to impress e religious message on e. man he must be ad- 
dressed in terns of the world -view he already accepts - et least 
in respect of everything which is not the primary and essential 
message. If you went to convey a. rnessege about brotherhood to 
ran who believe that the sun moves round the earth, you are care- 
fu.l not to entangle your message with whrt they would consider 
heresies about the earth moving round the sun. The message of 
the Çur'En is that this world is created and governed by a single 
supreme power which is righteous, and th= t therefore the right - 
eousness or wickedness of men's conduct is of eternsl import. 
The conceptions of &jí: . end rize were part of the world -view of 
the hr bs whom Mulisrmna.d addressed ; they were not obviously at vEri- 
ance with the main message of the Qur'án, but could even be inter- 
preted so elp to confirm it. 'ven if one considered them pertly 
false, there is no great reason for avoiding them; and is it clear 
that they are any more misleading than the modern Western con- 
ception of Freedóm, which makes man forget his dependence on God.? 
Whether in the course of centuries these conceptions would weaken 
the truly Islamic attitude in its struggle with pre -Islamic fatal- 
ism is another çuestion. ) 
35. 
III 
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE DOCTFINE OF QADAE. 
The writers of the "books of sects; on whom we ere mainly de- 
pendent for our knowledge of the course of theological discussion 
during the first two centuries or so of Islam, differed. very con- 
siderably in outlook and interests from the Western scholar of the 
twentieth century. Their materials, too, for the earliest period 
were rather scanty. Consequently much "spade work" has to be 
done before the special points which interest the twentieth century 
can be brought together and interpreted. :Aloft of the present 
chapter will be spent in the collection of material. 
1. The KhewTrij. 
a) Madman and Shutaib. 
One of the fullest and most interesting rassa.ges dealing with 
the early discussions is the story of Maiman and Shu`alb: 
"The fifth sect of the ty,1Frida. is the Shuteiblya, the disc- 
iples of Shutaib. He was one who dissociated himself from 
yaiman and his doctrine. He asserted that no one is capable 
of doing anything except what God wills , end that the acts of 
men are created by God. 
The root of the separation of the Shutaibiya and the Ma.imûn- 
Iya was that Shutaib had some money belonging to Naimún, the 
repayment of which he demanded. Shutaib said to him: I shall 
give it to you, if God will. MaimUn replied: God has willed 
that you should give it to me now. Shutaib said: If God 
had willed it, I could not have done otherwise than give it to 
you. MaimUn said: Verily, God hü.s willed what He commanded; 
what He did not command, He did not will; and what He did not 
will, He did not command. 
Then some followed MaimUn end others Shutaib; and they wrote 
to tAbd al -Karim b. `A.jarrad (so. the head of the `AjErida) , who 
was held in prison by }h.älid b. tiA.bdall7.h e.l- Bajsli. When 
the dispute of Maimün and Shutaib was made known to him, t l bd 
al -Karim wrote: Our doctrine is that what God willed came about, 
and what He did not will did not come about; and we do not fix 
evil upon God. This letter reached them at the time of the 
death of tAbd al- Karim. Meimun claimed that his view had 
been approved in that it was seid, wwe do not fix evil upon God ", 
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while Shu'aib claimed that tAbd al-Karim had rather approved 
of his view in so far as he had said, "what God willed came 
about, and whet He did not will did not come about." Thus 
they both associated themselves with tAbd al-Karim, but dissoci- 
ated themselves from one another. "= 
With this may be compared a previous passage giving the 
views of Ma imün: 
"The second sect of the tAjrida is the Maimúniya. 
Peculiar to them is their assertion of Qadar in accordance with 
the view of the Muttazila. God, they considered entrusts 
(fawwarja) acts to men, and gives them the capacity (istit0a ) 
for performing all the duties imposed on them. They are 
capable both of disbelieving and of believing. God has no 
will (mashi'a.) in respect of the acts of men, and the acts of 
men are not created by God. " / 
This story of Maimún and Shutaib does not sound like the ac- 
count of an historical event, but might be a later attempt to ex- 
plain how sects with diametrically opposite views both claimed to 
be the descendants of 'Abd al- Karim b. 'Ajarra.d. Yet the story 
probably contains genuine information about the early discussions 
on Qadar. 
The account of the views of Shu' aib is the least satisfactory 
part. Nothing is known about him apart from the notice of his 
views which precedes the story, and that contains nothing which 
might not be derived from the story; there is no distinctive ex- 
pression; the account of him is couched in the terms commonly used 
to describe the later orthodoxy, and only signifies that some 
later writer regarded him as a forerunner of the orthodox view.1" 
The part played by Shutaib in the story savours mainly oflthe old 
fatalism, since the impression given is that he invokes the Omni* 
potence of God to justify his own avoidance of duty. 
The letter of 'Abd al- Karim b. tAjarrad is quite different 
and shows an outlook both more balanced and ,much nearer to the 
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Çur) gn. God is certainly omnipotent, but God is also righte- 
ous; both these truths must be adhered to. The views of both 
viaimún and Shuteib are thus one-sided. 
Melmün represents those who are primarily concerned with the 
righteousness or goodness of God. In the anecdote his essenti- 
al assertion is that God's will and God's command are one; God's 
command is the st?nda.rd of right action, and cannot be evil; 
since God commandss the repayment of debts, it is evil not to re- 
pay them; so Shu' aib's contention that his non -payment of the 
debt is through the will of God "fixes evil upon God." Since 
evil does not proceed. from )the will of God it must be due to man; 
therefore God must have entrusted to man the acts in which evil 
may appear. Such at least seems to be the line of argument 
behind the account of the views of Maimün. The fact that 
Ma.imûn's view is said to similar to that of the iriuttazila shows 
that the notice comes from G. source much later than but 
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the use of the uncorìmimr word fawwada (entrusts) gives ground for 
holding that early material has been incorporated. 
The little that we know beyond this of the position of Niaimi n. 
is quite in keeping. He is probably to be identified with the 
Maimn who disputed wit h one Ibr ..him over the purchase of female 
slaves from one's opponents .3 The IKhaw7ri j were mostly very 
exclusive, and only "were friends with" those who agreed with them 
exactly in all their views; to take women from any milieu into 
their houses and possibly have children by them was clearly to 
imperil purity of doctrine in the community. On this point, 
therefore, Maimün would stand for moral strictness against laxity. 
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On the other hand, ivieimiin is reported to have permitted marriages 
"within the forbidden degrees "; end. al- BeghdrdI is so greatly 
shocked at this that he excludes Mejmün from the community of Isla.m4 
The point, however, probably does not indicate laxity, but is 
simply a. corollary of the search for women with pure doctrine, 
since these are most likely to be found in one's own family.- 
The further reportbthat Maid-in held that the children of 
unbelievers or polytheists are in Paradise by itself means little, 
but in the context of the whole development of the i.cxiji posi- 
tion it points to another line of thought leading to the doctrine 
of Qader. .
b) The Development of Khärij3 Thought. 
The KhawFrij were one of the "religio- political opposition 
parties" under the ?Tmaiyads, originally domiciled mainly in tIr.`2g. 
They grew out of the Qur'En reciters, a. loosely -knit body of men 
found. in Syria. as well es in They were of course no 
longer Beduins, but had sprung from the desert tribes rather then 
from the Quraish.= It is not surprising, then, that they were 
very individualistic and found almost any governmental restraint 
irksome. 
The first of the Khawá.rij are generally reckoned to be the 
TI:,uhakkima or Muhakkimún, who seceded from `ALT after the battle 
of Siffin. Their motto of le hukm illy li- 'llr.h (the decision 
is God's alone) meant that all matters were to be decided by re- 
ference to the word of God, about which they seemed to think there 
would be no difficulty. This was idealism, but idealism that 
could easily degenerate into fanaticism, end idealism that opened 
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the WE y to disruptive tendencies, since the practical effect of 
making the Qur' än by itself the ultimate standard was to make each 
strong leader a law unto himself. 
Yet the Khaw2ri j were profoundly important for the whole 
development, for at the centre of their theological teaching was 
the conception of a righteous God Who demands righteousness from 
His subjects - thet element of Islamic doctrine which the Arabs and 
their neighbours were most in danger of forgetting. Even the 
Imám was subject to the Divine law and liable to deposition if he 
disobeyed it - indeed it was a duty to thrust him out.1 
The secession of the kit Muhakkima took place in 37 A.H. 
During the next twenty years or so we read of various risings by 
rh.aw«ri j in Ufa and Basra, but we are given no details of the 
theological views of these men. In 61, after the flight of 
eUbeidallgh, the strong governor of Basra under Yezid, several 
exiles returned thither, including N fi` b. Azrsq, `Abdrll2h b. 
Seffár, el;bdallE!h b. Ib5 d end Hanzala b. Bellies, each of whom 
become the founder of a. sect.°' 
N fi` b. i-zraq pushed to extremes the conception of the 
supremacy of the Divine law. Al- Ashta.ri/s account!). deals mainly 
with the discussions originating in Basra about this time, and he 
says that Nä.fi` was the first to introduce novel doctrines. In 
particular these were: dissociation from the qa'G da (those who 
"stayed at home ") , a test for those who wanted to enter his camp, 
and e. declaration of the unbelief of those who did not come out to 
campaign with him.d In other words, it is a duty for everyone 
to take part in the struggle against the enemies of God. But 
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since, in their eyes, what is not white is black, and those who 
disagree with them are not white, the enemies of God came to in- 
clude not only the heathen, but even large numbers of the people 
of the Qibla. He would not countenance tagïya (prudent fear) , 
which in practice meant the hiding of one's true colours from 
reasons of expediency; no ore could be his follower who did not 
go out and share the risks of battle with him. 
But though this fanatical intransigence arouses little sym- 
pathy in us, we ought to recognize that the conception of the 
Divine law was still central. Those who committed grave sins 
were unbelievers, excluded from the community and punished in Hell. 
But the excessive emphasis laid on the duty of fighting for the 
community against its enemies seems to have brought with it some 
relaxation of the ordinary social duties; at least we are told that 
the punishment of stoning was done away with in certain cases. 
Some of the Baihasiya were apparently just as fierce as the 
Az .rica, the followers of Náfit b. Izraq ;'=they approved killing 
the people of the Qibla and taking their goods, and declared that 
killing and taking captive were lawful in all circumstances. In 
connection with Ibráhim's contention that it was lawful to buy 
femRle slaves from unbelievers, and Ma.imiTn's denial of this, the 
leader of the Baihasiya (in the Maoá.lgt .pbü Baihas) held (1) that 
Maimlzn was a,i unbeliever because he made it unlawful and dissociated 
himself from those who allowed it, (2) that those who suspended 
judgement on the question were unbelievers since they did not admit 
that Ibrahim was right and Maimûn an unbeliever, and (3) that Ibrr- 
him was an unbeliever because he did not dissociate himself from 
those who suspended judgement i n view of their suspension of judge- 
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ment End. refusal to associate themselves with Lim and dissociate 
themselves from Me.imun.t This is a. lovely exemple of the petty 
ona fissiparous character of Khäriji thought (though% there may be 
more in the transaction than meets the eve); yet even so there is 
stili the same fundamental principle of reverence for the Divine 
I w. 
A milder tendency sets in with the Na ja.dst or NajdTya, the 
followers of Najda b. tf.mir al- Ilanafi, who came into prominence 
later than the AzTriça, but had shot their bolt and been well -nigh 
exterminated by 73, whereas the AzEriga maintained themselves in 
the East until 78.. Najda permitted "prudent fear" at least in 
word, and he did not expect everyone to join with him in the fight 
against the unbelievers; this was a. work of supererogation, praise- 
worthy but not incumbent on all, so that "staying at home" (qu1úd) 
was not a sin. At the same time he seems to have been lenient 
in respect of impulsive acts of sin. Some of the tAwfiya, e 
branch of the Baiha.siya., also did not dissociate themselves from 
those who returned from the holy we to a state of "staying at home; 
"because they return to a thing that is lawful. "Is' 
With tAbd al -Karim b. tAjarrad and the `AjWrida. we reach a. 
truer conception of the supremacy of the Divine law. (Abd a1- 
Karim appears to have been influenced both by Najda and by 1!b171 
Baihas." The inststence on upright conduct, through its implic- 
ation that a man's eternal destiny in Paradise or Hell depended on 
that, now began to bear fruit. You associated with the "people 
of Paradise "; you dissociated yourself from the "people of Hell ", 
and possibly also fought against them. 
man was responsible for what he did. 
This presupposed that a. 
how th0q, were you to treat 
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children, who on account of their immaturity were unable to act 
responsibly? 
Nhri` b. al -Azraá - possibly still influenced by the old. con- 
ception of religion as a family and tribal matter - held that the 
children of believers and unbelievers went to Paradise and Hell 
respectively, and that therefore it Was right to kill the children 
(and wives) of unbelievers.' This view appears to have been 
adhered to by most other hh.aw .ri j - they even discussed whet happen- 
ed to children whose fathers changed from one group to the other 
after the children's death2 - until the time of `Äbd al -Karim b. 
`A_ ja.rra.d, who began to realize that such e view is incompatible 
with the supremacy of morality and its corollary of personal re- 
sponsibility. He saw that children could not be said to belong 
to the community of the. faithful till they had been summoned to 
Islam and had professed it for themselves, and that this could not 
happen till they were mature.a 
The logic of this train of thought was ineviteble , yet it was 
not easily accepted. According to al- Shahrastrnï, tAbd al -Karim 
himself still clung to the view that the children of heathen parents 
shared their doom; one ought to take up the attitude of "dissoci- 
ation" (ba.rä'a) even towards the children of believers who were not 
yet of age to profess Islam.# An important member of the 
`AjErida, Thaclaba, held that, until children both of believers 
and of unbelievers had made a decision for themselves after being 
summoned to Islam, the correct attitude towards them was one of 
neutrality, neither "association" nor enmity nor "dissociation ".1! 
It was apparently Ma.imu -_n who went farthest in this direction añd 
argued that, since the children of unbelievers had committed no 
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no sin, and in particular had not been summoned to Islam and. had 
then refused, they must be in Paradise.V. 
Cognate with the problem of children was that of ignorance of 
the Divine law. A story about Najda's son and his army mis- 
appropriating booty and being pardoned on making a plea. of ignor- 
ance serves to introduce a distinction between the religious know- 
ledge which is essential and that which is not.13 AbU Baihas 
and the Ba.ihas i.ya. were also occupied with this point. They 
allowed suspension of judgement in dealing with problems which no 
Muslim had hitherto experienced; but once a particular case had - 
occurred, everyone who was aware of it was bound to know who had 
decided truly aboutAand who fa.lsely.12- A.bú Bathes is also seid 
to have held that in some cases knowledge of a thing by name is 
sufficient without knowledge of its interpretation and essence 
(tafeira;hu wa- 'aina -hu) , but when a case of the thing occurs, a 
man must suspend judgement in absence of clear knowledge; but he 
would presumably have held that, when a man did something wrong in 
ignorance, he was blameworthy for not taking sufficient pains to 
inform himself. A branch of the Baihasiya apparently received 
their nickname of "Ashb.b al- Su'á.l" or "Questioners" from insisting 
that, though complete knowledge of all the details of the Divine 
law was not essential to being a Muslim, when a man came up against 
an action about which he was not sure, he must ask; after this 
question ignorance would no longer be permitted.' 
The development of Kh-5.ri jI doctrine about children and about 
ignorance shows how the conception of the righteous God demanding 
righteousness from rtis creatures leads by an irresistible logic 
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to the doctrine of human responsibility with its corollary the 
doctrine of Qadar, namely that man has power to perform the duties 
imposed on him. Thus the doctrine of Qadar grows naturally 
out of one side of the teaching of the Qur' Kn.7 
c) Other sects of the Khawârij. 
It .Ls not surprising, then, that several sects of the Khawdri j 
are said to have held the doctrine of Qadar besides the MaimUniya; 
but except in the case of the latter we are given no details of 
their view. Al- Ash`ari contents himself with the following 
brief notices: 
"The J3amzTya. ... affirm the doctrine of the I+7aimúniya, 
about Qadar." 
"The Ma`lümiya ... hold that the acts of men are not 
created, that the capacity accompanies the act, and that nothing 
comes about except whet God has willed." 
"The disciples of lI .rith al -Ib4 I ... hold the doctrine of 
the Muttazila on the question of Qadar, and differ in this 
from the rest of the Ibô.dïya.; they consider that the capacity 
precedes the act." 
"The As ab al-Su' ál ... hold the doctrine of the Yuttazila. 
about Qadar." tß 
On the other hand it has to be admitted that many of the 
Khawá.rij opposed these views. Besides the Shu'taibîye, al- 
as holding the 
Ash`arT. mentions the Khalaf!ya, Kh.zim!ya. and Majhizliyf 
A 
voluntaristm view ( which he calls the doctrine of IthbK.t or 
t-affirmation ") .' 
This opposition to the doctrine of Qadar does not nullify 
what has been said about the logical connection of this doctrine 
with the fundamental conceptions of the KhewKrij. There is no 
trace of opposition from a truly Islamic motive, unless it be in 
tAbd al- Karim b. `Aja.rred's insistence on the supremacy of God. 
Shutaib's outlook was seen to be somewhat fatalistic. Of the 
III,1,0. 45. 
other sects mentioned, the KhAzimiya (the one of whom the fullest 
account is given) seems to be influenced by pre -Islamic ideas. 
"The sixth sect of the tAjárida is the Kházimiya. Peculi- 
ar to them is their assertion of the doctrine of Ithbá.t in re- 
spect of the Qadar; and also that friendship and enmity are 
attributes of God in Ilis essence, and that God counts men His 
friends in accordance with what they come to, even if in most 
of their circumstances they were believers." 
The somewhat Lague phrases of the last clause refer quite defin- 
itely in my opinion to the doctrine found in the Traditions that 
men are judged by their last acts - a doctrine closely linked 
with pre -Islamic fatalism.'° 
d) Dates. 
So far as it is possible to estimate dates, it would seem 
that the Maimúniya and the Ins }ì b s1 -Su'Til were the earliest of the 
late 
Khawárij to hold the doctrine of Qadar. The IHamziya arensecond 
century.= The Maalúmiya are probably about the same time, for, 
if the text is correct, they would appear to be trying to find a 
compromise between the opposing views There is nothing to 
suggest that H ,rith al -Ib .di is early. The As hfb al-Su' á1, on 
the other hand, are the disciples of Shabib al- Najrani, who is to 
be identified with Shabib b. Yazid al- Shaibäni, drowned in 77 after 
the defeat of his rising.31 And I4laimffn is also early. Khbaid 
b. tAbdalläh was governor of (Iraq from 105 to 120, and since cAbd 
al -Karim b. CA jarrad was held in prison by him when he wrote the 
letter referred to, the dispute between Maimún and Shu(a.ib must 
have taken place in that period. But, if we assume that he is 
the same person who disputed with Ibrffhîm, then we know that his 
views were condemned by Abia Baihas, and the latter was put to death 
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in the days of Valid, 86-96, after having been active in Basra. 
since 61.E Thus there is possibly no great difference of date 
between Maimun and the Ashäb al -Su' á.i . 
2. Ghailä.n and the lVIurj i' a . 
This study has first considered the I.awgrij because it is 
easiest in their case to understand the logickl relations of the 
doctrine of Qadar. The traditional view, however, wa.s that 
the discussions about Qadar were started by Macba.d al- Juhani and 
continued by a follower of his, Ghs.ilz.n al Dimashci (Abtä. Ma.rw.n) . 
It will be convenient to deal with Gha.ilbn first. 
Perhaps the chief fact about him in this connection is that 
he was put to death by the caliph Hish`sm (105 -125) because of his 
Çadari views - or at least so it is alleged. Al- Tabari's 
account is not very illuminating, for all we are told of the debate 
between Ghailan and one Maimun b. Mihran, who had been commissioned 
by Hishám to refute Ghailán, is that the latter asked, "Does God 
will that sins should be committed?", to which Ma.imiin retorted, 
"Are they committed against His will?", whereupon Gha.ilân was 
silenced. =F 
The fullest account of his views is that of al- Ash(ari: 
"It is not said of the acts of men that God willed them when 
they did not come about, but neither is it said that He did not 
will them; but if they do come about it is permissible to say 
that He willed them. Of a human act, when it is one of 
obedience, it is said that God willed it in its time (sc. at 
the time of its occurrence) ; when it is one of disobedience, 
it is said that He did not will it. He held it permissible 
to say that God willed a thing which did not come about, and that 
something came about which He did not will. He denied that 
God wills that His creatures should obey Him before they obey 
Him, or wills that they should not disobey Him before theydis- 
obey Him. Everything belonging to God's activity comes 
about just when He wills it; if He does not will it, it does 
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not come about. He allowed that God does things although 
He did not will them. " 
The distinctive feature of this is the assertion that God's 
will and His action are simultaneous. Perhaps Ghailzn hoped in 
this way to reconcile God's omnipotence with the absence of pre- 
determined acts. Apparently he held that men's dutiful acts are 
not willed by God beforehand (thus making it necessary for men to 
do them) , but only as men doa them; of sinful acts he simply said 
that God did not will them, presumably meaning that there was no 
Divine volition at all in regard to them. That would give point 
to the story in al- Tabari - Ghail-ffn was not prepared to admit that 
sin was actually contrary to the Divine volition. On the other 
hand, he admitted the statement "that God willed a. thing which did 
not come about." The last sentence might conceivably mean that 
God performs His share in the sinful acts of men, even thought He 
does not will them; but more likely it O simply means that God may 
do things without previously willing them. 
There can be no certainty about such details, however, What 
is clear is that Ghailán was trying to rec on©le God's omnipotence 
with His freedom from evil, and that to do so he attempted to 
identify His will with His activity rather than with His command. 
But he probably also held that there was a. sphere exempted by God 
from His direct control and entrusted to men (though there are rio 
traces of his use of the word fawwada) ; something of this sort 
i ng 
seems to be implied in his phrase "everything beton to God's 
activity" (kull ma kna min fill Alläh) . 
We must remember that hitherto there had been little in the 
way of analysis of human activity. According to Gha.ilán a man's 
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capacity or power to act consisted simply in his physical fitness;:' 
what had been entrusted to him therefore was fundamentally the 
control of his physical powers. At the same time Ghailán was 
certainly a thinker of some subtlety, as is shown by his distinction 
between primary and secondary knowledge;.$ the knowledge that things 
are originated and controlled belongs to all men by compulsion, 
and may be called primary, but the knowledge that their originator 
and controller is one and not two or more is an acquisition (ikti- 
sib) ; it is with this secondary_( we might almost say "revealed ") 
knowledge that faith is concerned. 
Such notices give us glimpses of a considerable system of 
thought, but not sufficient to let us see clearly the place of the 
doctrine of Qadar in it. To attain to this insight we must 
consider the outlook of the Murji'a in general, for it is to this 
sect, or rather group of sects, that he is commonly reckoned. t9 
The Murji'a have probably been more misunderstood than any 
other of the Muslim sects. They were to a great extent the 
forerunners of orthodoxy, but by the time Islamic writers became 
interested in the history of theological doctrine they had died 
out, or rather been replaced by the orthodox theologians; and 
these, noting that a few of the views of their predecessors had 
come to be looked on as heretical, did not care to defend them. 
Consequently all the Muslim accounts we have of the Murji'a are 
prejudiced against them to some extent. The Western scholars 
of the last hundred years have not improved matters by introducing 
various Christian comparisons which do not quite fit. The 
Murji)a are not exponents of salvation by faith without works, 
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nor are they worldly- minded "Laxists" who opposed the Puritanism 
of the Khawá.ri j . 
The thought of the community plays a. much larger part in the 
religion of the Arabs and their subjects than the individualistic 
West can readily imagine. The question at issue between the 
Khaw2rij and the Murji'a. was "What makes a man a member of the com- 
munity and what terminates his membership ?" - what we might call 
the problem of excommunication, if we remember not to let ourselves 
be misled by Christian parallels. The accounts of the Khawárij 
ere full of the words tabarra'a and ta.wallg, which I have usually 
translated as "dissociated himself" and "associated" or "counted 
as friend ". Doubtless the old tribal conceptions contributed 
to this; the only truly religious feelings of the pre -Islamic Arab 
44 were connected with his tribe 
The salvation of the individual was by no means neglected, 
but it was closely linked up with the community. One attained 
to Paradise by being a member of the community of the "people of 
Paradise," while the rest of the world constituted the "people of 
Hell." The community of the Prophet in Madina formed the 
model, and many of the technical terms were derived from this 
source, such as hijra for going out to warfare against the heathen 
(even when it meant rebelling against the Commander of the Faith- 
ful or his lieutenants!). A. state of war existed between the 
"people of Paradise" and the "people of Hell" and ideally there 
h0 
con)ld be comings and goings between them. It is clear how 
easily a one -sided elaboration of these ideas would lead to the 
fanaticism of the Khawárij. 
The KhawTrij were interested in the intellectual content of 
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belief just as much as in moral conduct. The true community 
was community of believers, who had true belief or faith (imTn) ; 
all traces of unbelief (kufr) must be rigorously excluded from 
it. Thus the Na. jcdá.t held: 
"Religion consists of two things: one of them is the know- 
ledge of God and of His apostles, end counting forbidden the 
blood of Muslims and their goods end violation, end acknow- 
ledgement of what comes from the presence of God in general; 
this is obligatory; as regards whet is more than this, the 
people's ignorance is pardoned until a proof is given to them 
about all that is lawful .. " 
The beginning of this is reminiscent of the accounts of the 
various views of faith held by the Mirji'e. 
At the sane time, the Khawa.rij had often very limited views 
about the standard of righteous conduct. They certainly spoke 
much about "grave sins" (kabâ' ir) , but by these they understood. 
not so much what a Christian understands by mortal sins (still 
less the serious social sins of today) as "acts on account of 
which a. man must be excluded from the community." That is the 
meaning of their agreement (apart from the Najadat) "that every 
grave sin is kufr. " 4t The result of such romantic and unworldly 
strictness is sometimes merely the lowering of the standard which 
is made obligatory; thus we are told that some of the Baihaslya. 
held that drunkenness was lawful, end that there was no punish- 
ment for faults, such as neglecting prayers , committed as a result 
of being drunk!! The alternative was to maintain one's moral 
standards but to discover some way of dealing with serious 
breaches other than exclusion from the community. 
A conception that found some favour was that of suspension 
of judgement (waaf) . The view of a section of the Sifriya 
about adulterers is reported to have been: 
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"We suspend judgement about them, and do not say that they 
are either believers or unbelievers. "* 
iiention has been made in the previous section of those who sus- 
pended judgement in regard to the legality of the purchase of 
female slaves (disputed between Ibráhim and Maimfn) . They 
evidently formed a fairly distinct body, and were known as "Ahl 
al-Waqf" or "Wggifa. ", and were opponents of the Baihasiya..4= 
This principle of suspension of judgement does not carry one very 
far, but it is the first stage towards enabling people to live 
together who do not quite see eye to eye. It was applied. to 
other matters than the one mentioned. The following quotation 
suggests that it may have had something to do with the origin of 
the Murji'a: 
"There is a sect of them (sc. the Baihasiya) called the 
Shab!bïya. Sha.bib had suspended judgement in respect of 
Sálih (sc b. al- Musarrih) and of the F2 jita. They declared: 
We do not know whether the decisions made by pliti are right 
or wrong, nor whether the witness of the P.Wa. is right or 
wrong. The I iawErij dissociate themselves from them, and 
call them the Mur ji' a of the Khawäri j . "W 
(It is worth noting that the Pe hâb al- Su'ril, early exponents of 
the Qedari position, were the disciples of Shabib.) 
The Iúiurji'a, however, went a. step beyond suspension of judge- 
ment. Possibly irj5.' originally meant "the postponement of the 
judgement of the grave sinner till the resurrection, s o that no 
decision is made while he is in this world whether he belongs to 
the people of Paradise or to the people of Hell. "41 In other 
words, he is to be treated as a believer, a member of the true 
community, with whom one has association. A technical ex- 
pression of this is that "the house is th ,se 
the decision about its people is that t 




ers) , except for those clearly at variance with faith" ;i 
o 
the 
Khawárij tended to think that the world was the House of Unbelief. 
Faith still means whet is necessary to qualify a. person for member- 
ship of the community of the people of Paradise; the.fresh assertion 
is that faith does not include "all that God has made incumbent on 
His creatures", as the Kha.wärij said. -x 
While this clearly makes it possible for opponents to say that 
the Murjila held that grave sinners were believersr it is not an 
indication that they belittled sin in r:ny way. There may have 
been some extremists who tidxsm said that it did not matter what 
one did so Long as one had faith - "works do not help with heathen- 
ism, coo not harm with faith" - but even such a statement as that 
"none of the people of the Qibla will enter Hell" does not mean 
that Muslim wrongdoers will escape all punishment S= In general 
the Murji'a. were quite convinced that Muslim wrongdoers were liable 
to punishment, though they differed about the nature of the punish- 
ment; it might be in Hell or it might not if it were in Hell, it 
might be everlasting or (as the majority thought) it might only be 
tempora.ry.s6 What distinguishes the Murjila. from the KhawTrij 
is the much more frequent occurrence of the idea of pardon or for- 
giveness, even though it be thought of merely as the remission of 
a penalty; Abú Mutädh al- Túma.ni, for instance, held that at the 
balances on the Day of Judgement, if a. man's- good deeds were heavie' 
he went to Paradise; if his evil deeds were heavier, he might 
either be punished or by God's grace excused?! Ghailgn thought 
that God might pardon Muslim wrongdoers, but would treat alike all 
in the same position.i. Others held that they would be removed 
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from Hell by the intercession of the Prophet!! 
The conclusion to be derived from these somewhat lengthy dis- 
wevc. 
missions is that the :rur j i' a imbued, no less than the Kh.awEri j , with 
the thought of a righteous God demanding righteousness from HIis 
creatures. They differed in recognizing that right conduct is 
most likely to be promoted if men are not excluded from the com- 
munity for every sort of fault. It is interesting to note how 
the phrase Ahl al- Qibla, the people who pray towards Aecca, replaces 
Ahi al- Janna, the people of Paradise - an indication of the less 
romantic but truer conception that the community of Islam contains 
others than those who will certainly go to Paradise. 
Confirmation of these conclusions is found in the political 
position of the Murji'a.. The statement of al- Nawbskhti is con- 
sistent with the rest of our knowledge of this sect, and may 
therefore be accepted. 
"After `Ali had been killed, the sect that was with him and 
the sect that was with Talha_ and al- Zubair combined to form one 
sect with Mu`gwiya b. Abi Sufybn, except a small number of them 
of his (sc.`Al3's) Party (silica) and those who asserted that he 
was IdOm after the Prophet ... They are called altogether the 
Murji'a because they associate with the opponents together. 
They consider that the people of the Qibla are believers by 
their public confession of faith, and hope (raja) for pardon 
for them all. "ga 
This means that to begin with the Murji'a were supporters of the 
Umaiyads. Their theology, in its political application, meant 
that a ruler was to be accepted if he were sound in essentials, 
even if he did some things to which objection might be taken. 
They thus gave the Arab kingdom the justification without which 
it could not have continued. 
Just because of their conception of righteousness, however, 
towards the close of the Uma.iya.d period they moved into the oppos- 
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ition. A1- Newbekhtï reports that the view of GheiHTn and 
others was: 
"Every holder of the imamate deserves it, provided he has 
knowledge of the Book and the Sunna, and holds the imamate by 
the agreement of the whole community. "W 
This is a two -edged statement, and would justify not only support 
of Sucäwiya, but also rebellion against some of his successors. 
One account of Ghailä.n's martyrdom makes it pretty clear that he 
was not executed simply for his doctrine of Qadar; he had appar- 
ently criticized the whole fiscal policy of tUmar II as unright- 
eous in that he did not use the wealth he was amassing on behalf 
of the poor of the land.a In the East the Murji'a, as repre- 
sented by i.f rith b. Suraij and his scribe, Jahm b. Safwän, helped 
to unite athe different trends of the pious opposition" to procure 
full citizens' rights for the Iranian Muslims .2 Thus, while 
there is much to be said for the suggestion that the later Uma.iya.ds 
tried to stamp out the doctrine of Qadar because it made people 
less inclined to submit to the existing order though actually 
Jahm, who has just been mentioned, was later regarded as the 
extreme opponent of Qadar) , yet it seems more likely that what 
they really objected to was certain other views usually found 
along with the doctrine of Qadar and derived like it from the 
conception of righteousness. 
There is .much that remains obscure about the Murji)a. The 
distinction that Wensinck discusses.. between Imán and islam is 
closely allied to that made by the Murji)a between Imá.n and mem- 
bership of the people of Paradise, althc ugh the terms are used 
differently; and it would be reasonable to suppose that the 
Murji)a, since they existed from the beginning of the T?ma.iyad 
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period, had something to do with the drawing of the former dis- 
tinction. Again, since the date of some of them is uncertain, 
and since some , Like Muhammad b. Sha.bib , were much later. than Ghai- 
]_ n, the scope of the discussions is probably not always the same; 
e_g. the connotation of faith probably altered in the latter part 
of the second century when the Khawarij a.nd "excommunication" were 
no longer vital political issues. 
What is clear about the Mur. ji'a. is fortmnately also what is 
most important for our present purpose. They moved in the same 
circle of ideas a.s the Kha.wá.ri j . Indeed it was probably only 
later that a firm line of distinction was drawn between the two. 
Al- Sha.hrastani can include Ghailän and several related thinkers 
among the K awarij as well as among the Murji'a;iand the Wagifa 
and Shabibiya of the KhawU.rij seem to have stood very close to the 
Murji'a., and even at times to have been called by that name.t 
Although the two bitterly opposed one another, they also had a 
great deal in common. 
Consideration of the place of Ghailffn in Islamic theology thus 
confirms the conclusion of section 1 of this chapter. The 
doctrine of Qadar is closely linked with the conception of human 
responsibility, and that in turn with that side of the Islamic 
revelation which is the conception of a righteous God Who demands 
righteousness from His creatures. 
3. The Qa.da.rIya . 
So far nothing has been said about the Qadariya, who from 
their name might be expected to have much to do with the origin 
of the doctrine under consideration; and Matbad al- Juhani, the 
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reputed originator of the discussions, has been mentioned and no 
more. That is because our knowledge in these respects consists 
mainly of fragmentary details, which by themselves do not carry us 
very far. Now, however, that we have formed some picture of the 
origin of the doctrine, and have glanced at the whole of which it 
is an integral part, these details help to amplify our picture. 
a) The use of the name "Q2.dariya" . 
In a short article on this question Nallino ha® noted how 
from quite early times it has appeared strange that the name 
"Qadari ", which ought to mean an upholder of the Divine Qadar, 
does in fact mean exactly the opposite. He mentions the vari- 
ous explanations offered by modern scholars, and then offers a 
suggestion of his own which has won wide acceptation. The dis- 
cussions in the first century of Islam always centred in the Qur'.n, 
he reminds us; there were people who spent e lot of time discussing 
the Qadar, and who made it an important question; because of this 
the term "Qadarïya" was applied to them, without reference to the 
precise view they adopted about Qadar (just as the Muhakkima - 
the arbitratairs - were those who rejected the arbitration between 
t t- t ßlî aand ,ih? awiya. t s 
With this it is worth comparing a. passage from a1- AshLari's 
Ib ána : 
"The QadarTya consider that we deserve the name of Qadar, 
because we say that God determines (naddara) evil and unbelief, 
and whoever affirms (yuthbitu) the Qadar is e Qa.dari, and not 
those who do not affirm it. The reply to them is: The 
J ."tL Qadar! is he who a_tfirmsXthe Qadar is his own and not his Lord's, 
and that he himself determines (yuoaddiru) his acts and not his 
Creator. This is the proper use of language. The gold- 
smith is the man who does goldsmith's work, and not the man who 
has goldsmith's work done for him... Since you consider 
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that it is you who determine your acts and perform them, and nit 
your Lord, you must be QadarTya and not we; for we do not ascribe 
the acts to ourselves and not to our. Lord, and we do not say that 
we determine them and not He, but we say that they are determined 
for us. 
Reply: If whoever affirms that the determination is God's 
(man athbata 'l- tagdir li- '11áh) is a Qada.r3, then, since you 
hold that God determines the heavens and the earth, and determin- 
es acts of obedience, you ought to infer that you are Qadartya; 
since this inference does not stand your view is worthless and 
your argument self- contra.dictory. "tr 
This passage does not necessarily refute Na.11ino, since al- 
Ash`ari may not have known the true origin of the term; but it 
makes certain points clear. (1) "Qada.riya." was apparently first 
used as a nickname (as, of course, many of the names of the sects 
were). Those to whom it was applied resented it (perhaps be- 
cause it had the suggestion that they were presumptuously claiming 
God's Qadar for themselves) and tried to throw it back upon their 
opponents; but in this, as we know, they were unsuccessful. It 
is noteworthy that the term is never used by Mu`ta.zili writers like 
al- Kha.iyat and Ibn a1- Murtada. (2) Al- A.sh`ari appears to regard 
gadar as meaning "determination" (in the active sense) or "power of 
determining" - almost the equivalent of tagdir. This is how he 
appears to use the word in the MacElKt.ti He also records a 
similar usage of it by his master al- Jubbä.'ï.: 
"Creator means one from whom acts proceed in predetermined 
fashion (mugaddaran) ; everyone whose act odeurs in predetermined 
fashion is the creator of it, whether. he be eternal or originates. 
"Creator means one who performs his acts in predetermined 
fashion according to the determination he has settled for them 
(mugaddaratan tala 'l- migdär má dabbara. -há alai -hi). This 
is the meaning when we assert of God that He is creator. 
Similarly we assert of man that he is creator when acts proceed 
from him in predetermined fashion. "W 
Whatever may have been the original meaning and application 
of the name'lQadar!ya ", it never seems to have designated any close- 
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knit body of people, like some of the sects of the Iawgri j . 
As a name for a group of sects it never established itself, 
for it cut across more important groupings. Consequently, 
there is considerable vagueness about who and wh< t the Qadariya 
were, apart from, the fact that they held the doctrine of Qadar.1.1 
The only evidence of value is that of poi early writers like 
Khushaish and al- Ashtari. 
b) The evidence of the earlier writers. 
The following are the references in. the Magzlát : 
p. 126,1.8 : (On the future of children; two groups have been 
described but not named.) "The third group of them (sc. of 
the Khawärij) , the Qadariya., say that the children of both 
heathen and believers are in Paradise." 
2430 1.1 : (On the question whether. God can be obeyed by 
one who does n6t mean to do so; some 11b tazila say it is poss- 
ible even for the Dahrïya - fatalists or materialists - to 
obey God.) "The Qadariya revile those who oppose them about 
Qadar, and the Ahl a1- Iagq (sc. orthodox) call them Qadariya, 
and they call them Mujbira.; they are more appropriately called 
Qadariya than the Ahl al -Ithbt .t (sc. those who affirm God's 
Qadar). Those who deny the above doctrine say: The 
Mushabbiha (sc. ltluslims of anthropomorphic views) have no know- 
ledge of God and so do not obey Him; but the Qadariya, have a 
knowledge of God since they are Muwahhida. (sc. asserters of 
unity) , and so there is obedience to God in them. " -a 
p.477,1.9 : Abú Shimr was a Qadari. 
p.549,1.6 : (In connection with the view of MuCammar that 
God has power over movement, but not power to move.) "The 
Ahl al -%iagq oppose the Ahl al -Qadar and Mu`ammar in that, 
and say ..." 
p.549,1.9 : Along with Muttazila, except al- Shahbäm, the 
Qadariya held that God has no power over a thing over which He 
has given power to men. 
These are, , to the best of my knowledge, the only references 
in the whole of the Maalg:_t. The first confirms what has been 
seid above about the connection of the doctrine of Qadar with the 
the Khaw<<ri j , the third that with the Mier j i' a (for Abú Shimr 
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belonged to that group among the Mürji'a related to Ghailän, who, 
though normally classified as Murji'a, are sometimes listed as 
Khawäri j and even as iduttazila.1P The connection with lutammar 
is novel and interesting, but I have no useful comment to make 
about it, nor about the last passage. 
In the Ibána of al- Ashl-ari "Qada.rïya" occurs nine times and 
"Ahl al- Qadar" once.-4 In some of these the name is closely 
bracketed with that of the Muttazila; in others it is used in con- 
nection with the doctrine of Qeder and its appendages. The most 
interesting passage is that where the Qadariya are said to hold 
the view t h<F t God cannot know a thing until it exists ;1 this was a 
view held by most of the Pawn.fid, who include rlishm b. a1- Uakam 
and the Sakkákïya among others.= The curious view ascribed to 
them that God creates good and Satan evil might conceivably be a 
libel of some sort.7% Finally, it is puzzling but suggestive 
that al- A.shtari refers to the Qadariya in the middle of arguments 
against the Jahmiya; the doctrines in question appear to be 
God is eternally willing and powerful. 
Thus it is clear that for al- A.shcarï the Qadariya were a defin- 
ite body of people. Some of the later ones at least were 
Mutakallimún or speculative theologians, but did not belong to the 
Muttazila. Whether those he mentions among the Kha.wFrij lived 
in the LTmaiyed period or in the late second or even third century 
is not clear. If we suppose Abü Shimr to have been a disciple 
of Ghailán (who died before 125) , or a disciple of a disciple, 
the prominence of the Qadariya would date from the closing years 
of the Umaiyads and continue for the first fifty years or so of 
the tAbbásids until the great days of the Mu`tazila. (till about 
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190 perhaps). 
Khushaish has a long section on the Qadariya , but it mostly 
consists of arguments against them 
7q 
The descriptive passages 
may be quoted in full. 
"The QADARÌYA - their characteristics, doctrine and belief. 
The QEdariya consist of seven sects or groups. 
One group holds that noble actions (tiasaná.t) and goodness 
(khair) are from God, but wickedness and base actions from them- 
selves, so that they may not attribute any base action or sin to 
God. They discuss matters which it is not proper to repeat - 
may God be exalted far above what they say:.. 
A section of the Qa.de.riya is called the Mufawwic.a. They 
hold that they are entrusted (muwakkal) to themselves in such a. 
way that they have power (yagdarúna) for everything good through 
this delegation (tafwld) they speak about, with. ut God's help 
and guidance... 
A section of them consider that God has made (ja.tala.) the 
power for action (istitE.ca) in them perfect and complete, such 
that they do not require any increase in it, but are capable of 
believing and disbelieving, of eating and drinking, of standing 
and sitting, of sleeping and awaking, indeed of doing what they 
will. They hold that men are (sc. of themselves) capable 
of believing. If this were not so, they would be puniäh.ed 
for what they are not capable of... 
A. group of them, the Shabìbiva, also deny that the knowledge 
exists antecedently to what men are doing and what they are 
becoming... si 
A group of them deny that God creates the child of adultery 
or determines (gaddara) him or wills him or knows him (? ante- 
cedently) - may God be exalted above what they say! They 
deny that the man who steals throughout his whole life or eats 
what is forbidden receives the sustenance of God; they assert 
that God does not provide any sustenance except what is lawful - 
may God be exalted far above what they say: ... 
A group of them holds that God has appointed (waqqata) men 
their sustenance and their terms for a fixed time (liwagt ma1.5n ) 
so that whoever murders a man precludes him from his term and 
his sustenance to die at what is not his term, while of his 
sustenance there remains what he has not already received and 
fully obtained. Ma.y God be exalted far above what they say! 
These are all the doctrines of the Qadariya:. "Z2- 




word fawwa.4a was used by al- Ashtarï in describing the views of 
vla.imún; it is also used by al- Sha.hrestTni in connection with the 
xshä.b al- Su'á.l. Thus we are confirmed in our view that there 
was a close connection between the Qath..riya and certain sects of 
the KhawKri j . It .rte-ti seem strange that such a promising con- 
ception was not developed in later theology; the reason for this 
neglect is possibly that it lacked a Qur'Tnic basis, since iawwa4a 
is used only once, and then it is of a man entrusting his affair 
Interesting also is the mention of the Shatibiya es a sect of 
they are 
the Qadariya, sincen tiEt=4Esi doubtless to be identified with the fol- 
lowers of Sha.bib b. Yazid al- Najrgni, who - or some of whom - are 
also known as the As hgb al-Sul, as has already been noticed. 
Again we find ourselves in the same line of country on the border 
between the Khawá.rij and the Murji'a. The view here attributed 
to them may be the kernel out of which. sprang the doctrine al- Ashcari 
attributes to the Qada riya, that God does not know things until 
they exist .t The parts of the puzzle seem to be fitting together 
Tile principle underlying all these views is that of "not fix- 
ing evil upon God." Only the Mufa.wwida.show any trace of a de- 
sire to exalt human power, and even there it is only a slight trace. 
For the rest man is required to have the power to act primarily in 
order that God may not be unjust in punishing him. The central 
thought is the righteousness of God. 
c) Ma. ̀ bad a l- Juha.nï . 
There remains only the problem of the man who was "the first 
to institute discussions about the Qadar in Bara." liot much 
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is known about Macbad al- Juhanï. His death is placed in the 
year 60, and there is a. report that he was put to death by order 
of the caliph cAbd al- Malik. He is also said to have conversed 
with an cIrá.g3 Christian called Sñsan, who embraced Islam but later 
epostatized.1i 
In the books of sects, however, there is nothing at all apart 
from references to him as originator of the doctrine of Qedar; and 
there is nothing even of that in the Molt or in el- Maleti's 
Ta.nbih. But there is in the i+':ar .lia.t e sect of the That liba., w 
who are themselves a. branch of the tA jgrida , called the Ma`badiya 
from their head Macbed.116 They are mainly noted for their idea 
of taking alms from rich slaves and giving them to poor slaves; 
but al- Shahrastâni adds that they had views on the marriage of 
Muslim women. Now Maimiln, whose views on Qadar were studied 
first, belonged to the 'Ajgrida; and. the Tha`gliba hold a mild 
form of the views of the cAj.rida. So it seems in no way im- 
possible that this Macbad al -Kh ri ji is none other than Me rbad a.l-- 
Juheni. But, without further information, this must remain a. 
conjecture. At least we can say that this is the sort of milieu 
in which we should expect to find the originator of the discussions 
about Qadar. 
dote 1k. ^1 - eE2an el -Ba ri. 
In section 7 of Lis stuc1 r of Fl-etiegen al -Basra in Islem,XXI, 
1 -83, H.Ritter cleii s t_rirt al- ;fawn wes almost certainly Qtdari, 
grid the t, it so, he hies h, better right to be looked on as the found- 
er of the doctrine than an obscure person like - a`ba.d. There is 
certainly much to be se id for the view that he held the doctrine 
of Qeda:r. Though Lis neme is not in ibri Qutaiba's list of 
Qede riya (r4iacTrif,3'1) , that might be out of respect fpr his dignity; 
his disciple Qee de is iecluced. Besides the report in Ibri 
c.As kir (quoted. by Ritter, p.60) tiiet he was influenced by ,etbad, 
there is the following passage stn p.225 of the "Ae cárii : 
"He (al -ï {ss2.n) held the doctrine of Qeder in some respects 
(tskellarna fi shad' min 21- cadsr) , but later recanted of it. 
t tP b. YessFr, P. story-teller, who held the doctrine of Qede r 
end made Liistskes in speech, used to irecuent el- riasen with 
i,.r tbad s.1- Juha.ni and to ssk: '0 I hi3. Seid , these princes shed 
the blood of Muslims and seize their goods, and act snd say, 
"Our acts occur according to God's determination (eedrr). " 
Al -1 ssan said: "The eaemies of God lie.'" 
The mention of recantation me/ be mainly en attempt to "whitewash" 
u l-- Hasan. On the other hand, what he denies in this story pare 
the immoral conBeouences of an extreme determinism which denies 
human responsibility. This is in accordance with iris personal 
piety End uprightness of life. Similarly, the essence of a 
report, quoted. by Ritter, that he opposed the Çadsriys , is thst he 
asserted that man's sustenance is from God.. The probability is 
that he held a. moderate position, not altogether consistent with 
itself, in which emphasis 'r es laid on righteousness in men and God. 
ire can hardly by himself be the originator of the doctrine of 
Qader, since it grew logically out of a whole movement ol thought. 
Ritter's investigations, however, do confirm the connection of the 
doctrine with the conception of God's righteousness; it Was because 
el- tiassn exhorted r:.en to righteousness that he felt he must assert 
that they ned been given power to achieve it &Fitter,p.62). 
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Note B - Qadar and Ithb-.t . 
I have commonly used the expression "doctrine of Qadar" for 
what Western people would prefer to call the "doctrine of the 
freedom of the will ". The latter is unsuitable in Yluslim 
dogmatics, since the idea. of freedom as such is quite foreign to 
the Muslim mind, to which the question is one of whether man has 
the power of determining his actions. A favourite phrase in 
Arabic we.s- al-pawl bi- 'l- gadar, "the doctrine of the determination" 
or "of the determining power. ". The following examples will 
show how el- Ashcarl apparently uses it only with e. qualification 
such as "according to the view of the TuTuctazila ". They will 
siso show how the opposite carne to be the "doctrine of the affirm- 
ation" (ithbgt) for al- Ashca.ri, whereas al- Shahrest .nI does not 
confine himself to the technical use of this word; by his time a 
distinction had been made within Ithbât between Jabr (sheer de- 
terminism) and Iktisäb ( "acquisition" or modified determinism - 
the orthodox view); cp. chs. V and VI. 
el- AshCeri - Ma.q .l2.t. 
93,7 The distinctive feature of the Meimû.niya wee the doc- 
trine of Qadar according to the view of the Mu`tezila 
(al -gewl bi -'l -gadar (ale medhheb el- Muttezila) . 
93,13 The K_halefiya separated from the Meimün.ye about the 
doctrine of Qadar and asserted the Ithb t 
(faragü 'l- Maimúniya fi 'l -pawl bi- tl- gadar wa -g .lú bi'l- ithb2t) 
93,14 The ïla.mz!ye held firm the doctrine of Qadar of the 
Tula. imUniya 
thabatü cala Bawl a_i- 26ïa.imünlya bi- 'l- gadar) . 
96,4 The distinctive feature of the Khäzimiya was that in 
respect of the Çe.dar they asserted the Ithb2t 
(q'lü fi ' 1 -gadar 
97,2 : The MajhúlIya asserted the Ithbât of the Qadar 
(gâlü bi- ithbát el- gadar). 
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116,2 The Ashá.b al -Su'rl held the doctrine of the ',uctazila 
about Qadar. 
(q 1û bi -gawl al- Mu'tazila fi '1- gadar) . 
124,9 As for the Qadar we have already mentioned those of 
the khawErij who adopted the view of the Muttazila in 
respect of it and those of them who inclined to the IthbEt. 
(fa -aroma. ' 1- gadar fa. -qad dhakarnT man ya.dhha.bu fi-hi ils 
gawl a -.l- Milttazila. min al- r_hawrrij wa- dhaksrnr. men yamilu 
ila ' 1- ithb2.t min -hum) . 
al-Shahrastän3 - llilal. 
96a. The Hamziya agreed with the Ivaimúniya in respect of 
Qadar 
(wafa_qú '1- Mu'tazila fi 11- gadarr). 
96b The Miaimúniya were distinguished from the tAjä.rida by 
the affirmation of the Qadar, both good and bad, being from 
men 
(tafarrada ten-hum bi- ithbât al-qadar khairi-hi wa- sharri -hi 
min al- cabd). 
96b : The Aträfiya were of the opinion of Hamza about the 
doctrine of Qadar 
(tala. madhhab Ijamza fi '1 -cawl bi -' 1- ga.da.r) . 
97a, The Khalafiya opposed the Ha.mziya about the doctrine of 
Qadar andattributed the Qadar, both good and bed, to 
God 
(khala.ffi. '1- I-jamziya fi '1 -aawl bi- '1 -cadar wa -adj fia '1 -cadar 
khaira -hu wa-sharra-hu ila. '11-Eh) . 
97a The Shuta.ibiya. separated from Mimi n when. he proclaimed 
the doctrine of Qa.da.r. 
(hin a.zhara. '1 -gawl bi -' 1- cada.r) . 
III. 66. 
Note C - The Sakkäkiya , etc. 
The Sakk kiya are almost certainly the followers of Abi 
Ja tfar Muhammad b. Khalil al- Sa -kkKk (for the many variants of his 
laga.b see Intigár, 178, note). The Sakkâ.kiya held that know- 
ledge is an attribute off; God fi dhati -hi ; He is tä.lirl fi nafsi -hi, 
but it not described as tä.lim so long as the thing is not (Ma.o.219, 
490) . This is s omewhe t similar to the view of Hisha.m b. al- 
I9akam (Ma.o.37, etc.) . Muhammad b. Khalil al- Sa.kkäk was a. sheikh 
of. the Rafida (Intisär,6; cp.iyia.o.63), who disputed with Ja`fa.r b. 
Harb about the knowledge of God (Intisä.r,110f.) , and in a debate 
with al- Iská.fi defended Hishám b. al-Hakam (ib .142) . (A view 
of his about God's movement is mentioned, _vía.q.213.) Thus this 
identification would seem to be justified. 
-Further, because of the many variants of the name, it would 
seem that the Saka.nïya. of Intis2r,126 are the same people. They 
held a view of God's knowledge similar to Hishän b. el- Hakim. 
The sect of Shakk kiya, mentioned in the Sherh al -Figh al- 
Akbar, are probably different. They held that works are a. part 
of faith (p. 10) , and also apparently that when a man says he is 
a believer he mast add "if God will" (p.14). This would rather 
support the identification of them with the Shulffk (also known a.s 
Butrlya. and Ha.shwiya.) , who were the fourth sect of the Murji'a. 
according to al- Nawbakhti (Firaq el -ShrtF , 7) , and included men 
like al- Shafi`i and Mä.lik b. Anas; cp.pp.9,12,14f. 
IV. 
T H E BUIU T! Z I L A 
1. Their. Ilistorïcal Position. 
The iuctazila early attracted the attention of Western 
scholars because of the similarity of many of the views they held 
with those of the "liberal" thought of the nineteenth century. 
Where so much was alike, there was 2. tendency to assume complete 
identity, end to forget that the Vhltte zila. remained essentially 
Muslims. Doubtless there were wistful dreams of Islam end 
Christendom walking together like brothers, if only Islem had 
followed in the way of the Luttazile. and hed not been turned aside 
by that supposed reactionary, al- PshCarT; little was it realized 
how soon the West itself was to e. great extent to turn its back 
on everything "liberal ". 
The work of scholars during the last two decades, and notably 
that of Dr.II.S.Nyberg, has done much to rid us of these delusions. 
What I have to say about the historical position of the Mu'tezila 
is based mainly on his article in the Encyclopedia. of Islam.1 
In order to understand the position of the MuCtazile it is 
best to start with Abi7 fli4Hudheil, who was the true founder of its 
dogmatic system.- He died in 227 or shortly after,= but he wes 
e very old man when he died - the common account is that he was 
one hundred years old, but even the figure of 150 is mentioned. 
Mow even if we suppose- that he was not born till 140, that would 
still make him53 in 193 on the death of HUriln 21-Rashid; and there- 
fore we must suppose that most of his best work was done in the 
reign of that caliph, though he probably continued to be active 
throughout the first part of the reign of al- 1V1a.'miIn - say till 
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about 210.= Activity in the caliphate of HPrizn world elso be 
in accordance with whet we know of his relations with Bishr b. al- 
Muttamir. They appear to have been contemporaries ,= except 
that Abu '1- Hudhail seems to have criticized Bishr more than he was 
criticized by him, which suggests that Bishr may have been slightly 
earlier. i ow Bishr b. el- ;tiiuctemir is slid to have spent a cori- 
.sider.able time in prison under Hgrizn, which implies that he was en 
influential man es early as 180 or so; thus it seems likely that 
Abu ' 1- Hudhaml had also attained P position of some prominence 
before the end of the reign. 
y 
One of the great differences between the Muttazile and the 
sects previously considered wes that politics were coming to play 
a smeller part. The Muttazila certainly had political views, 
end those of Beghd2d. were in very close touch with the men et the 
head of affairs between the years ¿0O and 235. Yet it remains 
true that the men whose views we are about to consider were not 
the revolutionary leaders who have occupied us so fer, but some- 
thing much more like the theologian or the modern world. Poss- 
ibly their nearest to political propaganda wes their defence of 
Islam against .anicha.esnism and. Indien nsteria.lism - e defence 
of the caliphate and its underlying principles. They wrote 
what seemed to the people of that time enormous numbers of books,! 
and this helps to explain how we have such full accounts of their 
views. 
Because there were the beginnings of e university et Basra 
it was celled an assembly, üi2.jlis - Abu 'l- Hudhail wes open to 
a good many influences. Before his time the ms jlis and the 
kelam were in the hands of I)irPr b. tAmr; a connection 
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can be traced, both by way of development of Dirr's views and of 
reaction against them. There were also the mysterious Jahmiya, 
constituting some or all of the Muwehhida, who influenced Abu 31- 
Hudha..il, especially in his views on ta_w4Id . ° And the "learned 
Mur. ji' a." doubtless contributed too. a The Khaw2ri j were largely 
anti- Umaiya.d , and apparently ceased to be prominent after the pol- 
itical realignments which took place on the advent of the tPbbTsids 
in 132; but with the principle of tadl (justice) the -u tszile 
had taken over a it that was best in the thought of the Khaw2ri j . 
Non-Muslim influences must also be reckoned with. That of 
Greek philosophy is exemplified in the report that Abu 'l- HudtuTil 
made use of Aristotle. Recent researches have shown that many 
of the Muttazili conceptions were elaborated in the course of the 
struggle with :ìanichaeanism. The probability of Christian 
influence is indicated by the Apology of the Patriarch Timothy, 
which we stili possess, and which reports discussions held at the 
court of al- Ma.hdî in 155 , at which time Abu ' i- Hudhail would be 
bout 30. And early Muslim atomic theories have some kinship 
with Indian ones.= 
All these influences seem to have affected Abu 3l- Hudhail in 
one way or another; some ideas he borrowed rid modified, some he 
reacted against. It was out of this intellectuel ferment that 
there appeared the extensive speculations of the MUctazile, which 
eventually produced, or a1.a.;7ed a large part in producing, Muslim 
scholasticism. Yet so far no mention has been made of what 
Muslim writers counted the primary influence, his predecessors in 
the Mu=tazila, WE.sil b. CAt 3 and tAmr b. tTTbaid. 
Reliable information about these men is scanty. It would 
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seem that, while in some sense they may be claimed ES forerunners 
of the Mu`tazila., the great inteLiectuel expansion which hss inter- 
ested scholars did not commence till about the time of rh.rún 
Rashid, some fifty years after the death of W sil. The attrib- 
ution of the foundation of the Mutta.zila to W .sil was doubtless 
made in order to enhance the dignity of the body, for :Muslims tend 
to equate soundness with antiquity; 16 rivalry with the Jahmiya, 
whose founder was Wiled in 128, may also have had something to do 
with it. It is probably true, however, that the general polit- 
ical and religious orientation of the Mattazila was derived from 
that of Wgsil. Lie appears to have been the author of what they 
regarded as their distinctive merk, the doctrine of the Intermediate 
Condition, el- manzila bain al- menzilatain, or the doctrine that 
those who commit grave sins are neither unbelievers (as the Ihawgr.ij 
say) nor believers (t =s the ;;ur.ji'a spy), but are in an intermediate 
co.idition. This doctrine wes imports. nt mainly for its political 
implications , which were , es Dr. 'Nyberg has shown, the support of 
the f-Abbâsids a.gains t the lima.iyads . But again, like other two 
of the five basic principles of the MuLta_zila, al -Wa`d we- 'l -watid 
(the promise and the threat) and al -a.mr bi -' 1- ma`rúf wa- 'l -nahy 
tan al- munkar (tne commend about what is approved and the pro_i i hit - 
ion of what is disapproved) , it pla.ied hardly any part in the 
theological discussions. 
Whet we know od the views of lrä.sil end t1Amr shows that they 
were far removed from the sort of discussion that interested the 
Mn'tc.zila, as reported in the Tia.gal t. The only mention of 
Wr.sil tea is in connection with the ambiguous verses of the Qurt.nr 
t 
A report, probably derived from pl-JFhiz ,= . makes him interested in 
111.1. 71. 
subjects such as the general or particular reference of akhbär. 
On the other hand, we are informed that Wt7sil had arguments with 
dualists and gnostics from the extreme Shiva, in the course of 
which he doubtless entered into more philosophical questions, 
and may thus have paved the way for later developments; but no 
details of these seem to be available.19 
IThus the intellectual stirrings which made their appearance about 
the time of liTrUn al- Fashid were very largely something new, to 
which all the influences mentioned above had contributed something, 
even though the chief exponents of the new thought had roots in e 
ID 
religio- political group that went back to the time of the Pmaiya.ds .* 
While Abu 'l- Hudha.il mar with good grounds be regarded as the 
real founder of the Yluttazila, he was by no means alone. In 
Basra, besides himself, there was Mutemma:r, possibly somewhat older, 
and of independent views ;14 and before long there were also his 
pupils, al- Naz2.m and hishgm b. LÄmr al- Fuwa.ti, who argued vehem- 
ently against him.S- In Ba.ghdgd tnere was Bishr b. al- Mut-tarnir 
and his pupils, of whom Ab%a as? al- Ur. der was the oldest and 
probably contemporary with tabu 'l- Hudhe.il. The accompanying 
diagram gives an idea of the relationships between the main figures. 
Something of their distinctive standpoints, and especially of the 
divergences between the schools of Basra. and Baghdgd, will become 
clear as we proceed. 
2. The Rationalism of the vTu` tazila . 
In contrast to the nineteenth century scholars, Dr.yberg has 
perhaps overstressed the view that the liuctzila wére not ¡ ration- 
alists 













from the new conception of them he has advocated. 
"Where previously one saw enlightened philosophers, who from 
disinterested love of truth spun out their paradoxes and built great systems, we have now to set theologians, forced of necess- 
ity to tackle the greet spiritual problems of their time by the 
simple fact that, if they were to affirm their Islr-.m in face 
of the environment, they could not pass them by; in brief, we 
have to do With strictly theologically- minded and practically 
ctive theologians and m.issionar. ies . "W 
Onething that is quite clear is that the Yuttazila still live 
creation 
in the circle of iauslim ideas. Abu 'l- iudhail's conception ofA 
is still that God says to things "Be" and they are; and both he 
and al- Nezzam discuss problems connected with the general and 
particular applications of Qur.'ffnic precepts. iioreover they 
still clammed to be Muslims and to respect and keep within the 
bounds of the general agreement of Muslims .af In particular, 
they paid at least lip -service to the conceptions of the Term, 
Sustenanee, Guidance, the Sealing, and so on; even when they com- 
pletely interpreted. away or denied outright the fatalistic content, 
they still made assertions about these conceptions. 
The idea that the Term of a man's life, his ajal, was prede- 
termined was apparently questioned by some of the jiuttazila. 
They probably had in mind unlawful killing or murder, and wanted 
to avoid "fixing evil on God "; but their assertion that in the case 
of the man who was killed his term was the date to which he would 
have lived had he not been killed wes somewhat simple -minded. 
Abu 'l- I3udha_il is much more consistent in his acceptance of the 
conception, but is surprisingly impressed with the inevitability 
of the date, though he does not seem to think that the manner of 
death is -)redetermined; if the man had not been killed, he says, 




tried to escape from the difficulty by distinguishing between the 
the 
death and murder, and assigning the latter to the murderer a..nd only 
the former to God.- 
The associated conception that God. had assigned to man be- 
forehand his daily bread, his sustenance (rizo, arzRo), does not 
seem to have met with such wide approval. Avoidance of attrib- 
uting evil to God was the primary consideration. If a man lives 
on stolen goods, it is difficult to understand how a righteous 
God can have provided them. So the MuCta.zile generally held 
that God creates for a man only the sustenance to which he is law- 
fully entitled ; what a man obtains unlawfully was not appointed to 
been 
be his sustenance by God.. This has notnthought out very fully, 
and shows only en uneasy compromise with the established belief. 
In the case of such conceptions as those of the Sealing and 
Imprinting of the hearts of the unbelievers, &.nything objectionable 
in the conceptions is removed by interpreting them in a special 
way, namely, as something which follows upon a man's unbelief, 
but is in no way the cause of it. Some held that they were the 
testimony and the judgement that the unbelievers do not believe, 
and that they do not prevent then from having faith; others, while 
agreeing that they did not prevent the unbelievers from doing what 
they were commanded, said more picturesquely that the Imprinting 
un- 
is the black mark placed on the heart of the Abeliever in. odder that 
the angels ma.y conveniently distinguish the Friends of God from 
His Enemies.- 
Similar treatment is given to the conceptions of 
Guidance, 
Succour, Leading Astray, S±bandonment3.° The following 
lines of 
thought can be distinguished. (1) Some of these acts 
of God 
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may be interpreted as His narnin - and judging. This is particul- 
arly applicable to the negative ones like leading astray and aba.n- 
doning. Ida.11a (with its noun idlbl) normally means "he led 
astray" or "he made to go astray ", but the analogy of other words 
gives grounds of a sort for claiming that the word means "he count- 
ed astray" or "he made out to be astray ". Thus God merely de- 
clares, according to this interpretation, that they are in fact 
astray, and thereby does no evil. (2) God may be said to guide 
and protect men by giving them IIis religion through His prophets, 
by summoning them to Islam, by promises of Paradise and warnings 
a.baut Hell, and the like. (3) God's favours to believers, by 
way of strengthening them to obey or believe , are a reward for their 
faith: There is also the view that üe bestows His help and pro- 
tection on the man whoa. He knows will benefit by it - a sort of 
reward before the act. (4) God is said to give His protection 
to everyoe alike, but it has a different effect on different peal 
pie; the voluntary believer is helped, and the unbeliever has his 
'.unbelief increased. 
In these interpretations of conceptions from Qur'Tn and Trad- 
ition there are - besides the strength of the allegiance of the 
Muttazila. to Islam - two points to be noticed. The first of 
these is the extent to which the background presupposed is fatal - 
istic. The Mu`tazila appear to have in mind rival interpret- 
ations that are thoroughly in the spirit of the pre- 
Islamic age. 
Even their own discussions of "the man God knows 
will not believe" 
rather savour of the fatalistic idea. that a. person's 
final happiness 
or misery is decided while he is in the womb or 
even earlier.,= 
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The expression "God knows" is certainly theistic in form, but in 
effect it refers to a knowledge whose Subject is not clearly con- 
ceived, and which, moreover, is only descriptive and in no way de- 
terminative of events. I.s an antidote to the fatalistic element 
in the hearts of Muslims such views as those of the 14uctazila 
would appear to be far less effective than those of the Qur'á.n. 
They had simply asserted man's ability to deteriaine his fate, but 
the basis of fatalism was left untouched, for in regard to man's 
destiny they had stripped God of every role except that of observer 
and recorder. Man, conscious of his own weakness in face of 
the destructive forces of Time, was likely to find little to inspire 
him in their theorizings. 
The other point of note is that these interpretations of cur- 
rent conceptions are made in accordance with the principle of teal, 
the justice or righteousness of God; in this they were the sucess- 
ors of the Khawâri j . It is precisely here that their rational- 
ism begins to ap_)ear. In the instances considered they are not 
explicitly regarding Reason a.s a source of religious truth, but 
they are assuming the complete validity of their human, rational 
ideas of justice when applied to God and the complete ability of 
their finite minds to apprehend eternal Being. When they held 
that no evil or injustice might be ascribed to God they were think- 
ing of Him superior kind of magistrate or administrator. 
The punishment of evildoers is certainly just, but only where the 
wrong is the man's own doing. Thus ideas of sublunary justice 
led them to deny God's supreme control of human affairs. 




There were some who held that it could be 
known by Reason apart from Revelation that grave sins were punished 
and that the punishment was eternal-1.2" Others introduced various 
restrictions; for some it wEs only knowledge of God, not of His 
commands, that Reason gave, and consequently only the punishment 
of unbelief that could be known -pert from Revelation. Ai- 
NazzUm made a distinction of this sort between those acts which 
were good and evil in themselves and those that were only so a.s s 
result of positive prescription.1.3 It is difficult to know just 
how important this belief in Reason was for the systems of the 
Muctazila in general, for it is not frequently mentioned and there 
is much of s contrary nature; but sometimes et least it was quite 
openly and explicitly professed. 
3. Abu ' l- iudha it and his immediate pupils. 
It has been seen that one of the implications of the prin- 
ciple of Justice is that, since man is punished for his sins, he 
must be s. responsible agent. Though the terms i n which Muslims 
think about this whole question of "freedom" are often very dif- 
ferent from ours, on this particular point they come close to the 
Kantian formula that "Ought implies Crn ". The statement, "they 
all deny that God imposes E duty on (yuksllifu) man which he is 
not able (or has not power) for" (,yegdiru)i could almost be reduced 
to "takiif implies gudrs. ". Even "the man God knows will not 
believe" is commanded to have faith and is able for it; while 
paralytics and those permanently lacking in power have no duties 
imposed on them $s 
This formulation of the doctrine of human responsibility in 
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terms of power led to difficulties of its gran. The opponents 
of the _llîu'tazila:: took over the conception of power and used it to 
express their own view. They supposed th--t for each act com- 
monly ascribed to a men God created the requisite power in the man, 
but it wes merely power for this one cet and not for anything else; 
the man had no power for any .other act or even for leaving this one 
undone. Consequently the ;,wtteziit view had to be made more 
precise: men hes power over both the act and the opposite of it, 
and this power does not oblige him to the doing of it.3r 
This view wEs common to all the MuCtezile, and is not special- 
ly connected with Abu ' 1- Hudheil , but it seems to be not unrelated 
to his analysis of human power End activity, and in particular to 
his conception of "moments" or "times ", which was widely accepted 
by the Muttazile. The conception is briefly stated thus: 
is able to ect in the first, and he acts in the first, 
and the act occurs in the second; for the first moment is the 
moment of ,yef ̀ alu., and the second moment is the moment of fatela. 
"The moment is the division (faro) between acts and it ex- 
tends through the interval from ect to e.ct, and with every 
moment there originates an act."2.1 
In some ways this may seem obscure and confused. The point 
is, however, that Abu Y 1 Hudhc.il is not thinking so much of time 
ES measured by the clock, but rather of time es experienced, in a 
somewhat Bergsonian sense. The two parts of the verb "ect" in 
the first quotation hove not been translated because much of their 
point lies in their untranslatable associations. The normal 
translations would be "he will act" (or "he acts ") and "he acted ", 
but, as is well known, while they correspond roughly to our 
tenses, 
the distinction between them is rather that between incomplete 
and 
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and completed action - a distinction very difficult for the 
Western mind to grasp. There is about the imperfect ,TFfcein 
(and still more about yafcala, the subjunctive of it, which might 
just as well be the reading of the text) the suggestion of en a.ct 
thought about but not carried out - either still in progress, 
or not yet started. This seems to be the point of the distinc- 
tion drawn by Abu 3l -Hudha il. The first montent or time is that 
in which the internai or mental aspect of the act takes place, the 
decision to do X rather than Y, and the issue of commands to the 
body; the second moment or time is that of the execution of the 
act in the external or physical sphere. Al -Shi -. irastgni describ- 
es this Ais a distinction between "acts of the heart" and "acts of 
the members ".2 
Al -1 azzEm added a. slight refinement to the conception, and 
this was generally accepted. 
";Tan is able in the first moment to act in the second moment. 
Before the existence of the second moment it is said that the 
act will be performed (yufc.__lu) in the second moment; when the 
second moment has existed, it is said that the act has been 
performed (fucila) . That of which "will be performed in the 
seco:ld" is predicated before the existence of the second is the 
same as that of which "has been performed in the second" is 
predicated when the second moment has come into being. "s 
When .Abu 1 1- Hudhail said "the man acts in the first", the imper- 
fect yaftalu suggested that the action had already started (though 
the act was also said to be in the second) . Al- Na.zze7m admits 
that the imperfect (in the passive) may properly be applied to the 
act in the first moment, bu t by adding "in the second" he shows 
that the action has not yet commenced, strictly speaking. Ap- 
parently _he wants to make it quite clear that the essential action 
is the outward action. At the same time he does preserve the 
IV. 3. BO. 
important distinction, drawn by Abu. ' 1- Hudhell , between the mental 
and phyysicel aspects. 
The connection between these two aspects is the subject -r_:. -tier 
of the doctrine o° the will as necessitating (mUjibs) , which wes 
accepted and rejected by those who accepted and rejected the con- 
ception of moments respectively. This doctrine states that, 
where what is willed is immediately after the volition, the volition 
(or will) necessitates the object willed. Ii other words, the 
mental and physical aspects are insepara: 41y joined in a single 
whole .` 
Further discussions of these topics eppeer to be due to e con- 
fusion of the two aspects. So long es one is thinking of the 
power as a power of willing, rather than as the physical power of 
executing what is willed, it is not necessary to suppose that the 
power remains after the volition; therefore when. the physical act 
occurs the agent may be wholly without the power. Abu 1- 
Hudha.il held that a man may actually be impotent in the second time 
when the act occurs - a little speech may accompany dumbness, 
action (movement) may accompany death. The discussion whether 
the power of speaking with the tongue and the power of walking with 
the fóot are the same or different, and whether their "place" 
(rna1 e.li) is the same or different, shows s similar confusion. If 
the power is mental (or volitional) , the two are the same; if it is 
physical, they are different 
.k3 
What became the standard formula. of those who held the doctrine 
of Qa.dar, namely, that the power is before the act, is also con - 
nected with the conception of moments or times.. power is 
the "internal" or "metal" power of willing, of deciding between 
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the act and its opposite; this belongs to the first moment, End 
must therefore be prior to the act, which belongs to the second 
moment. 
.Apart from this fruitful conception of times or moments Abu 
al- iu.dha.il has little to ssy about the subjects considered in 
the present study. His interests were very largely in physics 
or at least in the physical side of metaphysics, and not in the 
practical religious life, unless indeed oust sources have enle rged. 
this aspect of him unduly. 
The lduttEzila in general professed belief in God -:s ell- 
powerful and the source of Ell power, but in matters of detail 
t_ief had to acknowledge limitations. There was the question 
of evil , for instance . Abu '1-Hudhail , with many others , held 
that God had power to do evil, but that He did not actually do it 
because of His wisdom and compassion.'* Alternatively he argued 
that evil proceeds only from deficiency, that there is no defici- 
ency in God, and that therefore it is impossible to suppose Him 
doing evil.141 
Apart from evil, and apart from the sphere which TTe has en- 
trusted to men, Abu 'l- Hudha.il spoke of a limitation of God's 
power, or at least of Is objects of power (megdizrT:t) these, he 
held, possess an end and a. sum, that is, are not infin.ite.0 
In this he was under the influence of the Jehmïye, who interpreted 
the verse "He is the First and the Lest" Cs denying to creatures 
implying 
E share in God's eternity, and conseç_uentlyAthe disappearance of 
all that is not God.2 This view lies behind some of the crit- 
icisms Abu 'l- hludha.il makes of the theories of other 
theologians.t 
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The immedi&té pupils of Abu / 1- F[udhail seem to hEve been even 
less interested than their mester in questions concerning prscti- 
ca1 religion. `'othing is reported about Fish2m b. tAmr El- Fuwati 
in the subjects here considered, apart from his rejection of the 
conception of times or moments, although in other fields he bitterly 
opposed his teacher. 
IbrEhim b. Seiyrr l- Nezzâ.m hEdfvErious specis.l metaphys- 
ical interests which led him along original lines. In some 
matters_ such as the conception of moments, he accepted 
Abu )1- Hudhail's views with criticisms and amendments. his 
denial that God has power over evil , where others lied held that I -Ie 
had the power but could not use it, is possibly due to a ;aeta- 
physical objection to the affirmation of .n unrealizable potential- 
ity.j 
It is clear, however, that al- Nazz -.m wee one of the more 
r6tionalistic of the TiUctazile. He attributed to his rational 
ideas of value such absoluteness that God Himself must bow before 
them. God must do wht is best for men; God must not assign 
men to Paradise or hell except in accordance with just principles. 
Thus Reason is really made supreme in the universe, but the pro- 
blem of the relation of Reason and God is not tackled. 
Al- NazzTm also appears to have been the first to make the 
point that for a proper choice the me.n must have before his mind 
two ammmama "suggestions ", one telling him to go forward, the 
other to desist.D It is an indication of the difference between 
early Islam and the modern West that this foreign seedling never 
really developed in îs luslim 
zv . 
4. Bishr b. al- Mu'tamir. 
While in Basra Abu 31- hudheil end al- azz;6m were thus working 
et some of the philosophical preliminaries of the problems of evil, 
predestination and the like, Bishr b. al- Mu'temir., the reputed 
founder of the school of Baghd 7d, together with his followers 
there, were dealing with some of the more strictly religious and 
moral aspects of these problems. Bishr wes rather more naive, 
or at least more primitive. There is no mention of any belief 
in Reason on his part. On the contrary, it is clear that he 
clung to the traditional belief that God is the Lord of life and 
death, so that, however much power over things He might ascribe 
to man, he always excepted this.? Yet his mind was sufficient- 
ly subtle to grasp the distinction between temporal and logical 




End. in calling attention to the two aspects of the 
83. 
will of God, as part of His essence and as part of His activity, 
he Was possibly preparing for the later distinctions between 
God's active : nd essential attributes .f 
The analysis of human activity occupied Bishr and led to his 
well -known doctrine of tawallud or al -fi`1 l- mutawalled, the 
doctrine of "generated or secondary effects ", which states that 
whet is generated from a man's act is also his act. =6 It seems 
possible that this may be e correction of the view of TiUtammar, 
who had taught Bishr. i1 'Aucarnmar, under the influence 
of for- 
eign philosophers, probably Greek, had held that the 
accidents 
which inhere in e substance Ere the "acts" of the substance 
by 
reason of its nature or constitution. That 
would mean that, 
when A flings E. stone and hits B and the part 
hit swells, the 
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flight of the stone is ti.Le n& ctt of the stone, end the pain and 
swelling Ere the oect'i of B's body.! In opposition to this Bishr 
holds thet ell these generated effects Fre the act of A. 
Bishr perhaps went to excessive lengths in the epplicetion of 
this conception. The list of examples he used includes: the 
teste of felTidhE j (E sweetmeat) rafter the ingredients Pre mixed 
together, the pleasure from eating something, perception upon 
opening the eyes , the breaking of F. fiend or foot upon E. f P Li end 
its sound condition upon the proper setting of the bones. i ore - 
over, B's knowledge that A has struck him is i.'s act, B's per- 
ception of things Etter A :yes opened his eyes is AS act, B's 
blindness when he Les been blinded by A is J's act. Wilile this 
conception of geners.ted e: fects Was widely accepted by the Muttezils, 
they tried to avoid esserting or implying that man WES able to 
nuke such things es colours , pleasure end soundness of body. :9 
These criticisms should not blind us to the fsct thst this is 
essentially en assertion of man's power to control and determine 
events , not merely in his own body, but also in the external world. 
Indeed, apart from E possible confusion between creating and caus- 
ing (which is perhaps no more then looseness of statement) , this 
is for the Western mind an obvious End. eminently common -sense view. 
Whet is surprising is the opposition it provoked among :iuslims. 
It íias to be admitted, however, that the general conception 
of human activity underlying the theory is not so satisfactory. 
Although Bishr held that man consists of flesh and spirit,ó.7 only 
one plane is considered in dealing with men's actions, the plane 
of the physical. "En's power to act, in his view, consisted 
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in health end soundness of the limbs end freedom from infirmities. 
The physical or external aspect likewise .ppeers to be the besis 
of the distinction between whet is "generated" and what is not, 
for the "generated" ect is one which physically goes beyond the 
.gent's body. In keeping with this ettitude Bishr rejected 
Ibu ' L- :iud.heilIs distinction between the physical and mentel aspects 
of activity, as expressed in his conception of "moLients" end the 
doctrine thet the will necessitates . =3 
The omnipotence of God wes to ken more seriously by Bishr 
than by most of the _,uttezile . He even seems to he,ve used it 
in e curious way to deal_ with the problem of evil, arguing that 
because God is omnipotent there must elw2ys be something better 
that He cEn do. Since His goodness is infinite and without 
limit, it is absurd to expect thet eny ectue.l manifestation of it 
is the best ; all that men may fairly expect of God is thet he will 
do whet is best for them in their religion, namely, remove all 
disabilities which prevent them from fulfilling His requirements. 
In general God is not obliged to do whet is best for men. =4 
Bishr was eimost certainly thinking here of the concrete problem 
of those who die es unbelievers end go to Hell fo_r. eternity; God 
cannot be seid. to do whet is best for these men, for some of them 
might have believed had they lived longer; end there are children 
who would hove professed Isir-m had they lived longer.. =may 
Pert of his argument for this position is the assertion thet 
God .hrs in store e gift or fevout (dinde 'll -.h lutf) , such thL:.t , 
if He bestowed it on e man He knows will not (? does not) believe, 
that man will believe and will merit the reward of feith.56 There. 
does not seem to be anything technical about the term lutf, and 
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it should certainly not be identified with the Christian concep- 
tion of grace; doubtless -bishr used it to cover God's succour and. 
guidance (and. his followers may have restricted it to this), but 
there seems to be no reason.why he should not also have included 
Ps one type of favour the prolongation of r men's life to give him 
a. chsnce to believe. =' 
5. The later school of BeghdFd. 
While Bishr still moved very largely among the conceptions 
of the QurITn, and his immediate successor, ibü LUsg el- i,urder., 
had a similar outlook, there was e greet change with the following 
Veneration of the IvIii tazils of Beghd d. Of "the two Js fsrs" 
and El- Isk7fï, pupils of al- urdEr. , Je`fer b. Mubsshshir shows 
least trece of the influence of Basra. The other two were 
clearly much influenced both by Abu 'l- Hudheil and al- I\azzTm, 
and are said to have been pupils of the latter.! 
L) Ja.tfsr b. Harb. 
Jatfcr b. 1 arb (d.236) was probably slightly older than a,l- 
IskTfT (d.240 or 241) , and we.s certainly closer to the outlook 
of Bishr. He alone of the Tvutta.zile, accepted Bishr's ides of 
the favours God is able to bestow on man, and he accepted it only 
with an important modification. With God's favour the unbeliever 
comes to believe, but his faith does not have the same merit that 
it would have had without God's favour, and he does not receive 
the same reward..... For Jac-far the favour took the form of assist- 
epce or succour, which left less for the men himself to do in 
order to have faith; end he implicitly acknowledged that whet 
counts is not simply what a man does, but whet he does by His own 
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effort. Between Bishr End Jecfer the difference between vol- 
tintary action and involuntary potion (or action under compulsion) 
had become more clearly understood, and it was in tree light of 
this fuller understanding that Je'far made this modificEtion.7a- 
the beginning of 
This is indeddnwhpt might be regarded es the romantic period 
of the school of BeghdM - the period when they were attempting 
to scuere the facts of life with aprioristic conceptions of whet 
ought to be. Jetfer had really -iven up Bishr's solution of 
the _problem of evil for that of el- NazzFm, or at least one based 
on his rationalism; eventu.='lly he became aware that the doctrine of 
God's favour was inconsistent with his other views end abandoned 
it. Goodness was no longer regr -riled as having infinite degrees; 
al --Jazz .m had taught that there was something of the nature of a 
limit about goodness; of e. certain thing you could assert absolutely 
that it was "best "; the infinitude of God's goodness lay in His 
being able to do an infinite number of things which were equally 
good.= Jatfer likewise held that God does what is best; he 
sets men in the best and highest mansion, which is the "mansion 
of reward" , where he is the subject of duties . It is better 
be 
for man to have duties imposed on him and.Agiven the power to per- 
form them and then, if he does perform them, be rewarded with 
tat tEE4 Paradise, than to be created at once in Paradise by the 
specie 1 unmerited grace of God (tefeddul) . Evil is presumably 
explained. on this view as due to man's misuse of the power commit- 
ted to him; and, as in the case of similar views in the Christian 
West, too much emphasis is placed on rfien's ability to earn Para- 
dise for himself. 
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Abu ,1- Hudhail's influence is seen in Jatfer's acceptance of 
the conception of "moments" and its corollary, the doctrine of the 
necessitating will;N but when he says that the power is reci'ired 
when the acts exists , not for the act, but to prevent the absurd- 
ity of en acct being performed by .-n impotent person, one cannot 
but suspect that he is not fully emancipated from Bishr's physical 
conception of activity, and has not fully grasped the distinction 
between the physical and mental espects. 
Besides the minor ouestion of "suggestions" in which he fol- 
lowed el-Na_zz the letter's influence is seen in the question 
of unrealizable potentialities, though Jatfa.r apparently rescted 
against it. He Pvoided spying that God is able to do evil, 
however, end merely stated (in line with the YJuttezilT. account of 
human power) that he is able to do both justice and its opposite 
end truth and its opposite. The logical puzzles about whether 
God could be said to have the rower of doing evil when it wes 
proved that He did not do it ra Tr be the result of criticisms of 
al-New Em (though Jai`far also argued personally with du.6lists)i6; 
at any rate Jatfar found a satisfactory solution. The discuss- 
ions about the "men who is hindered" (- l- ma.mnTIt) are perhaps con- 
nected with this point; Jacfer maintained that e faculty or pot - 
eXsfe 
entialityheven when it was prevented from functioning or being 
realized, just as a man continued to h<<ve sight although he wes 
blindfolded.77 
b) Al- IskFfl. 
Ab/ Je tfar MUhemmad b. cAbdallPh al- Isk7f1 was probably 
slightly younger than Jatfer b. Herb, and, while agreeing with 
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hirn in many things, was farther from Bishr e.nd more i. nder the influ- 
ence of al- Ne?,zgm. 
He apparently tried to reinterpret the doctrine of generated 
effects in eccordshce with the views of Abu )l- Hudhsii. He 
hsd accepted tAe conception of "moments", though he shared the con- 
fused view of Jecfer about it being absurd if there was no power 
when the ect occurred.. The further step which he took wss to 
define the generated. effect, not es thet which wes extern< l to the 
agent's body, but es whet lay outside his intention, thet is to 
say, whet is not connected with the internal or mental aspect of 
men's activity! His reflections on these matters Elso led 
him to e refinement in the doctrine of the will as necessitating, 
for he sew that some of the effects which a men wills and intends 
ere confined to his own body whereas others go beyond it, and 
that the latter are not necessitated in the seme way es the former 
8s 
The question of evil wes evidently becoming more insistent, 
perhaps owing to the ettecks of duelists. 'rnn.amed critics 
of the Yluttazila objected to Jetfer b. Herb's assertion thet 
God willed unbelief different from belief and bese, because it 
suggested that God willed u.nbelief.J It is quite likely thet 
El- IskTfi first mede this objection, for he himself avoided relet- 
ing God to evil in this wey by holding thet things were good end 
bed in themselves, end not because God. willed them so. 12- He 
presumably concurred in datfe.r's explanation of evil es due to 
man's misuse of the power God hed given him, but, even when this 
Led been granted, illness and the sufferings of children 
end 
animals remained to be accounted for. (Some 
of the views on 
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these matters are reported anonymously, but they were almost cert- 
ainly worked out in the school of Ba.ghdFd about or just efter this 
time.) 
The problem of the sufferings of children was probably the 
first to arise, since it had aireedy occupied the shewUrij. 
Bishr, or someone who adopted his position, had_ admitted that for 
the children to suffer and then receive an indemnity (such as ad- 
mission to Paradise) was not so good as the experience of plessure 
without pain; but God was not obliged to do whet Was best.g3 When 
one held, however., -that God did what was best, the matter became 
more difficult. The suggestion, attributed to Bishr, that the 
sufferings of children were a sort of anticipatory punishment of 
the sins they would have done when they grew up likewise did not 
help very much. The common view in later times WES tha..t God 
allowed the children to suffer in order to warn adults, and then, 
since it would be unjust if He simply harmed them in this way, He 
them 
indemnifiednby giving them pleasure. This raised further pro- 
blems, however, for if the indemnity was entry into Paradise and 
was everlasting, and if Paradise was the reward merited by re- 
sponsible acts of obedience , then they. could not merit such an in- 
demnity; it could only be given to them by God's grace.! The 
divergencies on these matters make it evident that the ideas of 
human reason are beginning to show their inadecuacy. And deeper 
questions lurk just round the corner; for, if children who have 
never received the call to Islam are in the same ultimate position 
as devout juslims, is there any reason why God should not have 
created the inhabitants of Paradise actually in Paradise and not 
submitted them to the trials of earthly existence? 
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The cuestion of the sufferings of brute beasts is mainly 
theological curiosity, though it also further illustrates some 
of the points considered. The generel view wa-s that in fairness 
they ought to receive some s or. t of indemnity for their sufferings; 
_certainly they could not be sent to Hell or to everlasting punish- 
ment, since they had had no duties imposed on them. Some theo- 
logians held we could only know they were indemnified, but not 
how it wes done, nor whether here or elsewhere; others ventured 
on suggestions. For grazing animals it was easy to ias.gine 
them being given everissting enjoyment in Paradise in the best of 
pastures; but bef'sts of prey were e. little more difficult. ' In 
this connection mention is made of the Stopping -place (mewcif), 
end one suggestion is that they there retaliate upon one another. 
Most ingenious of all is the idea of Jelfer b. Herb and el- IskTfi 
that the besets of prey, after receiving their indemnity (which 
may be either on earth or in the Stopping- place) are sent to Bell 
for the punishment of unbelievers and evildoers, but do not them- 
selves suffer anything there; doubtless this was to explain the 
mention of animals in ''jell, which would be unjust if it were in- 
tended es punishment.$® 
Although from the standpoint of the evildoer his punishment 
in Hell could be satisfactorily accounted for by principles of 
justice, from God's standpoint there were difficulties. If, 
as the Mucta.ziie held, =1 God may not harm anyone in reality, end 
if the punishment in Hell really hems them (es one would naturally 
suppose) , there is e contradiction. l- Iskrfi apparently felt 
this difficulty for he put forward the view that the punishment 
of :fell is really good and profitable and sound and. compassionate; 
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God is kind to His servants in that while they ere being punished 
in Hell they are being withheld from unbelief. =g Another similer 
passage suggests that whet wee in his mind was that the punishment 
of some sinners in the next world warns end scares unbelievers in 
this world.. According to this view those who ere used es s 
warning appear to be unfairly treated compered with those who are 
warned, and the implication is that the whole world. is created for 
those who eventually enter Paradise. Such a view is by no means 
indefensible, but it certainly presages the failure of the attempt 
to propòund a rational theodicy. 
c) Al- Katbi. 
Apart from reports of the views of "the Ba.ghd2:dis" or "some 
of the Baghddis" in general (certain of which will be dealt with 
in the next section) , little more is heard of any discussions at 
Baghdad of the subjects with which this study is concerned. 
Al- Ihedygt, the head of the school towards the close of the third 
century was mainly occupied in cuite different metters. His 
successor, A.bú Q sim al- Belkhi, known as al- ecbï, (d. 317 or 31V) , 
one of whose chief originel features was an attempt to reduce an 
the Divine attributes to knowledge and. power, is reported to have 
had an atomistic conception of human power:Li? No human power 
endures for two r; moments" but each is created separately in its 
moment. Since a fresh power was created in the second moment 
when the act took place, al -Ka'bi avoided combining action and 
impotence in much the sere wry es his predecessors, Ja' far b. 
Farb and el- Iskà'fï. 
These atomistic conceptions are not new, bñt it is noteworthy 
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citadel 
that they should be gaining a foothold in thee of 
tawallud - for the doctrine of generated effects emanating from 
Baghdá.d is probably the furthest that early ruslim theologians 
went in acknowledging causal connection in the world. About a 
century before al- racb3, for instance, al- Nazzc?m had held that 
every body is created in every moment of its exis ter ce :1 0 
e slightly later date some of the +Iuttazilz. (according to the re- 
port of an opponent) said that the power for each act is originat- 
ed before it and then disappears; indeed, before each act there 
are originated powers for this act and for every possible altern- 
another 
ative, then, when this Tioment has passed , powers forAtiods act 
end its alternatives... An extreme statement of this sort of 
position is that of STaih Qubba.? He completely rejected the 
conception of generated effects; the flight of the stone when 
thrown, for instance, is in no way the act of the person who threw 
it, but is the act of God, and it is quite possible t_- et God may 
not create it in any particular case; likewise, if God so wills, 
He can combine perception with blindness, or knowledge with death. 
By the time of al- Baghdädï (early fifth century) the orthodox view 
was that God creates all accidents, and that accidents do not 
endure .4.. 
The reasons for this denial of causation in nature are im- 
portant for our knowledge of Islam, but are hardly within the pro- 
vince of the present study. ' It is sufficient here to note how 
the affirmation of human power is gradually undermined.- 
TV. 
6. The later school oí Basra. 
a.) CAbbsd. 
The discussions at BaghdUd which have j-st been considered 
were taken up in Basra by (i.bbâd b. Sulaim2n, who died probably 
about the middle of the third century. t. bbTd WFS F pupil of 
lish2m b. cx.mr &i- Fuwati, who led the opposition in Basra against 
his master Abu '1- i±udhail. His penchent seems tó have been 
for subtle logical puzzles, which mostly did. not carry him far 
towards the reE.l solution of problems. 
One of the points which concern us here wes his attempt to 
explain the relation of God to evil by using a. distinction appar- 
ently derived from an earlier Besri, MuC2ïimer.4= Just ss e men 
hes power over his wife's conception of e child, although he him- 
self does not have power to conceive a child, so (thought Yiueemmer) 
God may have power over movement (that is, can cause men to move) 
although he himself d es not 'reeve power to move, and likewise may 
have power over evil (sc. the evildoing of men) but not power to 
do evil. This distinction was also used by al- Shahh2m, leader 
of the main body of the uttezile in Bara after. Abu 'l -I udheil, 
and by others who discussed the doctrine of "accuisition ".9= By 
use of the distinction tAbbG.d was enabled to maintain the doctrine 
on which he leid so much stress, that God does no evil in any re- 
spect, while adhering to the view that God is ell-powerful :lc He 
does not seem, however, to have developed the underlying idea. that 
creation is different in kind from any human activity. 
His insistence that God did no evil went to such lengths that 
he is alleged to have denied. that God made the unbeliever, since 
"unbeliever" is a combination of "men" and "unbelief", end God (lid 
y4. 
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not create the "unbelief ".ya He likewise denied that God made 
unbelief base.r Further, contrary to the rest of the Muctazila, 
he maintained that illness and. disease, and even punishment in 
Hell, were not really evil; those who said they were ought, to 
call God an evildoer. (sharir) .'' 
Apart from these extreme statements (or possibly in accord- 
ance with them) tAbb2d reacted against the sentimental and all- 
too-human conceptions of God's ways current in BaghdEd and inclin- 
ed to a more realistic outlook. There was no motive, he held, 
in God's creation of the world (though it is not clear whether 
this means that the universe is not for the benefit of men, or 
that no motive at all is to be discerned.- Likewise, there is 
no purpose in the sufferings God causes to children, and He does 
not indemnify them.l. As for. animals, far from being indemni- 
fied, they are simply collected and destroyed.  The turn of 
expression in his view of whether God does what is best is quite 
in character; "everything He does is permissible, and there may 
not be any good thing which He does not do." "26 There is still 
a touch of romanticism about the second half of that; but it would 
also bear the realistic interpretation: God is good, but His ways 
are inscrutable. 
b) Al- Jubbr'ï. 
Muhammad b. CAbd. al- WahhTb .al- Jubb7' i (d.303), pupil of a l- 
Sha.hh7m and his successor in the "chair" of Abu 'l- ITudhail, and 
teacher of al -As cari, restored. the 2Juttazile of Basra to a pos- 
ition.of eminence. As is only natural his views are cuite 
fully given in the n- rlt. 
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Very noticeable is dais reaction against sonne of the doctrines 
which tended to separate the spheres of Divine and human activity. 
Al- Sha.hh m gently e ccepted the doctrine of "acquisition ", 
for he repeeted. Damn's formula of "one act, two agents" in more 
technical language; e single movement, he said, MP./ be the object 
of power (msadúre) for both God and man, one cresting it and the 
other acquiring it.' If this is interpreted as meaning one and 
the same act, it is the formula of later orthodoxy, end it is cuite 
possible that al- Shs..hh.2m took it in this way.- This was rather 
contrary to üu(tazill" principles, however, and those of the school 
of Baghd2d who took up the conception of "acquisition" made the 
formula of al- Shehhäm apply to an sot of the same sortiW They 
further held that, waea God gave men power over acts of e certain 
sort, He removed all acts of that sort,from His own power.' 
This was in accordance with the distinction between voluntary acts 
and those done under compulsion, since it is impossible for God 
to be the agent of e voluntary human pct. 
Al- Jubb2'i would have nothing to do with all this. He 
maintained that God continues to have power over s clEes of acts 
over which He has given men power.=° he denied the distinction 
of Abb7d between "power over evil" and "power to do evil", where- 
by God might be the creator of something and yet not have it 
ascribed to Him as its agent; if God brought about conception in s. 
woman, he said, then He was "one causing conception" (muubil), 
although this was the word which would n.;rmelly be applied to her 
husband.' His motive in this was presumably to assert that it 
is in one end the same world thet the powers of God end 
man are 
operative, for the disjunction of spheres suggested by the oppos- 
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ing theories is in the long run tentemount to disbelief in God. 
The same motive is seemingly also behind his rejection of the 
2 
conception of "acquisition ", end he de.'ines "creator" (khFliq) 
in such e way - "one who acts, or from whom acts proceed, 
according to a (previous) determination" - that the definition 
can be applied to man.:: This is quite contrary to the trend of 
contemporary discussion, which had been towards restricting "creat- 
ing" to God and permitting even "acting" to be used of man only 
in the sense of "acquiring ".¢ 
Al- Jubb2'T makes it quite clear, however, that he reteins 
the distinction between voluntary end involuntary acts, even 
though he says thet God can compel men to do acts thet ere usually 
in the class of voluntary acts. God may compel men to carry 
out acts of justice and injustice, of faith and unbelief, of 
speech,. and the like; but if He does so, the men may not be de- 
scribed as "just ", "faithful ", "s-pea g ", "pan" "kin for sre. ping means 
"making speech" and similarly for the rest; and if God creates the 
act, then man does not make it '= fie admitted that God had 
"favours", such as His succour (tawfig) , which He could bestow on 
glen, and by whose lid they might believe and do their duty; but 
these apparently did not destroy the voluntary character of the 
action. 
There is also a reaction in ei- Ju.bbr'i against the extreme 
views of tAbbEd and others in denying that God lied any relation 
to evil. Thus tpbbP d bs view thet illness and disease are not 
evil is considerebly modified; these are evil, eel- Jubb7'i admits, 
but only metephoricelly.= Terhers h.e meent by this that, l- 
though they might be unpleasant, that did not prevent them from 
being beneficial, which was the true rilerning of "good "; (they might 
be benêficial by Effording an opportunity for pr. ectising resign- 
ation, or simply by being involved in the restoration of the body 
to lealth).J Similarly he held that punishment in Hell, though 
it does hurt people, is really justice and wisdom on God's pert. 1.2 
Thus whet is at first sight evil ma;I be attributed to God. 
iuch more significant of the change of outlook is the view 
that it is not obligatory for God in sil things to do what is 
best for raen. God must indeed give men what is best for them 
in respect of religion, since otherwise He would stultify His com- 
mend to them to have faith End, along with that, the whole system 
of duties with rewards and punishments attacaed . But apart 
from His imposition of duties on men, He would have had no oblig- 
ations towards them, end; even as things ere, His sphere of oblig- 
ation.is limited; thus, although He is able to do something that 
will enable them to give Him fuller obedience and so to merit e 
greeter reward, He is not obliged to do it:2 
What he has to say about God's "favour" or "favours" -points 
in the same direction. (lutf, alts f) . He denied that God was 
able to bestow a favour thet would make the man He knew would not 
believe into a believer; presumably this Wes because in order to 
be a believer a inn must believe voluntarily, and God had already 
done whet was best for men in respect of their religion. But 
apart from this God did have favours to bestow .ti somewhat 
obscure passage deals with this point.1 First the case is 




and whose reward would be reduced with the bestowel of favour in 
virtue of the reduction of effort on his hart; in this cese it is 
only what will lead to the lesser reward that is incumbent on God, 
namely, to impose duties along with the bestowal of favour. Then 
will not 
&1- Jubbr.'i contrasts with this the case of a man God knowsA 
6.,1)4 dim at Eli without favour, and says that, if God 
poses duties on him in the absence of favour, then it is necessary 
that some advantage should be derived (presumably by God), not that 
tie man's disability should be removed. Such a man has doubt- 
less already received the favours common to all of instruction in 
religion and the like, end, since that s been done, there is 
nothing contradictory about God's purpose; beyond that, it is not 
to be expected thet the men will be shoved or hustled into redis e . 
In other. words , the universe is constructed not for the greatest 
bliss of men but for the fulfilment of what God in His wisdom 
desires. 
The whole legalistic scheme of rewards and punishments was 
showing its inadequacy and falling into discredit. Where for 
his predecessors the crown of all existence had been the attainment 
of Paradise through one's own efforts in obeying God's jaw, to al- 
1,04e. 
Jubbc'i it seemed quite permissible for God to4crea.te& men straight 
off in Paradise, had He so willed W- This would have been en 
act of "uncovenanted grace" (tefe4ç?ul) on God's part, and that im- 
plied that it was no longer regarded es obvious thet the "mansion 
of reward" was .the highest. Both this notion of tafecj ul (which 
seems to make its first appearance here) and that of indemnity 
(Iaw ) for unmerited suffering were much discussed by el -Jubb 
'1!15 
Clearly he was realizing that God's operations cannot be 
fully 
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accounted for by legal conceptions. He even admitted an element 
of inscrutability. God rtia._¡r pardon one man, he sold, r -.nd yet not 
pardon another who has committed exactly the s _me offence .W- 
Through all these varied doctrines two mein tendencies can be 
traced. One is towards the correction of the overemphasis on 
man's power and self -sufficiency. To perform one's duty and 
earn the reward of Paradise by one's own striving is no longer the 
supreme ideal of human life. There is, on the contrary, some 
recognition of man's weakness; he is P. creature who requires God's 
succour and Gad's pardon. The second tendency, which is com- 
plementery, is towards the recovery of something ofAprimitive real- 
ization of God's omnipotence. To some extent God's ways may be 
beyond man's comprehension. He is not bound by the conceptions 
of human reason - of justice and inj7stice - but only by what 
is involved in His own wisdom, ne. ely, that His operations shall 
not be self-stultifying. 
c) The succession to el -Jubb ,'i. 
With al -Jubb ' i the h[u`tezile reach e parting of the ways. 
They were not pure rationalists, for they had practical religious 
interests; they were even in e sense missionaries of Islam. But 
they had certainly been trying to assimilate Islam to idees of 
Reason; despite the tendencies just described al- Jubbe'1 still pro- 
fessed its 
n. firm belief in the authority of Reason .1.1F The rationalistic 
movement was most evident in el- Nezzâm end in those influenced by 
him like Jecfar b. Herb end el- Isk2.fi. But the simple rational 
scheme of these men began to break down as it was confronted more 
and more with the complexity of actual life. Symptoms of this 
Iv. 6,c. 
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ire already apparent in eAbba`d. -fresh idees must therefore be 
introduced by war of addition or modification, or else the whole 
scheme must be given up. With al- Jubbr'i the additions and 
modifications have become so extensive that the main scheme is in 
danger of destruction; it is almost impossible to forma single 
cóherent system (even in respect of the mein problems only) out of 
the congeries of views he seems to have held. 
It is my contention that from this situation there are two 
possible lines of development - retrenchment and advance - end 
that of the pupils of al- Jubbr.'i his son Abü ii shim chose the 
former end al- Ashear3 the :Latter. The little we know of Àbü 
dshim's views on these matters indicates the.t he had moved back- 
wards to e. stricter interpretation of the retionel scheme, with 
more insistence on man's ability to earn his selvetion and on God's 
obligation to act according to the idees of Reeson;t presumably 
this wes done only et the cost of glossing over some of the facts 
for which his father tried to make allowance. PI- Jjshea.ri, es 
will be seen in chapter VI, abandoned Reason as his supreme guide 
and took instead Divine revelation, thus working out to its logical 
conclusion the movement away from human self-sufficiency and 
towards recognition of God's omnipotence already manifest in 
al -Jubb ' ï . 
IV. 
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Note A. Al -fill a1- mub2sher. 
The opposite of a1 -fiel a1 -mutaw fled is al -fi`l al- rnubTsher. 
iviubFs ha.r is the passive participle of bF shera, which means "he 
attended to fit) personally" or "he engaged in "; cp.TJlilal,65, 
where various philosophers are seid to have held to the tradition- 
they 
e1 views except thetixb2sherü. the science of Kel2,m. The best 
be 
translation for al -fill el- ñ1ubFsha.r would nroba:bly^ "irmïledia.te act". 
The original distinction appears to hf ve been between what did. 
and what did not go beyond the a .gent's own body in a physical 
sense. Thus (i.ia.ç.231,1.15) the mubFsher cot is said to be one 
a man does in himself (fi. nefsi -hi) ; and in the following para- 
graph the instances are mentioned of speech, knowledge and action 
alter depth (presumably movements). There is no record of the 
word having been used by Bishr himself, but he probably drew the 
distinction, since he held that a man performs acts in himself 
which are not generated (ghair mutawa.11ad) (402,1.4) . Apart 
from one report about Abu '1- Hudhail (312,1.14), the word is 
mainly used by the followers of Bishr et BeghdFd , Ja'fer b. Herb, 
al- Isk..f! and al -K bi (230,1.9; 232,1.10,14). A1- Iskfi, 
however, used the same terms to express the distinction between 
what is intentional and what is unintentional (wia.c.409; cp. p.89 
above) ; and it seems likely that in some of the instances listed 
mubTsha.r and mutawallad are to be interpreted in this sense (cp. 
IV. 
Note B. Atomistic Tendencies. 
103. 
It is not within the province of this study to discuss fully 
the reasons for the growth a.nd dominance of the Etomistic or 
1?:occesionalist" view of nature, but three relevant lines of 
thought may be noticed. (There are some resemblances to the 
occasionalism of Malebranche, but of course nothing of his theory 
of "occasional causes ".) 
(1) The Muslim writers of the early centuries were more 
interested in logic and grammatical science than in natural 
science, that is to say, more interested in the relations of 
things to words than in causal relations between things. 
Consequently they tended to assume that what has a separate 
name, or can be given one, is a. separate thing - that two 
things which can be distinguished in thought Must be distinct 
in reality. This might be described by saying that their 
perception of difference was more developed than their per- 
ception of relatedness. 
(2) Divine omnipotence must, of course, be conceived in 
terms of human analogies . ?Tnfortuna.tely there is E view, 
predominant in the East, but also widespread in the West, that 
the height of human character is reached when a man, who changes 
his mind according to the whim of the moment, has full power to 
accomplish his wishes. This seems to lie behind the 
.duttazili discussions of whether God has power to go back on 
what He has already decided. He is thought of es acting from 
to 
momentnet moment and not according to any fixed plan. They 
have :ailed to realize that the strongest and best character 
is 
that which is most stable, and that change and 
vacillation are 
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a sign of weakness. The West, perhEps unjustly, suggests 
that this is connected with the irresponsible practices ettrib- 
u.ted by tradition to the great sultans of the Best. 
(3) God's control of the world is thought of as immediate. 
He has no vice-gerents; He delegates authority to none; He does 
not even allow bodies to produce their own accidents. It 
has been seen that the conception of tefwicj, the delegation of 
authority to man in entrusting him with his own acts, did not 
find much frvour as an account of human responsibility. 
Undoubtedly there is important truth in this conception of 
God's immediate control of every event, but it must be bslenced 
by the complementary truths of the stability of His purposes 
and the delegation of authority to secondary agents or causes 
which have e comparative independence. 
V. 
THE UPHOLDERS OF THE D IV INE QAD_AR. 
1. General Considerations. 
Apart from our information about the Muttazila we have only a 
fragmentary knowledge of the movements of Muslim thought from the 
time of HTri-in al- Rashid to that of el- Ashtari. It would hard- 
ly be unfair to the common views to describe the t ihs ; "There 
were the Mutta.zila.; there were the orthodox, who mostly just 
quoted Qur.'Jn and Tradition and made very little use of reasoned 
argument; and there were a. number of large and small, but not 
very intelligent sects." 
The primary reason for this absence not merely of a general 
picture, but even of many important details, seems to be the in- 
historical mentality of Islam. The *uslin theologians' inter- 
est in the truth of a doctrine, though an excellent thing in it- 
self, excludes interest in the stages of the process by which men 
attained to this truth. Change and development they regarded 
as the accompaniments of falsehood; views only formulated in the 
second or third century were alleged to have been explicitly held 
since the days of the Prophet himself.= The chief importance 
of the great theologians of the past was the support they gave to 
doctrines now considered orthodox; whatever slight heterodoxies 
were to be found in them - and how could such fail to be present 
whe i doctrine was still largely fluid and undeveloped? - were 
tactfully left unmentioned rsince these deviations would detract 
from the value of their support. Sectarian views, on the other 
hand, were of interest mainly as a sort of Aunt Sally, which later 
theologians might try their hand at knocking down. It would not 
be greatly exaggerating the case to say that the consequence of 
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this wes that we are told only the unorthodox views of the sectaries 
and only the orthodox views of the "sound" men. 
One of the corollaries of this is that it is not correct to 
think that there was a large uniform body of opinion during the 
second and third centuries which might be labelled "orthodox ". 
and 
There was certainly a. wide field of agreement, hmtAeven the Mu -taz- 
ila. claimed that their views were in accordance with those of the 
ijmdc or consensus of Muslims. But this left much scope for 
deep divergences of opinion among those who were later accepted 
as orthodox. 
In distinguishing between the xxmatxmmvamemkx main strands in 
Muslim theology during these centuries, the question of whether 
man used kalán (reasoned argument) is probably of minor importance. 
Kaidm had to do with the method rather than the subject- matter of 
theology, and as Islam came of age this method spread among MITT 
different groins of Muslims.t If, however, kaaám is taken to 
mean not simply "reasoned argument" in generai, but "argument from 
premisses derived. from Reason (and not from Revelation)," this is an 
important difference; but the evidence suggests that there was 
little kaidm of this sort at an early dater and that even the 
Mu'tazila made the Qur'an the basis of their arguments. Again, 
have definite views and 
the very opponents of kai m, who are presumably free from it ,Ade- 
fend these views in some way or another, and so may be said to have 
a theological position. 
Thus to give an adequate account of the various trends in 
Muslim theology, the net must be cast more widely than Islamic 
writers are in the habit of doing. It is clear that among the 
upholders of the Divine Qedar, as of other orthodox doctrines, we 
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may expect to find both sectarians and also "orthodox" of different 
brands. 
2. Abü .Tanifa and Fiqh Akbar I. 
Filth Akbar I may be taken as illustrative of the beliefs of 
many devout and faithful 1áislins about the middle of the second 
century. Of its ten articles it is the third which chiefly 
concerns the present study: 
"What reaches you could not possibly have missed you; and 
what misses you could not possibly have reached you." 
It is evident that this article belongs to the thought -world 
of Tradition rather than to that of the Qur'an. Taken by it- 
self it represents sheer atheistic fatalism; its non -Islamic pro- 
venance would seem to be proved by the fact that the Traditions 
containing it do not attribute it to Muhammad hinseif.7 On 
the other hand, it has to be admitted that the proposition is 
quite capable of being interpreted theistically, namely, when it 
is God Who is regarded as determining the course of events ; and 
from what we know of Abi lïanifa's position in Islam, we can hardly 
doubt that he did in fact interpret it in this way. 
The real truth of the matter probably is that, while Abü 
Hanifa and other like -minded men of his time adopted the Qur'ánic 
attitude to fatalism and encouraged men to righteousness in con- 
duct ,= it had not occurred to them that it was needful or desir- 
able or even possible to distinguish between atheistic and theistic 
determinism; that is to say, they probably had not noticed the 
difference between the conception of a course of events determined 
by impersonal Time or Fate and the conception of the course of 0 
events determined by God Who is righteous; and therefore they had 
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not considered. the possible effect of the first view in discourages 
injen from acting righteously. Perhaps the Muslim theolog- 
ians never got this distinction quite clear; some certainly avoid- 
ed this proposition, but others were content to retain it.9 It 
is of interest that the commentary o:^ this creed neglects the 
actual wording of the article and discusses definitely theistic 
questions 
is a report that pir r derived the whole conception of 
the mahiya or essence of God from Abñ Hanïfa.i Now this con- 
ception is linked up with an attempt to solve the problem of sit 
the existence of evil in this world where God is supreme by em- 
phasizing the limitations of the human intellect. It would 
therefore follow, if such an interpretation ofthe doctrine is 
himself 
correct, that Abñ HanïfaAha.d tried to deal with the problem of 
evil in this way. Thus, besides his many other services to 
Islam, and despite the allegations of heresy levelled against 
him, he would have played an important part in the development 
of Muslim theology. 
It is not surprising to find in Abú Hanifa these beginnings 
of rational speculation in matters of theology, for his name is 
associated with the movement for the extended use of reason in 
legal questions.= At the same time, however, it has to be re- 
corded that he - and many others along with him - held a conserv- 
ative and somewhat confused position in respect of predestination. 
V. 
3. The Jahmlya and the doctrine of Jabr. 
a) Jabariya and Mujbira. 
The view expressed by al- Shahrestz.ni may be said to be the 
standard one on the subject.= 
"Compulsion (jabr) is the denial that actions really come 
from man, and the attribution of them to God. The Jabariya- 
consist of several groups. The pure Jabariya. are those who 
do not assert any act at all to be man's or any power for. action. 
The moderate Jabariya assert that man has a power which does 
not have any influence at all. As for those who assert *hat 
originated power has an influence in acting end who call this 
"acquisition" (ka.sb) , they are not Jabaris, although the Mu`ta- 
zila apply the term "Jabari" to one who does not assert that 
originated power in isolation (istiglâlan) has an influence in 
production and origination." 
The idea that the orthodox doctrine is a mean between Jabr and 
Qadar is stated in al- Bagridádl's well -known remark that true 
justice lies apart from both Jabr and Çadar.li The example of 
the pure Jabari is Jshm b. Sa.fw5.n because of his statement that 
man does not really act; it is only metaphorically that he is said 
to act, in the same way as the sun is said to shine End the mill - 
wheel to turn. 
On the other hand, this threefolJ. classification of Qadar, 
Kasb and Jabr is not found in any early documents, like the Fish 
Akbar I and II, the Wa.l3ya.t Ab3 Iia.nife , end al- Asheeri's creeds 
in the Mao,älát and the IbEna:.= There is much in the MaoTlâ.t 
about Qadar, but practically nothing about Jabr; the only use of 
the word in the technical sense that I am aware of is in the 
account of an anonymous sect of the REfida. who held that there is 
no ja.br as the Jahmi says and no tafwïd es the Mutta.zila say, but 
the authorities leave it undecided whether man's acts are created 
or not. Similarly the name Ja.bariya is absent from the Maaálgt , 
the Kitá.b a.l- Intisá.r, the Tanbïh of al- Malati, the Sharti al -Fiah 
108. 
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al -Akbar ascribed. to al -" .turidï, and similar works .1! Al- 
Baghdddï does not mention any sect of JabarIya, though he can 
speak of an individual a.s a Ja.ba.ri. L1 In each of the works 
mentioned, however, there is at least one reference to a. sect of 
Mujbira, though in the first three the application of the term 
does not fit al- Shahra.stdni's account of the Jaba.riye. There is 
thus quite a little nest of problems here - who were the Mujbira 
and who were the Jabariya, how did the change come about, where 
do the Jahmiya come in, and so on? 
Much light is thrown on these points by the solitary reference 
to the Mujbira in the Maqglg.t : 
"The Qa.da.riya revile those who disagree with them about the 
Qadar; the Ahl al -Hagq call them Qaderiya. , and they call them 
(sc. the Ahl al -Hagq) Mujbira, and they are fitter to be called 
' Qadarlya.' than the Ahl al- Ithbd.t 
With this may be compared what appears to be the only mention in 
al- Malati's Tanbïh: 
"If you hear someone call a certain person a mujbir and dis- q3 
cuss Cad]. (justice) and ijbgr (compelling) , then he is a QsdarI.e! 
There seems to be no reason to doubt the truth of the essential 
point in both these statements, namely, that mujbir (which might be 
translated "compeller ") was originally a. nickname given to their 
adversaries by those who held the doctrine of Qadar, in much the 
same way as they themselves received the nickname of Qa.darïya.. 
It is in keeping with this that there are something like a dozen 
references to the Mujbira in the Kitä.b ai- Intisgr, a Muttazili 
work; their doctrine is also spoken of as jabr.11z 
The implications of this assertion are noteworthy. Since 
the designation of Mujbira was applied by the Qadsrls to all their 




and moderate Jabariya, of al- ShahrastEnl's classification, but also 
those who held the doctrine of acáuisition; in other words the 
Mujbira must have included those who were afterwards regarded es 
orthodox. 11- ShahrastEnI notes that the Ma ta Lila. use "Jaba.ri" 
in this way. Thus the doctrine of Jebr was originally a doctrine 
held by the orthodox ( though they did not give it that name them- 
selves) , and only at a later date did it become heresy. 
An examination of what can be learnt about the Mujbira from 
the Kitäb al- Intisâr tends to confirm these inferences. No 
names are mentioned, however, so that we have to rely on what is 
said about their views. In opposition to Abu 'l- Hudhail they 
maintained that man has power over a single act only, and not over 
two opposite acts - for example, only over unbelief, and not over 
both unbelief and faith.. Further, they denied that God has 
power over evil or. wickedness ,. 
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they think that God has created 
the world for the good and benefit of His friends and the harm and 
suffering of His enemies,; and the view that an act may proceed 
from two agents is apparently attributed to them. Now all 
these views are held by some or all of the group of men round 
Dirär, al- Najjâ,r and Burghûth, who are collectively referred to by 
al- Ashtari as A.hl al- Ithbât. = This was the group which invented 
and developed the conception of ka.sb, and which would be reckoned 
among the Mutakallimún. But since the Mujbira comprised several 
sects at variance with one another = it is reasonable to suppose 
that the writer included usader this term those who adhered to the 
old views 'opt avoided speculative theology. 
It is impossible to give an exact proof of the stages of the 
transition by which the doctrine of Jabr passed from being ortho- 
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dox to being heretical - from being a description of those who 
held the conception of acquisition to being e description of their 
opponents "on the extreme right ". By making use, however, of 
some points that will receive e detailed demonstration later in 
this chapter and in the following one, I think I am able to give 
an account which has the air of verisimilitude. 
until about the second half of the second century there were 
no important distinctions among the opponents of the doctrine of 
Qadar with regard to this particular point , though of course dif- 
ferent men would express themselves differently. The intro- 
duction of the doctrine of acquisition by Dir-dr marked a new de- 
parture. Gradually as a result of the discussions between his 
followers and the Muttazila an important new point became clear, 
namely, that there was a difference between acting under compulsion 
and acting voluntarily; if God compelled a man to do some act He 
hadG commanded, t_ien the maLL had not really fulfilled the command, 
for what was commanded was to do the act voluntarily . Appar- 
ently there were a few (perhaps merely conservatives, or perhaps 
men influenced by Indian mysticism) who did not accept the con- 
ception of acquisition or the distinction between acting voluntar- 
ily and acting under compulsion; and in respect of these men those 
who did accept the conception and the distinction came in the course 
of time to speak of the doctrine of Jabr - not at once, it would 
seem, but only after the lapse of about a hundred years, that is, 
about 300&A. H. The anonymous sect of the R .f ida. mentioned above 
apparently avoided Jabr but without adopting Kasb. Some of the 
followers of _AMU Hanïfa were the foremost defenders of the doctrine 
of acquisition in the fourth century, and it is not surprising that 
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in the Sharb. al-Fiah al- Akbar they alread -ï criticize the gujbira 
(with views similar to the Jahmiya or pure Jabari.ya of a.l- Shahra.- 
stanï) and regard themselves as taking a middle way between them 
and the Qadariya or. Muttazila. It is significant, and likewise 
confirmatory of what has been said, that al- Ash`ari himself, who 
did not set much store by the concept of acquisition and carne very 
near to Jabr, did not apply this term of opprobrium to anyone, but 
instead used phrases with the word ithbat, and referred to the 
Mu jbire (or some of them) es .ßhl al- Ithbat . 
b) The Jahmiya. 
In al- Ashtari's general account of the views of Jahm about 
half consists of his explanation of the acts of men. 
"No one acts in reality except God alone. He is the agent, 
and men have the acts ascribed to them only by tkm way of 
metaphor. Thus it is said that the stone moves, the sphere 
revolves, the sun sets; and yet it is God Who does that with 
the stone, the sphere and the sun. God has, however, created 
for man a power (qüwa) by which the act takes place, and the 
will for it and the choice of it, whereby he wills it, just in 
the same way as He has created for man height by which he is 
tall and colour by which he is coloured. " =O 
Now Jahm b. Safwân, the person whose views these are reputed to be, 
has a firmer position in general history than most of the theolog- 
ians discussed in this study. He was the secretary of al -I rith 
b. Surai j , who led a revolt in Persia against the TTma iyads in the 
closing years of that dynasty. Jahm himself was killed in 12$/ 
746, while the revolt was still in progress. But the very fact 
of having Jahm's early date so well established raises problems. 
It seems clear that the Jahmïya about whom we hear so much 
belong to the later second century, the third century and even the 
fourth century. Al Ba.ghdädi, who died in 429, says that in his 
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day Jatmi's followers were in Tirmidh, and that some of them were 
converted to the views of the Ashtariya. V By that time they 
were evidently rather obscure, but up to the time of al- Ash;a.ri's 
Ib .na they were apparently very prominent, for in the Ibgna he 
treats them as a major sect, roughly equal to the Murtazila or 
Ha:rürïya (= Khaw .ri j) . In the 71 pages from Khushaish repro- 
duced in al-Malati's Tanbih, 35 or almost exactly half are devoted 
to the Jahmiya (mostly of course to their. refutation) , and there 
are said to be eight sects of them. -1- In contrast with this 
the Murji'a receive 7 pages, the Rgfida 8, the Qadariya 9, and the 
Harüriya or Khawärij 7. A list is given by Ibn Taimïya of 
theologians who wrote a "Refutation of the Jahmiya" or some simil- 
ar work.t? We actually possess the Redd tala 'l- Jshmïya of 
Ahmad b. I;Ianbal , the Ikhtiláf fi 'l-Left of Ibn Qutaiba, and parts 
of the arguments of Muhammad b. Aslam, P friend of Ahmad's . - 
No mention is made of the name of any member of the sect, 
but we are told that Bishr b. Ghaiygth al -M risi (d.218 or 228) 
and his generation spread a. Magna. Jahmiya..= As the majority 
of those who wrote refuting the Jahmiya belong to the first half 
of the third century, it seems likely that the spate of polemics 
may be due to the propagation of views attributed to the "Jahmiya" 
by men like Bishr. But there are also traces of the importance 
of the Jahmiya before this time. They are the only sect men- 
tioned by name in the Figh Akbar I, which dates from about 150; 
and pirGr b. tAmr, who is said to have had Jahm for his Imgm, must 
have reached maturity by about 180.1(f tiugä.til b. Sula.imgn, who 
died in 150, is also said to have opposed Ja.hm.3.1 
Thus there seemsto have been e. group of followers of Jahm 
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from the time of his death onward. For the most part they re- 
mained rather obscure, and we do not know who they were or how they 
came to prominence or where they lived. They seem to have in- 
fluenced Dirar and al-Najjar, especially in their view that our 
knowledge of God is mainly negative, but these men canoot be reck- 
oned among the Jabmiya; nor can Bishr a 1- I'1arïsi, if his views were 
similar to those of al-Najjar.lf As there must also have been 
some development of views between say 120 and 220, we cannot be 
Le 
certain which of the views ascribed to him were actuallyAin explicit 
form by Jahm himself, and which were first formulated by his fol- 
lowers; thus, the remarks about power, will and choice in the 
passage translated above would seem to be later than the debates 
of the Mu'tazila and their opponents on these questions in the 
early third century. It seems necessary, therefore, to regard 
the views commonly ascribed to Jahm as those held by the Jahmïya 
who were contemporaries of Abu )l- Hudhail and his immediate fol- 
lowers, and to leave it an open question how much was explicitly 
held by Jahm who died in 128. 
At first s ight it may s e 'm strange that the Jahmiya , who are 
reckoned among the Murji'a, should hold the doctrine of Jabr, 
whereas Ghailán and his associates, who are also among the Murji'a, 
were the protagonists of the doctrine of Qadar. In chapter III 
it was argued that, in the case of both the Murji'a and the Khawá 
ri j , the doctrine of Qa.dar was bound up with their insistence on 
the righteousness' of God. It was noticed that some sects of the 
r hawärij opposed the doctrine of Qadar and held otthodox views; 
but, to judge from the case of the KhAzimïya, of whom% there is 
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the fullest account á! their. "orthodoxy" was little more than a con- 
servative defence of pre- Isl emic fatalism. Are the views of the 
Jahmiya, then, simply conservatism, or can we trace e truly 
Islamic motive behind them? 
From the standard accounts of the Jahmiya in al- Baghdad5 al- 
Shahras täni and the Maq -61ät, it would seem that the answer to this 
question is certainly that we can trace an Islamic motive. This 
motive would be found in the conception of the absolute and unique 
supremacy of God, or, as Wensinck phrases it, "the overwhelming 
individuality" of God. The Uniqueness and transcendence of 
God is emphasized in the doctrine that God cannot properly be 
called a "thing", for a thing is created and has its like, but 
that is not true of God... Al- Baghdni adds that Jehm refused 
to permit God to be called Living, Knowing, Willing, because these 
attributes belong to other than He; God may only be described by 
attributes uniquely His, such as Powerful, Bringer- into -existence, 
Agent, Creator, Giver of Life or Death.' Thus there is an 
unbridgeable gulf between God and man. 
The somewhat strange doctrine that the punishments of Hell 
come to an end is also connected with the thought of the absolute- 
ness of God, and is not due to any "rationalistic" objection to 
traditional eschatology (analogous to nineteenth century ration- 
alism) . It proceeds from religious feeling, and was commonly 
defended. as an interpretation of a verse of the Qur'an: "He is 
the First and the Last. "tea According to the Jahmiya this meant 
that God continues to be "existent being" (k7.'in ma.wjúd) even when 
there is nothing else; just as there was a "time" before God created 
anything when He alone was, so there will be e. "time", after He 
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hEs ceased to preserve what He hes created, when He alone is; 
further, if God alone is, then both Paradise a.nd. Hell and the 
people in them must have ceased to exist. Apparently the sug- 
gestion that any created being shared the eternity of God, even 
if only in one direction, was felt to be an infringement of His 
unique majesty. : he doctrine of the createdness of the Qur'än, 
which is sometimes said to have been originated by Jahm,=and the 
doctrine that God's knowledge is originated, $foray proceed from the 
same conception of God. 
All this fits in very well with what is said about the doctrine 
of Jabr in the reports of the views of the Jahmiya. It follows 
from this that the doctrine of Jabr as they express it Hies no f:cor 
nection at all with the atheistic fatalism of the Arabs before 
Muhammad, but on the contrary is derived from an intense realiz- 
ation of the majesty of God. Their determinism did not come 
from disbelief in God combined with belief in Fate, but from an 
excessive and unbalanced belief in God. 
This is confirmed by the description of Jahm as muwa$$id.11 
Now a muwa7id (or "assertor of unity ") wes one who was included 
among the Ahl al- Tawhîd (or People of Unity) , and we are further 
informed that such a person might be wither a mujbir or an 
It seems certain that the latter group constituted the Ahl al -aAdl 
wa- 'l- TawhId (people of Unity and Justice) , and this was a name 
given to themselves by the Muctazila; Abu 'l- Hudhail is said to 
belong to the Ahl al- Tawnid,7 and there are many resemblances be- 
tween his views and those of the Jahmiya. Thus the Jahmïya 
have a n established place among the "unitarians" of the Islamic 
community, and their doctrine of Jabr is linked up with their 
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thoroughly Islamic conception of the unity and uniqueness of God. 
Such et least is the conclusion et which we arrive when we 
consider merely what have been termed the standard accounts of the 
Jahmiya.. But some of the facts brought to light by the long 
extract from Khushaish in p l- Mela.ti's Tanbih require some modific- 
ation of our account of the Jahmiya... The same themes occur, 
but in rather heightened form - the assertion that God is not a 
thing or at least is dissimilar from all creatures, God's omni- 
presence in an almost pantheistic sense (which is bound up with 
the denial that He is in heaven and seated on the throne), the 
impossibility of knowing God or of making any positive assertions 
about Him, the denial of various eschatological conceptions. 
Now it was previously known that Jahm's speculations were said to 
have started from the attempt to refute the Indian sect of the 
Sumanïya or Samaniya.' According to the version of Khushaish,: 
Jahm was so seriously troubled that he did not say his prayers 
for forty days , on the ground that he could not pray to One he 
did not know. The impression given by this account is that the 
Jahmiya, or at leaSt some of them, had been deeply influenced by 
the religions they were combating. The Sumaniya mostly denied 
the resurrection after death and believed in some form of trans- 
migration of souls; and some such basis of metempsychosis, togethi 
er with final absorption into the Deity, would be a ground from 
which many of the tenets of the Jahmiya could easily be compre- 
hended. 
It would be out of place in this study to try to discover the 
exact provenance of these doctrines of the Jahmiya. But even 
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if, as seems likely, they grew up under non- Islamic influence, it 
nevertheless remains true that the majority of the Jahmiya. were 
essentially within the fold of Islam, nourished from its initial 
impulse, end developing in their own way one side of its teaching. 
The reply to the overemphasis of God's righteousness is the over- 
emphasis of His majestic and almighty unity. The opponents of 
the Jahmiya may justly have thought that they were fighting some- 
thing foreign threatening Islam, but, because of the truly Muslim 
element in the Jahmiya, this debate helped the community to a 
more adequate expression of its own essential beliefs. 
4. Dirär and the Ahl a.l- Ithbat. 
a) pirar. 
The statement of al- Ma.la.till that before 'Abu 'l- Hudha.il it was 
Dirâr b. 'A.mr who had the ma'lis and ka.lam in Basra throws light 
on the mystery that had hitherto surrounded Dirr_r and helps us to 
understand something of his importance. He was the leading 
teacher or lecturer in the field of speculative theology and mete- 
physics in that intellectual centre of the Muslim world. He 
stood sufficiently c se to the Jahmiys for Bishr b. al -Mu tamir to 
say that his "Imam is Jahm" ? while Ibn e1- RawandI assigned him to 
the Multa.zila; = but the accounts of his views in the various books 
of sects show that there was considerable independence in his 
attitude. 
pirar is almost certainly the first exponent of the conception 
of "acquisition" or "appropriation" (kasb, iktisab) which eventu- 
ally became the orthodox account of man's voluntary activity. 
Al- Ash`ari reports: 
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"The ground Of the separation of Dirgr b. CAmr from the 
Muttazila was his view that the acts of men axe created, and that 
one act comes from two agents (fr,cilan) , one of whom creates it, 
namely God, while the other acquires it (iktasaba) , namely man; 
and that God is the agent of the acts of men in reality , and 
that men are the agents of them in reality.".* 
The point of this conception wa.s probably to make plain the dif- 
ference between voluntary human acts and the "acts" of inanimate 
objects. Human acts certainly proceeded from the agent and 
could be attributed to him in much the same way as falling is at- 
tributed to the stone and setting to the sun. But in the case 
of human agents there was also a more active or positive relation; 
to describe this it might be said that the man ma.cr_uired" the act, 
or "appropriated" it , or made it lis own" (kasaba, iktasaba) . 
It was thought that in this way human responsibility was sufficient- 
ly safeguarded, while the parallel statement that God created the 
acts of men fully admitted His omnipotence. 
The selection of the word kasaba. to describe this special 
relation of man to his acts is probably influenced by its use in 
the Qurlán, especially the verse: 
"God will not burden (la yukallifu) any soul beyond its 
power. It shall enjoy the good which it has acquired, and 
shall bear the evil for the acquirement of which it laboured 
(la -hP má kasabat wa- ̀ alai -h . ma` 'ktasabat) .*4 - 
Despite the fragmentary character of our records we are able 
to get glimpses of much reflection and speculation on questions 
like that of the nature of substance. In this connection DirTr 
held that accidents which are other than bodies do not exist for 
two times (zamdnän) ; this is perhaps e beginning of atomism, but, 
since he held that man's power (istit2.`a) was both before and ac- 
56` 
companying his act, he cannot have been a consistent atomist.s 
In respect of "generated effects" his view, - in accordance with 
V. 4, a.. 120. 
his doctrine of acquisition - was that they are the act of both 
God and man; those effects of his act that e man could have pre -' 
vented had he so willed belong to his act, á' Another reference 
shows that pir2r, or at least his followers, were involved in the 
discussions about God's "making unbelief wicked "; they also held 
that God made the unbelief .1: 
From the standpoint of the present study the most important 
feature of his teaching is his doctrine of God's essence (mahiya) .? 
The point of this doctrine, which is said to have been handed down 
from Abü Hanifa=9 - the point to which the Muctazila objected - 
was that man could not know God's essence or "what He is" (mg huwa), 
or, as we might perhaps say, know Him as He is .G2 God knows 
Himself immediately, by looking at Himself "face to face" as it 
were (shahá.da) , whereas we can only know Him by proof and inform- 
ation about Him (khabar - referring to what we learn through 
revelation) . iI In Paradise men will receive a sixth sense whereby 
they will be able to "see" God's essence, that is, to know Him as 
He knows Himself. 
With this doctrine of God's essence is connected his view that 
God's names only convey to us negative knowledge about Him; to say 
that He has power only means that He is not ignorant, and so on.= 
This is important because it is a recognition of the limitations 
of the human intellect in attempting to know and understand God. 
In this Diri.r stands in complete contrast to the ïaïuttazila of 
Baghdád (who were later than he) , but perhaps his influence helped 
to bring about the reaction of al -dubb .' I against the buoyant 
self -confidence of Baghdád. 
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b) Al -Na j j är . 
The views of al Husain b. Muhammad al- Najjá.r ere very similar 
to those of Dír?.r. Despite the order of al- BeghdEdi and a.l- 
Sha.hra.stäni, however, al- Na.jjä.r is certainly the younger, and was 
probably a. pupil of Dirr.r's . i3 The general account of his views 
given by al- Ashtari contains much that is valuable for our present 
purpose: 
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"Al- Husain b. ivíuhammad el -Na j jär and his followers, the 
usa.iniya, held: 
(1) The acts of men are created by God; men are the doers 
of them. 
(2) There is nothing in the sphere of God's sovereignty 
except what He wills; He is ceaselessly willing that what He 
knows will be in its time will be in its time, and willing 
that what Iie knows will not be will not be. 
(3) The power (istite'a) may not precede the act; the help 
('awn) from God is originated in the time (}ßä.l) of the pct 
along with act, and this is the power. 
(4) One power is not sufficient for the performance of two 
acts, but for each act a power is originated along with the 
origination of the act; the power does not endure ; the exist- 
ence or non -existence of the act depends on the existence or 
non -existence of the Hower. 
(5) The power of faith is succour, right direction, grace, 
kindness, benefit, guidance (tewfia, tasdid, fa.dl, niema, ihsgn, 
hudE) ; the power of unbelief is confusion, abandonment, 
affliction, evil (dalal, khidhl5.n, ba12:' , sharr) . 
(6) Ah act of obedience may exist in the time of the sin 
which is the not doing of it, provided it is not the sin which 
consists in not doing the act at that particular moment, or 
provided tha t the moment is not a Moment for the sin which 
consists in not doing the act. 
(7) The believer is a believer, one following the true 
religion (muhtadin), whom God succours and guides; the unbe- 
liever is abandoned, one whom God abandons and leads astray, 
on whose heart He makes an imprint (or "sets a seal" - ta.ba'a), 
whom He does not guide nor regard; God creates his unbelief, 
and does not do what is good for him; if God regarded him and 
did what was good for him, he would be sound. 
(8) God may cause suffering to children in the future life, 
or he may show unmerited favour (yatefaçldalu) to thhem and not 
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cause any suffering. 
(9) If God in His kindness wanted all 
believe , He is able to perform such favor 
for them that they would believe. 
(10) God has imposed duties on the unb 
are not able to perform, not because of 
or accidental infirmity, but because they 
li- ta.rki -him la -hu) . 
(11) Man does not act in another, but only performs acts in 
himself, such as movements, rest, volitions, cognitions, unbelief 
faith; man does not make pain, nor perception, nor vision; he 
makes nothing at all by way of "generation" (tawallud) ... (here 
Burghuth is mentioned)... 
(12) God is ceaselessly generous in that avarice is denied 
of Him, ceaselessly speaking in the sense that He is ceaselessly 
not impotent for speech (kaläm); the speech or word of God is 
originated and created. 
(13) In respect of the assertion of the unity of God al- 
Na j jrr held the doctrine of the Tiuttazila , except with regard 
to his will and generosity; he opposed them in respect of Qa.dar; 
and he held the doctrine of postponement 0irjá' - the dis- 
tinguishing merk of the .u.rji' a) . 
14) God may change the eye into the heart, and give the eye 
the power of the heart, so that man sees God with his eye, that 
is, knows Him with it; God cannot be seen by the eyes except 
in this way. 
(15) The man who dies dies at his term, and the man who is 
killed is killed at his term. 
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the unbelievers to 
rs or gifts (altá.f) 
elievers which they 
ny inborn impotence 
do not do them 
(16) God gives man sustenance both of what is lawful and of 
what is unlawful ; sustenance is of two kinds , sustenance of food 
and sustenance of property. "e" 
iiluch of this speaks for itself, and a few brief remarks about 
it will suffice. Al- Najjar has taken over Pir2r's view of the 
negative character of our knowledge of God's attributes. = He 
avoids the innovation of pirEr's "sixth sense" by suggesting that 
the eye may be given the power of knowing,`6 but still maintains 
the doctrine of mahiya_. t7 He also accepted Dirrr's conception 
of'a.cüuisition;V he appears to have emphasized the difference be- 
tween the operations of God and those of man.1 
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Severel of the articles are in marked contrast to the doctrines 
of the Mctazila which were considered in the previous chapter. 
The omnipotence and supremacy of God are upheld even at the cost 
of His justice. God has absolute control of the course of events, 
so that man can do nothing contrary to what God wills :7X X Whethe r 
a man is a believer or an unbeliever depends on whether God has 
helped or abandoned. him.7= God could, if He so willed, give 
such a gift to all the unbelievers that they would become believers3: 
God's succol'r and abandonment are thought of as effective, and not 
as subordinate to the man's decision (which was the view of the 
Muttazila.) ; but article 10 shows that there was nothing simple- 
minded about al -Na.j j2.r's view. He rejected the contention of 
the Muttazila that the imposition of duties implies the power to 
perform them; but in so doing he made the distinction (even more 
clearly perhaps than Abu !l- Hudhail himself) between physical power 
and volitional power; it is not through impotence or infirmity 
that the man is unable to obey God, but simply throughli the act of 
not obeying Him.. He apparently was more a.tomistic than the 
early Iviu`tazila, and denied that a man's act can have any generated 
effects in another person or thing.I3 He held the strict pre - 
destinarian interpretations of the Term, Sustenance, and the Divine 
operations of succouring, abandoning, and the like, and thought 
God could not be said to be tied by human conceptions of right and 
wrong in dealing with children.f3 There is no record of how he 
would have answered the obvious objection of the iuttazila that he 
was "fixing evil upon God." 
The passages about man's power are very interesting, and 
probably mark the beginning of the orthodox doctrine on these points 
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Direr had held that man's power is both prior to a.rld accompanying 
his act; so it is said; but this probably only means that it had 
not occurred to him to make the distinction. Al- Najjgr intro- 
duced a new atomistic conception of human power; it is power for 
only one act, and every other act reruires a fresh power; it is 
thus originated - created by God, of course - along with each act, 
accompanying the act and not prior to it. From what he ssys 
in article 10 it would seem that he thought of this as volitional 
power es distinct from physical power. Abu 'l- IIudha.il's con- 
ception of times or moments, which tries to equate the distinction 
between the volition proper and the physical act with what comes 
earlier and later in time, may fit those experiences where for a. 
considerable period a man weighs up alternatives before deciding 
between them. In the major part of human activity, however, 
this weighing of alternatives is less prominent, and here al -Nsji is 
theory of the simultaneity of volition and physical act is closer 
to the facts. What seems to Western eyes to be the ult *ete 
difference between the two views, the fact that in the one case 
the power is over only one act and in the other it is over the act 
and its opposite or opposites, evoked little discussion; the whole 
way of looking at the matter was different. Doubtless al -Naj já.r 
had some way of describing how men choose between two alternatives, 
but we are not told what it was; this is where his theory is weak, 
however. 
It is not necessary here to study in detail how his new theory 
of human power affected his conceptions of the body and its parts 
(substance and accidents) , in which apart from this he followed 
Pirgr. =7 Clearly we are dealing with a most important thinker, 
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who influenced the Mutta.zila in their formative period by his op- 
position to their views, and who was a. pioneer in the defence of 
orthodox doctrines by reasoned argument. 
c) Burghüth. 
Muhammad b. íÌs2. Burghüth is commonly said to be a follower 
of al- NajjUrP and his reports of the discussions of the ii,uttazila 
about man's power appear to come from s later, but only slightly 
later, period.2 
One of the distinctive views of Burghüth is that generated 
effects, like the flight of the stone when it is thrown, are the 
act of God through the necessitation of the nature (sc. of the 
thing in question - tabt) ; it is God Who impresses on the stone 
such e nature that it flies when it is thrown. to -Na j jär had 
merely said that e man does not produce any effect in another 
person or thing; Burghüth accepted. this point, but went further 
and attributed the effects to God, not directly, however, but in- 
directly, through the fact that God was the creator of that nature 
of the thing from which the effect was produced. This concep- 
the 
tion ofAeffects or "acts" of a thing proceeding from the nature of 
the thing is doubtless derived from Mutammar,! but, in opposition 
to Mutammar, the effects are said to be the work of God and not of 
the thing in question. The view was not e very happy one, how- 
ever, and found little support. It nominally preserved God's 
supreme control of events, and in particular of whet happens to a 
men (which was presumably why al -Ne j jä.r denied that one man's 
actions can affect another) , but this wa.s not s control from moment 
to moment, since God left the nature of things as He originally 
fixed them; that is to say, the nature of men and of inanimate 
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objects were given some measure of autonomy. 
' Burghuth thus apparently had a considerable degree of belief in 
the omnipotence of God (certainly more than the Ylu'tazila), but 
was unable completely to reconcile this with other conceptions 
that he held. He even seems to have gone to extremes in em- 
phasizing the difference between God and man. He refused to 
apply to God terms which could be used in an insulting way of men, 
for instance "agent" (f6'il).1?- His opponents pointed out that 
create (khalaga) is used insultingly of man in the ur'n, =3a.nd of 
course one could not be prohibited from using this of God, so that 
his attempt to make a complete gulf between God and man broke down 
to this extent. Al- Ba.ghdadi's report that Burghuth refused to 
apply the term "agent" to men belongs to the same circle of ideas, 
and., with the previous point, marks an early stage of the discuss- 
ion whether man really acts 
s`- 
Yet, whatever Burghüth may have thought about the propriety 
of various uses of words, he seems to have grasped the unique 
quality of man's voluntary activity. God, he held, cannot com. 
pel (alja's) a man to be believing, unbelieving, just and so on, 
for the man is commanded to have faith and to avoid unbelief vol- 
untarily (taw °an) , and if he does so against his will (karhan), 
he does not fulfil the commend.. 1 In other words the very con- 
ception of a command presupposes a spontaneous power of obeying 
in the person to whom it is addressed. There is here some- 
thing of the autonomy already noticed with regard to the concep- 
tion of "nature "; the act must in some sense proceed from the 
man himself. But there is no mention of Burghüth having 
criticized the view of his master al- Najjfr that God could per- 
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form such favours for the unbelievers that they would believe; 
it would therefore seem that this giving of favours was regarded 
as something quite different from compelling. 
Burghúth also went beyond a1- Najjá.r in attempting to supply 
an answer to the problem of reconciling God's omnipotence with 
the evil in the world. Once again he seems to have made use 
of ideas derived from Mute mmar. He distinguished between 
"having power over evil" End "having power to do evil ". It was 
easy to show that when God created knowledge or desire it was not 
He Himself but the man in question who was the subject of the know- 
ledge or desire and properly to be described as "knowing" or "de- 
siring".. In the case of evil, however. , God did not create it 
for man - just as He did not create faith or unbelief - so that 
the explanation of evil ' is little more than a restatement of the 
opposites to be reconciled. 
Burghúth presents above all a. picture of a man trying to inter- 
twine two separate strands of ideas, but not making very much pro- 
gress. The metaphysical conceptions derived from Mutammar were 
too greatly out of harmony with the religious ideas of Islam. 
d) The identity of the f.hl al- Ithbgt . 
There are over twerlty references in the Ma.ág.lát to a mysteri- 
ous group of people called Ahl al- Ithbgt or ILîúthbita.= A survey 
of these passages makes it clear that the "affirmationists" were 
indeed those who affirmed God's Qada.rN They are reported as 
holding various other views besides that which they derived their 
name, and with regard to these they sometimes differed on points 
of detail . V Thus al- Ashtari must have used the term of a 
V.4,d. 128. 
definite theological school (or schools). 
Close examination of the material enables us to recover some 
of the names of the members of the group, though al- Ashca.rí is not 
so helpful as he might have been. He includes Hirer among them, 
however, by speaking of "all the hl al- Ithbä.t apart from pir. ä.r ".9t 
The only other person explicitly stated to belong to them is al- 
Kushá.ni;P as this person, Ahmad b. Salma al- Kushgni, is also said 
to be a follower of al-Naj jär, there is a strong presumption that 
al -Na.j jg.r was included in the Ahl al-- Ithbät ;¢ Finally, since 
it is clear that there was a close connection between Muhammad b. 
Herb and a.1 -. aj já.r, al- Ash`a.rï's statement that a. certain view was 
"the view of Muhammad b. Harb and many of the Phi al- Ithbát" doubt- 
less implies that he was one of them (though by itself the phrase 
could not be said to make this conclusion necesssry).2 
the 
None ofnother_ notices specify particular men, but a. study of 
the views themselves confirms and expands the results already ob- 
tained. Many of the views about Sealing, Guidance, Leading 
Astray and so forth are similar to those of al- Najjz.r, and attrib- 
ute t8 man's condition of faith or unbelief to God's initiative 
6 
All the Ahl al- Ithbát except Direr are said to hold the view that 
no act of a man is in any person or thing other than himself;27 
and this was the view of al -Na j jä.r. i'e likewise held that God's 
attributes are to be interpreted negatively, like the "generality 
of the Muthbita ".fig Furthermore, even if the identification of 
Muhammad b. Herb with Burghlzth be not accepted, there are indic- 
ations that Burghûth was one of the Ahl al- Ithbát, quite apart 
from the presumption on general grounds that this would be so. 
his view of generated effects was closely akin to that of "Muhammad 
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b. Harb and many of the Ahl al- Ithbät. "2, its special views are 
also reflected in the statements that "most of the Ahl al- Ithbät" 
held that God is not able to compel men to a faith by which they 
are believers, and so on, and that, although God has a power over 
the evil of others, He does not have power to do evil .V. °
Something of the connotation of the term "Ahl a.l- Ithbät" is 
thus made clear. Dir$.r was one of the prominent early members 
of the group, but it was rather the teaching of al- Najjgr that con- 
stituted. the norm. His followers, like Burghith and al -Kush ihi , 
bonged to it, and also, it would seem, the group of Khawärij 
around Muhammad b. Harb (if he be different from Burghúth) and Yahya 
b. Abï K2.mil. Despite the light that is shed by this result, 
there is still much that is mysterious. Why is the term used 
only by al- Ashtari? What happened to the group between the 
time of al-Naj jg.r and Burghúth at the beginning of the third cent- 
ury and the youth of al- Ash`ari at the end2V 
e) Estimate of the Ahl al- Ithbs.t . 
It is now possible to form some sort of estimate of the Ahl 
al- Ithbät as a whole. Clearly they are of the highest import- 
ance as adversaries who, at a comparatively early period - close 
of the second century and beginning of the third - were able to 
meet the Mutta.zile on their own ground. An examination of the 
topics dealt with by the Muttazila will show that many of these 
were topics made prominent by the nil al- Ithbät ; indeed it would 
not be too much to say that in this section and in the preceding 
chapter we have been dealing with two sides of the same discussione 
It is noticeable, too, that the driving power 
behind the Ahl 
al- Ithbät came from a truly Qur' änic outlook and not from pre- 
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Islamic fatalism. Certainly they had a very definite belief 
in the omnipotence of God. Al -Naj jär had insisted that every- 
thing in the sphere of God's sovereignty WPB in accordance with 
His will, and the group in general held, in more technical la.ngu- 
ge, that there was no object of power (magdúr) over which God did 
not have power: =2" Whereas the MuCtszila had held that man's 
power is such that he can bring about events independently of God 
and indeed contrary to His foreknowledge, the Ìhl al- Ithbä.t firmly 
denied that man had power to do anything except what God knew would 
be and willed to be 
IZ3 
It was doubtless because of the apparent 
infringement of God's omnipotence that al-Najjar and others of them 
denied that man has any power to produce effects in another person 
at least 
or thing;- if all that men do is willed by .Godnpermissively, it 
hardly seems necessary to deny that they produce effects in others, 
but evidently the religious conviction that God is constantly 
watching over the believer was satisfied with nothing less than 
this denial. 
Growing out of the belief in God's omnipotence was the ac- 
knowledgement that faith and tnbelief are to a great extent depend- 
ent on God's initiative. This is the thought that underlies 
IOf .
most of their views about Guidance and kindred topics ; in oppos- 
ition to the insistence of the Muttazila. that God treats all men 
exactly alike and gives all an equal chance, they were ready to 
admit that God was mainly responsible for making one man a believer 
and another an unbeliever (and admittedly there are many cases 
where human understanding can discover no rational grounds for the 
differences between men in this respect) . They held that God 




by which men are believers or unbelievers, obedient or disobedient.' 
At the same time they were cuite clear about the unique char- 
acter .of human voluntary activity. God did. not force or compel 
men to have faith or unbelief., or to act justly or unjustly.W 
Though God creates the faith, it is ndt truly faith until main hes 
made it his own - in technical language , until he has appropriated 
or acquired it. Perhaps it is with this idea in mind that they 
prefer to speak of God's gift or favour to man (lutf, la.tïfa) , in 
the presence of which min believes ,gym rather than to say that God 
makes the man believe, since that might mean that He forced him to 
believe. it any rate they all maintained the difference between 
voluntary and compulsory actions, and used the term iktisä.b (or 
kasb) to describe man's relr.tionship0 to his voluntary acts. 
When we survey the movement as a whole we can see some traces 
of a solution oflthe problem of evil. They seem to have admit- 
ted that God was the author of harm or physical evil, and of such 
an evil as the punishment of Hell pm He was also capable of doing 
much better things than any He had done, or alternatively. of doing 
what was less good.11 But for the most part they seem to have 
denied that He was the author of injustice or moral evil in such a 
way that He could be called unjust or wicked. The report that 
groups of them held that God was able to compel men to moral evil, 
and that therefore there was no moral evil in the world of which 
God was not agent - probably an inference from ]Arä.r's view that an 
act has two agents, God and man - may be verbally accurate, and 
yet not a. true expression of their. convictions .° -° In other words, 
their belief in the omnipotence of God led. them to statements of 
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of this sort, although at the same time they were suite convinced 
that God the !Merciful and Compassionate, Whom they served. was not 
unjust or wicked. 
In due course the formula was worked out by BurghÜth and others 
that God has power over evil but not power to do evil, that is, 
that what God creates is not to be ascribed to him in the same way 
as an act is ascribed to en agent and characterizes the agent. 
i3ut from the very start there was also another line of thought, 
the recognition of the inscrutability of God and that His ways are 
not altogether within man's comprehension. This would. seem to 
he the deep underlying ground of the doctrine of mahiya, the in- 
comprehensible essence of God, known to Himself, but not to be ap- 
prehended by man until the day of resurrection. filong with 
t:.is doctrine went the negative interpretation of God's attributes 
- for instance, to say He is "knowing" only means that ignorance 
is to be denied of Him. It would follow from this - though our 
sources appear to be silent on the point - that man can know that 
God is not wicked or unjust even though he can form no positive 
conception of His goodness and justice. The intellectual dif- 
ficulties caused by the existence of evil are thus largely due to 
the limitations of the human mind. 
If this accouht of the thought of the i hl al- Ithbä,t is sound, 
then in many respects they anticipated the essentials of the ortho- 
dox position; it will be seen in the next chapter, however, that 
the school of f.bú Ha.nifa stands closer to them than al- Ashcari.12 
5. His hUm b. el -lla kam . 
Another prominent Mutakallim who opposed the lu`tazila and 
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upheld the Divine Qadar was HishTm b. a.1- Haka.m. from the fairly 
full information about him in the books of sects, and especially 
the Magä.lat, it is clear that he was well versed in all the sub - 
jests discussed by the Mu`ta.zila. He belonged to the Rá.fida. 
(or imamiya) , a subdivision of the Shiva, and much of his activity 
seems to have been in Kfa. hbu '1- Hudhail talked. with him, 
and his report of his views suggests that Hish Tm was slightly 
older."' 
There are two passages in the YaciTl2t which are specially 
relevant to the present study. 
"Hishrlm b. al-Eskam yield that human acts are created by God. 
Jatfar b. Harb relates that HishUm b. al- I4akam said that the 
acts of man are his choice (ikhtiy r la -hu) in one respect and 
compulsion (idtirffr) in another respect; they are his choice in 
that he wills them (a.rT da) and acquires them (iktas a.ba.) , and 
they are compulsion in that they do not proceed from him 
except when there is originated the cause (sabab) raised. up 
for them." 
The associates of Hishm b. al- IHakam held that power 
(isti#áta) is five things: (1) soundness ( intie) ; (2) freedom 
of circumstances (t.khli at al- shu'Un) ; (3) space of time (al- 
madda fi 'l wagt) ; ^4 the instrument through which the act 
comes about, such as the hand through which the slap comes 
about, the axe through which the chips of wood. are made, the 
needle through which the needlework is produced, and so on; 
(5) the cause (sabab) which makes its appearance and is raised 
up, by reason 7l of which the act takes place. When 
these things are all present, the act occurs. Some of this 
power exists before the act, and some of it only in the time of 
the act; the latter is the cause. He held that the act does 
not come about except through the originating cause, but when- 
ever the cause exists and has been originated by God the act 
takes place inevitably; what makes the act necessary (al-ma jib 
]Li- '1 -fit1) is the cause; the other elements of human power do 
not make the act necessary." 
These are accounts of e. line of thought essentially different 
from that of DirEr, but possessing some similarities, such as the 
use of "acquire" in the technical sense. It is impossible, 
however, with the material at our disposal to determine the extent 
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to which iiisham and Dir .r may have influenced one another, or even 
whether iIishfm himself used the word ikta.sa.ba. It would seem 
most likely tha.t.ikhtiygr end i4tirEr (choice, compulsion) were 
the words he selected to express his own views. His general 
idea. appears to have been that human activity is the result of a 
causal chain, but that man's volition is one of the links in 
this chain. 
I?ishgm',s views on these matters do not seem to have found 
many adherents - perhaps they were too naturalistic for the reli- 
gious mentality of Islam - but his interest in the analysis of 
human activity may indirectly have influenced the discussions among 
the iutta.zila. What is important, however, is just the fact 
that he tried to frame a theory that would have a place for both 
human responsibility and Divine omnipotence. 
A consideration of the views of some of the other members of 
the REficda suggests that Hish.m was perhaps much closer to the 
Qe.dari position than the opening assertion that "human acts are 
created by God 'would imply. A group of them, who are not 
mentioned by name, held the following views: 
"God knows what will be before it is , except the acts of men; 
He knows them only in the time of their existence, since if He 
knew (distinguished) who will sin from who will obey, He would 
intervene (} ja) between the sinner end his sin." 
Now a similar phrase is found in accounts of the early iliu`tazilï 
thinker of Baghdád, Abú MUsá al- Murd2r.t He is reported to have 
held that God might be said to will sin in that He placed nothing, 
or left a gap (khallg) , between a. %man and sin. From this verb 
khall75 comes the noun takhliya, by which Hishám b. al- Ha.kam de- 
scribes the second of the conditions of human action.' 2 Takhliya 
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is probably the nearest word in Arebic, etymologically, to "free- 
dom." It is therefore conceivable that in making takhliya 
shu'ún a. prerequisite of human action iishb".m had in mind man's 
independence of God, roughly in the sense adopted by those who 
held the doctrine of Qada.r. 
Hisham's views about God's knowledge also point to an affinity 
with the QadarTya. According to a1- Ash`a:rï the Qadar!ya held 
that God cannot know a thing until it exists ; and a subdivision 
of them, the ShabTbiya., held a similar view with special reference 
to human acts .1:1 The great majority of the RTfida. likewise held 
that God does not know what will be before it actually is ; =q and 
this idea. was at the basis of Hish m's quite subtle Ndectrine of 
God's knowledge; he held that one could only properly speak of a 
knower where the object of knowledge was in existence, and con - 
sequently, "if God were knower of whet men will do,' there would 
not properly be any test (mihna) or choice. "= 
With regard to this point, therefore, it might seem that the 
Rffida. were to be regarded as allies rather than as opponents of 
the IfuCtazila. But, though they thus emphasized the independ- 
ence of man, they seem also to have had some awareness Of the other 
aspects of the question and to have worked towards a balanced view. 
Though only the beginnings of this are to be found in Hish .m b. al- 
Hakam himself, it is yet noteworthy that before the time of al- 
Ash'ari a group of the Rrtfida should have formulated the doctrine 
of the middle way between "free will" (tafwïd) and absolute deter- 
minism (jabr) 
'11 Up to a certain point, therefore, it would 
appear that these Mutakalliman of the RT fida. may be reckoned among 
the defenders of the Divine Qadar. 
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6. The WasIyat Abi hanifa. 
It wou'd fill a great gap in our knowledge of the more ortho- 
dox theologians of early Islam if we could determine the man or 
group of men who drew up this "Testament of Abu iia.nifa." , or whose 
views are presented in it222- Unfortunately, owing to the dearth 
of material, I have to confess failure in this, although I think 
I can give some more precise indications than Wensinck has done. 
Wensinck did not attempt to distinguish between the different 
groups which might claim to be orthodox or at least were the fore- 
runners of the later orthodoxy, and tends to speak of a homogeneous 
"community". f3 This neglect falsifies some of his arguments; 
for instance, when he says that the articles of the Wesiya. "do not 
yet contain the term kasb", he overlooks the possibility that the 
term may have been already in use the technical sense, and yet 
may have been avoided by the group responsible for tnis creed..- 
The first five articles of the Wasiya, dealing with faith, are 
in many ways close to the views of the Murji'a. It seems to 
have been the Murji'a first and foremost who made faith a subject 
of discussion. Article 4, to the effect that sinners of the 
community of Muhammad are all believers and not infidels, was a 
distinctive belief of the Murji'a; and article 2, denying the in- 
crease and decrease of faith, is based on the impossibility of one 
person being a believer and an unbeliever at the same time, which 
is very close to the view of all the Murji'a. that there is no faith 
in any unbeliever.'= 
At the same time, however, there are a few points of detail 
where the WGs ïya differs from the views of the Murji'a as commonly 
reported. Most of the :Jurji' a held that faith could increase 
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and decrease. Again, in articles 1, 10 and 14, the Wasiya 
speaks about the mung.fioUn or hypocrites. Now this term was 
the one used by a.1- Ha.san al BasrT in opposing the view of the 
Khawgrij that the main who commits e great sin is an infidel, 
whereas the Murjila simply said he was a believer; and in the 
accounts of the Murji'a in the Msgrlgt, though there is much dis- 
cussion of the fgsiq or evildoer, there is no mention of the 
munáfiq, except in the views of Mu4emmad b. Karräm and his fol- 
lowers .'- 
Article 15, asserting that the power is along with the act, 
is proof of some connection with al-Na j jgr. On the whole it 
is much more likely that the author of the Was3,ya derived this 
doctrine from al- Najjár than vice versa; the latter is not imposs- 
ible, but it would necessitate an earlier date for the WasIya than 
the one suggested by general considerations. The fact that al- 
Na-. j jgr is reckoned among the Murji'a is confirmatory of this con- 




There are indications of very txmmg opposition to the Ja.hm- 
Tye.; for instance , the assertion of the uncreatedness of the Qur' .n, 
the strong assertion of the reality of the punishment of the tomb, 
and the denial that Paradise and Hell will vanish:. Abu '1- 
Hudhail's view was similar to that of the Jahmiya on the latter 
point, but apart from this there is really nothing in the Wasïya 
to show that the author had the Muttazila specially in mind. 
This may be due, however, to his lack of interest in the questions 
iies=asesi discussed, rather than to the composition of the creed 
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before the discussions took place; yet even this lack of interest 
would suggest that the Mu tazila. had not ,yet atteined a position 
of prominence. 
The allegiance of the suthor of the Was iya to the doctrine 
that the Qur'an WEB uncreated argues a. certain affinity to Zhmad 
b. Hanbal. On the question of the breaking of the fast while 
travelling nis position is most akin to thEt of Ahmad and the 
ZÛ.hiriya, though neither in this nor in other legal ratters does 
it conform exactly to any of the established schools.= The 
division of acts into three classes only, instead of the five which 
became recognized later, involving the omission of the Permitted 
and the Disapproved, is likewise akin to the tendency of thé 
Zrhiriya to make everything either Obligatory of forbidden.`!' 
The phrases of article 24 about the meeting of God with the people 
of flsradise being "without description, comparison or modality" 
(bi -1 . kaifiya .. ta.shbih . , jiha) are reminiscent of b. 




On the other hand, he does not confine himself to the Qur'K n 
and the Sunna as foundations, as did the extreme followers of 
Mimad b. iianbal. Many of the brief proofs attached to the 
articles in the Wasiya are indeed based upon Qur'an and Tradition, 
but some appear to use rational arguments; thus the unvarying 
character of faith is proved by the impossibility of a man being 
both a believer and an unbeliever at the same time, and the doct- 
rine that God ha.s seated Himself on the throne without any necessity 
is proved by a reductio ad absurdum Pt the same time, however, 
it is to be noted that there is no trace of the principle of ijmmc,, 
the agreement of the community, which had a prominent place in 
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the teaching of al- Shäfi`I and his followers. 
Thus we have some indications of the general position of the 
author of the YVaçiya.. In view of the title he was presumably 
a - follower of Abli lanifa. He has some resemblances to /'+hmad 
b. Hanbal, but he was more favourable to kaläm. A Henan: 
pupil of Muhammad b. al -Hasan al- Sheib5,ni, of about the time of 
Aimed (d.241/855) is rather suggested: 
The author of the Wasiya, whoever he may have been, was 
certainly an upholder of the Divine Oadar. He maintained that 
the determination (ta.gdir) of good. and evil is wholly from God, 
and that both man and all his works are created by God.'rS The 
mention of God's command to the Pen to write is suggestive of the 
traditions about the writing down before the beginning of the 
world of all that was to happen till the Day of Resurrection;= 
and Wensinck has interpreted the article in this way. But the 
from 
quotation . the Qur' n refers definitely to records of what men 
have done, made after they have done it, and not to a determin- 
ation of their acts beforehand; and. the Arabic words 715. huwa. ká'inf 
which Wensinck has translated, "Write what shall happen till the 
day of resurrection ", would be as correctly rendered, "Write whet 
is tiienin (sc. and go on writing) till ... "; and the article 
would then mean that a record is made and kept of all that men do. 
Otherwise we should have to suppose that the author had twisted 
the quotation into a proof of this idea of predetermination. 
From the fact that his position in general is thoroughly theistic, 
it seems much more likely that he would try to interpret the 
fatalistic conception in a theistic sense. On the other hand, 
the mention of the Preserved Table at the end of article 7 
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suggests that he held that there was a "pre -writing" of human 
acts 1 =7 
. The chief interest of article 7 is t'het it distinguishes 
between God's command, desire, good pleasure, and the like, on 
the one hand (a.mr, , malt.a.bba , rice) , and on the other, His will, 
decision, determination, creation (or formation) , and knowledge 
(mashï'a., aaW , taqdir, tekhllo, film). Sins nd acts of 
Ltter 
obedience are both in accordance with thence group; only acts 
of obedience are in accordance with the former group.' This 
appears to straighten out the confusion that had caused trouble 
as early as the time of the dispute between Maimún and Shu' ib,' 
but it introduces a divisiod within the being of God which leads 
to theoretical difficulties. This article also says that acts 
of obedience occur with God's help (tawfiq) , and sins with His 
abandoning (khidhl.n) - the only mention of these or the other 
similar qualities in the Wa-ïya.; this suggests that these points 
did not bulk large in the author's religious experience, e fact 
which would indicate his remoteness from the circle of ideas of 
men like al-Nej jär and even Bishr b. al- Mb.cta.mir. 
Perhaps too much should not be made, however, of these omis- 
sions, for the argument to show that human power (istit.`a) is 
along with the act is based on a. truly religious sense of depend- 
ence on God. 
"If it (so. man's power) were before the act, then men would 
be independent of God in time of need, and this is contrary to 
the definite judgement of Scripture (47,40): 'God is the Rich, 
and ye are the poor.'" 
The author of the Waslya is thus seen to belong to a fairly 
conservative school of thought, yet he is not unaware of the 
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distinctions that have come to light, and of the need for making 
decisions about these. Despite his allegiance to Tradition, 
which might have made him sympathetic to fatalism, his determinism 
is very definitely theistic and not fatalistic. It is God Who 
determines everything both good and bad, for anything else would 
be an infringement of His unity; it is God Who creates and gives 
sustenance and strength to puny, impotent man. The confusions 
are not completely removed but much progress has been made. 
7. Khushaish. 
Abu e sim Khushaish b. Asram al- Tdasg'i is a. little -known 
traditionist, who died in 253. His importance dor us is that 
a large part of his Kit-Jb aï- Istigffma fi ' 1 -Sunna wa -' 1 -Fadd fi 
Ahl wa-ll-Ahw71.1 is contained in the Tanbïh of al-Me-let-I.; 
so that Khushaish is one of the earliest writers accessible to us 
at first hand .1° 
In keeping with Massignon's remark that Khushaish was close 
to Ahmad b. Ha.nbal, we find that the arguments which he produces 
against the various sectaries in his work are almost entirely 
from the Qur'än and Tradition. The main exception to this is 
that he sometimes quotes sayings of great .uslims of the past of 
acknowledged reputation; for example, Ibn 'Abbg.s is reported to 
have said that "impotence and intelligence are predetermined 
(bi- )1- gadar) ß,.M1 There is no reference, so far as I have ob- 
served, to the "agreement" (i;jm-0) of al- Shfiti and his follow- 
ers as a source of truth in dogmatics to which appeal can be made; 
so that.Iiushaish must have stood quite apart from that side of 
orthodox thought. The nearest to this is a passage where the 
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"orthodox party" (al- z.li1.Un) are reported to have forbidden a man 
making the supposition that he had done something other than he 
actually did.T' 
It is hardly correct to speak of "arguments" at all in deal- 
ing with Khushaish, for his "method of argument" was simply to set 
down a string of verses from the Qur'r n and then Traditions of the 
Prophet and anecdotes about notable men, End to leave the reader 
to discover for himself how they all applied to the theme in 
question. The bareness of this method of supporting one's views 
is well illustrated by the story of Ghailrn's audience with the 
caliph cUmer II (99 -101 A.H.) . The caliph challenged Ghs.il«.n 
about his views, and when GhailEn had received permission to state 
his case, he simply quoted: 
"Has there come upon man a period of time when he was nothing 
worth mentioning? Verily We created man from a drop, a 
mixture, testing him, and We made him able to hear and to see; 
We guided him a.s to the way, whether grateful or ungrateful." 
The caliph's reply was little more than the assertion that Gha.ilán 
was mistaken, and the quotation of other verses: 
"(Recall) when thPly Lord said to the angels: 'Lo, I am going 
to place r vice- gerent in the earth.' They said: 'Wilt Thou 
place in it one who will work corruption and shed blood? We 
sing hymns in Thy praise and ascribe holiness to Thee.' He 
replied: 'I know what ye know not.' Iie taught t.da.m all the 
names; then He mustered them before the angels and said: 'Tell 
me the names of these, if ye speak the truth.' They said: 
'Glory be to Thee! we have no knowledge but what Thou hast 
taught us; Thou art the Knowing, the Wise.' He said: '0 Adam, 
tell them their names.' Then when he had told them their 
names, He said: 'Did I not say to you, that I know the secret 
(things) of the heavens and the earth; I know what ye reveal 
and what ye have been concealing." 
This reply evidently greatly impressed G.hailsn, and he promised to 
keep quiet on the matter. There is no indication at all how the 
one quotation is supposed to counter the other, and the reader is 
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left to puzzle this out for himself. Presumably the point is 
the t the words "whether grateful or ungrateful" a.ppeart to leave 
open a choice to man, whereas what is seid about God's knowledge 
of hidden things in the second passage includes knowledge of what 
men will do .m 
In fairness to Khushaish it must be noted thet there w. are 
a few occasions when he does something more than this. In the 
last part of the section on the Cadariya some elucidations are 
given of the Çur'r.nic quotations, though perhaps these belong 
rather to the Tradition.'m4 The view of al- çä.li4rin about making 
suppositions, already referred to, suggests that Giusha.ish end those 
who thought like him were aware of the discussions among the 
Mutakallimún even if they rejected kalm, for this was a much - 
debated topic .1? The closing phrase of + he section on the 
Qadarïya: 
"(God) commanded Iblis to show reverence, a nd intervened. 
( rrâla) between Aim and that;" 
is reminiscent of phrases used by el- MurdFr and others .t' Thus 
JOaushaish may not really have been so remote from the "advanced" 
theological circles of his time as the form of his book might 
lead us to think. 
With regard to the content of his teaching, a prominent place 
is given to the righteousness of God. This is best seen in his 
arguments against the Jabmiya, whose monistic and pantheistic ideas 
placed morality et a discount; in defending traditional eschatology 
against them, Knushaish was defending the doctrine that a men's 
conduct hes eternal significance. On the other hand, when it 
came to the question of God's omnipotence, he apparently noticed 
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no difference or inconsistency between the truly theistic view end 
what I have called the atheistic or fete listic view. After 
quoting a. number of verses of the Qu.r/ .n which exalt the majesty 
and might of God, he passes on to Traditions and anecdotes which 
reflect the spirit of fatalism. Explicitly, of course, the 
fatalism is always covered over by e veneer of theism, for it is 
always God Who is looked upon as the ultimete source of the pre- 
determination of man's life; and, in view of their attachment to 
the Qur'.n, it seems probable that the theism was the dominant 
factor in the thought of men like Khusheish. But they ere still 
able to hold without E. Qualm th at a man's ultimate place in Para- 
dise or Hell is predetermined, with the further suggestion that 
nothing he can do can alter that. God's supremacy is thus 
asserted in a way that unduly restricts human power. 
1 Khusha.ish is interesting to us not simply for himself, but because 
on this matter he is the representative to us of a large body of 
moderate or conservative opinion. Doubtless many of those who 
differed from him in that they accepted the principle of ijm.` 
would have agreed with him in whet he had to say in defence of the 
Divine Qa.da:r, and would likewise have failed to see any inconsist- 
ency between theistic and fatalistic determinism. Each of the 
great treditionists presumably had his "ten.dency ",W but, since 
el- BukhEri (d.256) and Muslim (d.261) are roughly contemporaries 
of Khushaish, on this question of predestination one would expect 
them simply to reflect the moderate thought . of the middle of the 
third century with all its confusion. So far as I have been 
able to observe from a very brief survey, this is actually the case. 
V. 
O. Ai_Kh&r. rFz . 
Abú aa.c Id Ahmed b. tlsE ai- 'harrG.z , who died probably in 286, 
differs from the other figures concerned in that he was a mystic 
rather than a theologian, concerned with the practice of religiose 
rather than its theory. His Book of Truthfulness, which we 
possess, deals with the practice of virtues quite as much as with 
the specifically mystical states. V What he has to say about 
predestination, therefore, is probably characteristic of the 
attitude towards it of many devout Muslims of his time. 
Mysticism, and indeed all religion, has its dangers, end one 
of these is that the soul may come to prefer the selfish enjoyment 
of states of religious exaltation to the exercise of virtues which 
involve it in the storm and stress of active life. The fatal- 
istic current within Islam seems at times to have s'wept al- Kharráz 
on to the shoals of excessive passivity or quiescence. He 
quotes this story with approval: 
"A certain man said: 'And I have 
workings of destiny in me, whatever 
man drank poison. When they said 
he replied, 'If I knew that my cure 
touching my nose or my ear, I would 
no blessings 
may b e f at . ' 
to him, 'Ta. 
could be ecc 
not do it.'" 
save the 
The same 
ke an antidote; 
omolished by 
c 
When considering whether trust in God (tawakkul) is consistent 
with reliance upon secondary or natural causes (asbrb simply), 
he exhorts his readers to sever connection with the majority of 
such causes. He does not absolutely forbid the use of medical 
treatment, for Muhammad had commanded the use of drugs ; but he 
suggests that this is only in certain cases, and that the "higher 
vocation" is that of the man wno has nothing to do with such things; 
many examples show that God can defend one from any evil, whereas 
drugs are frequently ineffective 'V 
In much of his book there is a note of despair and rejection 
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of the world, doubtless connected. in some way with his predestin- 
arian views, though whether contributing to them or derived from 
them would be difficult to say. "God has abused the present 
world," he says , and quotes the verse : "Know that this present 
life is play and sport and show ... "; and a littlei later he speaks 
of "God's condemnation of this world and how He has belittled 
its worth, and does not approve of it as an abode for His saints:' 
Another passage is reminiscent of St.Paul's "desire to depart and 
to be with Christ;" but it lacks St.Paul's perception of a posit- 
ive purpose to be attained by remaining in the world. 
"The man who longs after God is disgusted with this world, 
and with remaining therein; he desires death and the ending of 
his span and lot. It is peculiar to him, that he seeks to 
be estranged from created things , and keeps himself alone in 
solitude and isolation. "ll 
There is a better side, however, to the teaching of al- Kharráz. 
He reaches a. lofty conception of trust in God even "in the valley 
of the shadow" and of acquiescence in all the circumstances of 
one' life. - This is the solution in practice of the problem 
of evil, which remains insoluble at the theoretical level. He 
realizes that even the devout servant of God is not always pre- 
served by God from misfortune; nevertheless, he maintains, his 
trust is in no way impaired. Such a man, too, will not say, 
" need will be fulfilled," for he knows that God is fulfilling 
His own purpose .V 
"The trustful man knows that he is moving towards what is 
known (sc. in God's foreknowledge) , and he is well- pleased 
with God, being aware that he cannot through trust obtain the 
hastening of what God has postponed, or the postponement of 
what God has hastened. He has succeeded in expelling im- 
patience and trepidation, and has found rest from the torment 
of covetousness; having trained his soul in knowledge both 
intellectual and spiritual, he says, 'What is destined will 
be, and what will be is surely coming' (má quddira sayakúnu, 
wa -má .yakúnu fa -huwa all) ... One of the Companions 
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said: 'I entered the house of the Prophet , and there was in 
the house a dried date; and the Prophet said, Take it; if 
thou hadst not come to it, it would have come to thee.'" 
Acquiescence (ricrd can Alláh) is a still higher stage. 
"I said: 'What is the sign of acquiescence in the heart, 
and what is its manifestation ?' He replied: 'It is the 
heart's joy in the course of destiny. A certain man has 
said: 'Acquiescence is meeting calamities with hope and cheer- 
fulness.' It is related. that Anas b. Milk said: ' I was a 
servant of the Prophet. He never said to me with regard to 
any matter, Why didst thou do that? or, Why didst thou not do 
that? He would only say, So it was destined, and so it was 
decreed (qu411; .. quddira) . ' ... This saying of tUmar is 
an indication of acquiescence, because one is patient only 
with regard to something disagreeable, and grateful only with 
regard to something agreeable; and he said, 'I care not which 
of the twain has fallen to my lot;' This was because the 
two states were equal in his sight.'" 
The note of joy which was touched on at the beginning of that 
passage is found more fully in the section on "Truthfulness in 
the knowledge of Gold's benefits and in gratitude to Him." 
"As for His former blessings, these are: that He remembered 
thee before thou wart anything at all, and privileged thee with 
a belief in His unity, faith in Him, and the knowledge of Him; 
He also caused the Pen to inscribe thy name on the Preserved 
Tablet as a Muslim. HWI 
The modern Western reader is struck with the strange juxta- 
positions of deep religious insight with crude fatalistic anec- 
dote. It seems that Islam, for all its spiritual strength, 
could not shake itself free from the dead hand of old Arab ideas 
of dahr. The confusion - wheat and tares growing side by side - 
remained. Yet even out of the thought of the predetermination 
of events al- Kharráz can draw spiritual nourishment - awareness 
of the prevenience of God - as when he writes of a man being given 
to "realize through pure faith whet was already in eternity laid 




Perhaps one of the main results of this chepter has been to 
show the many- sid.edness of the intellectual life of Islam in 
the second rand third centuries, reite apart from the >1uctazila 
who have occupied so much of the limelight. With it all, how- 
ever, it is strange that so many theoiggi<-ns uhould have remained 
unaware of the clash between theistic and fatalistic attitudes. 
Certain aspects - notably the different schools and trends among 
the mere orthodox - have been touched upon very lightly, since 
they were not specially relevant to the subject in hand. 
Enough has been said, however, to show that there was a very 
great degree of preparation for the work of al- kshtari. In 
all this the contribution of the . hl a.l- IthbEt is seen to be of 
the highest importance. 
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Note A. ïvlu a.mmad b. warb al-Sa.ir.fi. 
It seems to me probable.thet this person is none other than 
Burghüth, who is also Muhammad b. `Ìsß. al- SairUi (spelt with sin) . 
he is usually referred to as "Muhammad b. Harb "; "al- Sairg.fi" 
(spelt with sad) is added only in Magalat,383. P1- ShahrastJni 
(Mila1,103) end el- Ishtari (iao.120) include his nerve in lists of 
theologians belonging to the Kh w ri j . ¡long with meny of the 
1!h cl- IthbFt he is reported Wac.383) to have held that perception 
is to be ascribed. to God since He originates in the senses the 
nature (ta.bïca) which generates it; this is almost identicel with 
Burghüth's view ebout generated effects . Finally there is e 
long passage (Pvia.c!.10 ?,i.14 - 108,1.13) describing the views of 
"many of the Ib Tya" (. sect of the KhewTri j) end in particular 
those of Yehya b. (.obi) KEmil, Muhammad b. Herb end Id.ris al- Ib2dï. 
On examination these views prove to be almost identical with 
erticles 4, 10, 5, 9, ?, 1, 2, of the views of el -NE.j j2r, together 
with the report on p.514. One of the more noticeable deviations 
is the addition of tawcan in Erticle 9; God is said to be able to 
do a favour for the unbelievers so that they would believe volunt- 
arily - the very point that Burghúth had emphasized. (The 
description of men's power to act es a. meCnT , "form" or "concept ", 
is a further example of the influence of Mu_terrmar; the technical 
use of the term is etso found in a report about a :.l- Na.jjE7r - Ma.r.528) 
Thus ikuhamuna.d b. herb agreed in general with al- Najjar, but 
differed from him about generated effects; and that is exactly 
how the views of Burghñth ere described. He even uses the 
4rord tawtan, which seemed to be cherecteristic of Burghuth.- 
The only ground for objection to his identification with Burghüth 
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would seem to be his connection with the Khawni j . There is 
admittedly a. puzzle in this to which I can offer no solution, but 
it need prove no stumbling -block to identifying the two men. 
Burghlzth also was connected with the Khawrr. i j , for his name is 
included in the s eme list in Milal ,103 - evidently the confusion 
had occurred before the time of el- Sha.hra.stni. The identi- 
fication of Muhammad bi Harb with Bur.ghizth may therefore be re- 
garded as highly probable; at the very least we must be dealing 
with two closely related men. 
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VI. 
A L - A S i l t A. R I A. N D H I S C P I T I C S 
The theology of al- Ash`ari is generally regarded as marking, 
a turning -point, or the completion of a stage, in the history of 
Islam, and the present chapter will show that there are good 
grounds for such a view. On the other hand, modern scholars 
have found it difficùlt to understand the exact nature of the 
achievement of al- Ash`ari, and the more of his writings became 
available to them, the less did the new picture of the man they 
thus acquired tally with the preconceptions they had formed from 
the descriptions of his followers. The surprise .and dismay of 
the Western scholar is reflected in the words of Wensinck, after 
summarizing al- Ashtari's arguments to -prove that God may be seen 
in Paradise and quoting his profession of allegiance to Aiimad. b. 
Ha.nbal: "Is this the al_Ashtari whose spiritual descendants 
were cursed by the Hanbalites and who is detested by Ibn Hazm? 
Or is al- Ashtari a man with two faces ?"= 
The trouble is that the Western scholar of the last century 
has tended to be out of sympathy with al- Ashtarï from the very 
first. From the standpoint of the liberalism with which he has 
nearly always been infected the conflict between the Muttazila 
and their orthodox opponents has nearly always appeared to him as 
a conflict between freedom of thought and the tyranny of absolute 
dogmas; and, since the superiority of reason in its free exercise 
was his own dogma. (probably unacknowledged as such) , he viewed 
with extreme disfavour the man who was primarily responsible for 
the overthrow of the (supposedly) pure rationalism of the Muttazila. 
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This attitude is found at least as early as von Kremer's Geschichte 
der herrschenden Ideen des Islams, published in 1668,1 and has 
continued with modifications until the present time, though Dr. 
Nyberg's work on the Muttazila marks the beginning of a change. 
The present study is based on quite a different attitude. 
Islam is undoubtedly, whatever the ultimate judgement about it 
may be, one of the great religions forces of the world, and for 
that reason he who would understand it must approach it with a 
considerable measure of humility and reverence. The theology 
of al- Ashtari and his school was finally accepted by the great 
majority of Muslims as an adequate intellectual expression of 
their religion, whereas that of the n tazila was rejected.; 
therefore - the conclusion forces itself upon us - it is to al- 
Ashtari and his like that we must turn if we would understand 
something of the inmost essence of Islam and the source of its 
strength. The very fact of his conversion from Muttazil3 
doctrines to more traditional views probably helps to this end. 
1. The Conversion of al- Ash`a.rï. 
Abu '1- 4asan tAli b. tIsmVìl al- Ash`ari was born at Basra 
in 260/873. He was one of the more promising pupils of the 
head of the Muttazila in Basra, al-Jubb .' I, on occasion even tak- 
ing the place of the master, and might. have been expected to become 
his successor, but when he was 40 he was converted from Mu`tazill 
doctrines to those of the party of the Book and the Sunna, and 
devoted himself to the intellectual defence of this position. 
Towa.rds the end of his life he moved to Baghdad, grid there he died 
in 544/v35.1 
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More is to be learned from the stories of his conversion than 
is usually supposed, even if they are perhaps partly symbolic in 
character. Thus his dissatisfaction with the views of al- JubbV! 
is crystallized in the story of the three brothers, which occurs 
in various forms. It concerns the ultimate fate of three 
brothers, one of whom was pious, the second wicked, while the 
third died as a child. Now, if Paradise is reserved for those 
who have merited it by their good conduct, then the child has no 
part there. If to avoid the unfairness of the child's exclusion 
from Paradise (seeing it rias had no opportunity to do good works), 
one says that God knew that the child would have been wicked, had 
it survived, then one is open to the retort that in fairness God 
ought to have cut off the second brother before he fell into sin., 
This story is given in the form of a dialogue between 
ai -Ash ̀a.r i and al -JubbA' i , = but , when the views which lead ' t o this 
impasse are carefully compared with those described in the Magä.l5t, 
it is clear that they are rather those of the M1a`tazila of Baghdád 
whom al- Jubbá.'i criticized. é Al -Jubb .'i had given up the at- 
tempt to show that all the dealings of God with men could be ex- 
plained as the reward of merit, the punishment of disobedience, or 
the indemnity of unmerited suffering; he saw that the destinies of 
men could not be explained fully in terms of the îational concepts 
of justice and fairness, and was ready to admit that the idea of 
tafa . ul or undeserved grace and favour towards man on God's part.at 
In any event, the conclusion towards which the story points 
is that these human conceptions are inadequate for. the .facts of 
human life. One cannot give a rational explanation of the 
differences between the fate of different men; one must simply 
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accept. It seems to me very likely that ai- JubbK'i was begin- 
ning to be aware of_the limitations of reason, and that his pupil 
was in this respect only carrying his thoughts a stage further. 
Certainly, al- gish`ari's position is to be regarded as the logical 
development of the whole movement of the laurtazila. They had 
attempted to account for the complex facts of existence according 
to a certain system of ideas, but, despite .their efforts, there 
remained glaring contradictions between the system and the facts; 
it then becomes natural to turn aside to see whether some other 
o 
system will be more satisfactory. 
Again and again in the Ibána' it will be found that al- Ash`a.rï's 
method of argument consists in confronting the a priori idees of 
his adversaries with hard fact; he is a realist arguing with 
romantics. Thus in the section dealing with God's wild he 
argues from the facts of the excess of infidels over believers, 
of the existence of things which God forbids, of the existence of 
human acts which God does not will. 
As this insufficiency of human reason was borne in upon him, 
al- Ashtari was led to take decisions. The story of his dreams * . 
which likewise occurs in various forms, certainly has its basis in 
fact, and may very well be largely accurate, for modern. psychology 
rather leads us to expect dreams at the crises of life.= 
- During the month of FamadUn the Prophet appeared three times to 
al- Ashcari in dreams, evidently marking three stages in the change 
of heart and mind which took place in him. At the first stage 
he was clearly dissatisfied with rationalistic Kalärn, and decided 
to turn to the Traditions and the Qur'an; he did not yet trust 
himself completely to these, however, but..busied -himself rather 
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with the interpretation of them according to the methods of Kaläm. 
On his second appearance some days later the Prophet asked al- 
' Ash.6'arl how he had obeyed the injunction to support what was re- 
lated from himself, the Prophet,- and, when he had been informed, 
simply repeated the injunction. Aécording to another version 
al- Ashari had first studied the Traditions about seeing Muhammad 
in dreams (a.s he doubted the reality of his experience), about 
intercession and about the vision of God. It is also said 
that, at the appearance of Muhammad, al- fish`a.rï said he doubted 
about the vision of God with the eyes because it was contrary to 
the conclusions of reason, and received the reply that it was not 
the Traditions that were -doubtful but the arguments of Reason. 
Ail the versions agree that after this dream he completely gave 
up Kal .m, and confined himself to a study of Traditions and of 
commentaries on the Qur'dn. 
The final stage was reached after the third dream. The 
Prophet again asked for 'an account of his doings, but was not 
altogether pleased with what he was told: "I did not tell you 
to give up Kal .m, but to support the true Traditions." Thus 
Reason, expelled from a throne, is reinstated as the handmaid of 
Revelation. The insufficiency of rational ideas .has probably 
something to do with the selection of the subjects studied in the 
Traditions, for the intercession of the Prophet for sinners was a 
corrective of strict justice, and the vision of God with the eyes 
in the next world was complementary to the inadequacy of our 
rational conceptions of Him in this. The story of the dreams 
is thus thoroughly in accordance with the conclusion of the stmlay 
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problem of the three brothers. Together they point to what is 
probably the best description of the position of ál- Ashcari - 
"the subordination of Reason to Revelation." 
There is therefore from -one point of view considerable justi- 
fication for Wensinck's assertion that "his IbEna shows him through- 
out as the stern . adherent of Qi.zr' e.n and sunna, whose arguments 
consist chiefly of quotations from these two sources ";d but the 
latter part of the remark is one-sided. There is all the dif- 
ference in the world between the arguments of al- Ashari and those 
of Khushaish, and we need only compare the two to learn something 
of al- Ashcari's intellectual stature and of his retention of the 
use of Reason. 
Actually iiz will be found that the bases of al- Ashtarïis 
arguments fall under four heads. The first two of these are 
the ones Wensinck mentions; namely, the Qur' ân and the Traditions, 
but even in the chapter which he analyses on the visibility of God . 
in the next life, these sources account for only five of the eight 
arguments, and in some of the other chapters the proportion is 
even smaller... ìoreover; while revealed truth is the basis of 
the proof, there is, by contrast with Khushaish, a very consider- 
able structure of rational argument built upon it. He does not 
simply quote verses; he shows how those on which he relies support 
his doctrines, and how those cuoted by his adversaries do not prove 
what they want them to prove. Thts in regard to the point 
mentioned, the objection from the verse, "Sight reacheth not to 
Him," is not valid; this may mean "Sight reacheth not to Him in 






and we must adopt one of these interpretations, since otherwise we 
should make the Qur'an contradict itself, which we know it does 
not do. if This doctrine that the Qur3 .n is not self- contra- 
dictory is reminiscent of the statement in one form of the story 
of the dreams that , when he examined the sound Traditions , he 
found that they constituted a rational system. 
The third source of the premisses of his arguments is ijmá` 
or the agreement of Muslims. The final argument for the vision 
of God to the faithful in Paradise is that the life of Paradise 
is "as Muslims are agreed" one of perfect delight, and the highest 
of all delights, greater even than that of seeing the Prophet, 
is that of beholding the countenance of God. Similarly in the 
discussion of God's will, views are rejected because they contra- 
dict the principle, "on which the Muslims are agreed," that what 
God wills to be, is, and what He does not will, is not .1 = The 
acknowledgegent of ijmá` as one of the bases of law had first 
been made by al- Shá,fi`i (d.204) , and appears to have been applied 
to dogmatic theology not long afterwards by the Mu °tazila.i! 
Finally, there area number of purely rational arguments. 
Of those about the visibility of God, the sixth and seventh in 
Wensinck's analysis belong to this category. The Dormer of 
these is based on the principle that whstever exists is capable 
of being shown to man by God, and of course God exists; the latter 
starts from the proposition that perception of oneself is a nec- 
essary condition of the perception of things, and this proposition 
is supported by the analogous one that self -knowledge is a nec- 
essary condition of the knowledge of objects. Again, in argu- 
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ing against some of the R,u tazila who denied that God makes. un- 
belief base, he asserted that "an act is not really an act, except 
when the agent knows it according to the reality on which it is 
based." These examples could be multiplied indefinitely. 
It should be added, however, that there is no clear -cut distinction 
between rational premisses and those derived from the agreement 
of 1uslims. It may be a matter of common observation that 
hUslims pray to God for the power of faith and shun the power of 
unbèlief, but it is also a matter on which Muslims might be said 
to agree.. The truth is that al-- .Ashtari's arguments practically 
all appear to have been directed against specific people, and, if 
his opponents admitted his assertions, it was not necessary for 
him to label the source "reason" or "agreement ". Anything that 
infringes the dignity of God and suggests weakness, ineffectiveness 
or carelessness is certainly false, and this was a: point the 
Muttazila, for instance, could not but admite since they made use 
of it themselves. 
The study of the Ibana thus shows that, while al- AshCari 
quite definitely gave the first place to Revelation, he neverthe- 
less assigned e. very important part to Reason. 
In view of this it may seem strange that he gave his allegi- 
ance to hhmad b. Hanbal's formula of bi -lä. kaifa. (literally, "with- 
out how "), which is sometimes looked upon as the mark of obscur- 
antism.L= This is not really strange when one remembers that 
there had been a prominent body which had attempted to deny the 
possibility of all knowledge of God apart from negative knowledge 
(or knowledge of what He is not); the Jahmïya had,been among the 
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prime adherents . of this doctrine of ta`ti1, and in a moderate 
form it had been continued by some of the ,Áhl al- Ithbát Such 
.a view is sound from al- Asshcari's standpoint in so far es it means 
that Reason by itself is not capable of apprehending the nature 
of God. But he had gone on to the further position that the 
knowledge from which we are precluded by the limitations of our 
reason is available to us through revelation. It follows that 
reason cannot even be allowed to sit in judgement on the phrases 
and conceptions in which the revelation is contained; man must 
simply accept them. The allegorical interpretations of anthro- 
pomorphic .expressions , which a.1- Ash`ari declaimed against ,12 such 
as the suggestions that God's hands signify "grace" or. "power", 
were próbably associated with the assertion of the competency of 
reason apart from revelation, and this would necessitate 
rejection of them. On the other hand, when the relation of 
reason to revelation was cleärly understood, it would no longer 
be necessary for his followers to set their faces absolutely 
against all allegorizing. 
Likewise al- Ashra.ri's apparently irrational acceptance of the 
traditional eschatology, is to be understood in the light of the 
contemporary alternatives. To a great extent those who like 
the Jahmiya, denied the various picturescue events of the Day of 
judgement were trying to deny the eternal significance of right- . 
eous conduct and, in effect, to maintain that it did not matter 
what a man did. Even where this was not the motive of those 
who rejected the traditional conceptions, there was still the 
danger of amoralism - the obliteration of the distinction 
between right and wrong. 
r 
VI. 
2. The Omnipotence of God in al- 1',shearl.'s Thought. 
A superficial reading of the creeds in the Ibffna and the 
piagElzt or of the body of the IbEna is enought to show that al- 
1!sh`arï strongly emphasized the omnipotence of God, and even ad- 
opted many of the conceptions that I have maintained are pre - 
Islamic rather than Qur' ánic . 
The fifth article of the creed runs as follows: 
"They affirm that there is on earth nothing either good or 
bad except what God wills, and that things exist by the will 
of God. Thus, it is written: 'But ye will not so will, 
except it be that God willeth;T and thus the ,uslirns say: 
'What God wills is, and what He does not will is not.' "122 
The last remark is perhaps meant to be a. proof of the doctrine 
from iimä.`, parallel to the proof from the Qur'an. Certainly 
the common belief of T, Slims that "what God wills is , and whet He 
does not will is not" is prominent in the chapter of the Ib`ana 
about God's will. The old fatalistic principle that "what 
to 
misses one could not have attained1one, and vice versa& is men- 
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tioned in both the forms of the creed, though in different places. 
There are also traces of the Tradition about the Pen in the phrase 
that "God knows what men do, and has written that these things 
Will be. "- 
A cognate point, which is insisted on almost ad nauseam in the 
Ibâna, is that the difference between the faithful and the unbe- 
lievers is the result of God's differential treatment of then, 
and not the result of their own independent act. This thought 
underlies all that al- kshEari has to sa;y about Guidance, Error, 
the Sealing and similar matter. It is the eorollary of God's_ 
omnipotence that' He must will all that occurs in the earth. 
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If a man's unbelief and sin are his own work and are not what 
God willed, that would imply weakness or carelessness in God; 
and such a state of things is unthinkable. 516 al- Ash`ari 
-is driven inevitably to the conclusion that God'creates.the 
unbelief and sin of men. 
The account he .gives of human activity is .thoroughly in 
line with this insistence on the omnipotence and all -comprehending 
activity of Gad. - he adopts the view already held by al Ida j jar , 
the autho tr of the .Wa.sïyat Abi HanTfa and others that man's power 
to act only accompanies the act and. does not exist before it, 
and that it is power for only one act and not for alternatives. 11 
Jn other words, when God gives a man the power to believe, the 
only act open to the man is to believe; he has no power either 
to disbelieve, or even merely to refrain from believing. Thus 
in a sense the act is the man's act since it comes about through 
a power which has been created in him; but it never in any way 
passes out of the control of God. There remains only the 
shadow of man's responsibility for his actions. It is not 
surprising, then, that al- Ashtari appears to reject Burghtlthts 
contention that an act is not a voluntary act when man is. com- 
pelled by God to do it, and asserts that God, besides being able 
to create acquisition forman, is able to compel him to do evi1.12 
11- Ash`ari's acceptance of the conception of acquisition 
(ikjtisáb) is little more than lip-service. Perhaps he retained 
al- Jubbä'i's'aversion from the idea. Besides the passage 
just referred to, there are, so far as I can discover, only two 
occasions in the Ilaaálát and the Ibâna. where he uses the word in 
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connection with his own views. In one of these he states that 
"the meaning of iktisn is that the thing comes about through an 
originated power and is an acquisition (ka.sb) for the person 
through whose power it comes about" - that is, he points to 
its created character; in the other he is primarily concerned to 
insist that whatever man does by way of acquisition is still 
within God's control - "there cannot be within the sphere of God's 
authority- any iktisäb of men which He does. not 
Befoxe we condemn al- Asheari out of hand -for his belittling; of 
man's responsibility for his acts it is worth looking at his 
attempts to solve the "problem of evil" with which he was now 
confronted. He is quite clear that the absolute supremacy of 
God's will implies that He has willed all the evil in the world; 
otherwise God would be weak or negligent. But he is also quite 
certain that God is good and righteous. One of the arguments 
he uses depends on the contrast between God and Iblis, whom he 
regards as willing evil ; since there is more evil in the world 
than good, then, if the evil is contrary to God's will, Iblis 
must be more effective than God (anfadhu) , and likewise worthier 
of the attributes of omnipotence(,ictidár) , authority (suit .n) and 
divinity. 
One line of solution depends on the doctrine that righteous- 
ness or goodness has no intrinsic existence but is derived from 
the prescriptions of a lawgiver; as there is no lawgiver above 
God to determine what is right and wrong for Him, there is no 
law for Him to transgress.% This is not very satisfactory, 




1pis mein solution, however, occurring in different pieces 
of the Ibr,ria, is along the line first explored by men like Bur - 
ghv_th. This is that the relation of God to what He creates 
is quite different from the relation of man to his acts, and that 
consequently God is not necessarily to be described by the terms 
applicable to a human agent. If a man perform.a a movement, he 
is described as "moving "; but when God creates a movement in one 
- of His creatures, He is not to be described as "moving". This, 
al- A.shtarï holds, applies to God's creation of evil. 
"If they ask': 'Which is better , the good or the person from 
whom the good proceeds?', the reply is : 'The person from whom 
the good proceeds by. way of (unmerited) favour is better than 
the good.' If they then say: 'Then which is worse, the evil 
or the person from whom the evil proceeds?', the reply is: 'The 
person from whom the evil proceeds by way of wrongdoing is 
worse than the evil. From God, however, the evil proceeds by 
way of creation, and He is dealing justly thereby -"IA 
One of the most interesting parts of al- Ashari's argument 
is where he uses human parallels (based on passages from the 
Qur'rn)'i to show how it .is possible for a person to will folly 
without being foolish. It would seem that the I 1uttazila or 
some similar group had raised the objection against those 'who - 
maintained that God could create evil without being an evildoer 
that "whoever wills folly (safah) is necessarily foolish. "V 
The first example is that of the sons of Adam. When the 
offering of the one was accepted and not that of the other, the 
latter threatened to kill his brother. The brother, however, 
made no defensive or protective attacks on the assailant; ".Evenif 
you try to kill me," he said, "I am not going to try to kill .ÿou, 
for I fear God; I will that you should take the blame and be an 
inmate of Hell." In other words, the brother whose offering 
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was accepted deliberately willed a course of action which includ- 
ed his brother's killing him (unless the mention of God restrain- 
ed him) , because he considered the alternative to be sinful. 
Yet though he thus willed his own murder, he could not be called a. 
murderer; without his willing of the murder it would presumably 
not have occurred, so that his will bpd an effective share in 
bringing about the event, and yet the murder could not be ascrib- 
ed to him as its agent. 
The second illustration is similar. Joseph, after re- 
peatedly refusing the solicitations of his master's 'wife, met 
her threats of imprisonment with the words : "Ny Lord, I prefer 
the prison to that to which they invite me." _ Thus Joseph, 
fearing God and desiring above all things to avoid sin, willed his 
own imprisonment, which was a sin on account of its injustice. 
As in the previous case, this volition was effective in bringing 
about the imprisonment, since, had Joseph complied with -tie 
woman's requests, he would not have been imprisoned. But, 
though Joseph willed the sin in this sense, it obviously could 
,not be ascribed to him in such a way that he was in the least 
degree sinful on account of it. Al- Ashtari therefore concludes 
that, although God wills folly, He is not necessarily foolish. 
This is an exceedingly interesting argument, and promises 
to take us farther towards the volution of these difficulties 
than any other. The relation of the human will to the Divine 
is more likely to be understood by the analogy of the relation, 
of human wills to one another than by the analogy of the relation 
of physical forces (which tends to underly the discussion_of 
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human and Divine powers). The examples show how an event can 
be willed by different persons in different ways, and yet truly 
willed by both; and it would seem possible along these lines to 
explain how the will of God can be supreme in the world , and yet 
not destroy the genuine responsibility of the human wills. 
While the form of the argument and its particular application are 
doubtless al- 1?sh`arï's own, it seems to be not impossible that he 
may have received a hint from the Apology of Timothy, the Patri- 
arch of the East Syrian Church (dating from about 165/781) ; it is 
known that al- Ashtarï had studied Christianity, for he wrote two_ 
books about it.t? Timothy is replying to the objection of the 
Caliph al- Ma.hd3 that ei iher Christ was unable to prevent His 
crucifixion, and so was weak, or else He willed it and therefore 
the Jews are not to blame He makes comparisons with the fall 
of Satan from heaven and the expulsion of Adam from Paradise, and 
later with Infidels .Who kill Muslime fighting for the sake of God, 
and argues that "the fact that God had willed Satan to fall from 
heaven and Adam to go out of Paradise does not absolve Satan and 
Adam from blame and censure" and that the slayers of those who 
fight for the sake of God are blameworthy, even though they simply 
fulfil the wish of the victims, for they did not kill them to 
facilitate their entrance into heaven. 
When we return from this consideration of the actual argu- 
ments used to the çuestión of al- A.sh`ari's belittling of human 
responsibility and his disregaatd of the distinctive character of 
*ea voluntary activity, our judgement must be modified somewhat. 
Al-n.s ht a.ri is not driven to these positions by any logical nec- 
essity. Human responsibility and voluntary action could 
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.easily have been found a place within his theology, and indeed 
might almost be said to be there already by implication. The 
point is rather that he is simply not interested in them; his 
preocéupation is to convince men of the overwhelming majesty of 
God. Even if he has borrowed nothing from Titothy, the con- 
trast in the two men's use of similar arguments is instructive. 
It is not surprising, then, that al- A.sh`ari raises no ob- 
jection to the fatalistic conceptions that had become traditional. 
It has already been noted that he repeats the formula, "Whatever 
-misses you could not have attained to you ... ", and has something 
suggestive of the writing on the Preserved Table. In connec- 
tion with the appointed term (ajal) and sustenance (rizq) , his 
views were those of al-Ns.j jár and of orthodoxy in general g1 
In defence aY' the proposition that God provides unlawful susten- 
ance as well as lawful, he argued that it was possible for God to 
provide a thing without giving the ownership of it, since infants 
and cattle were provided with milk and hay respectively without 
being given the ownership of these things.; 
Yet despite all these intrusions of fatalistic views, the 
outlook of al- Ashram is very much a God- centred one. He 
quotes several of these um-Qur' Znic tradition01 but, when he 
draws conclusions from them, these have reference not to human 
life as determined but rather to God as determining it; "God 
knew that what will be will be, and wrote it down, and has writ- 
ten the people of Paradise ard the people of Hell. "I From 
the somewhat fatalistic story of the dispute between Adam and 
Moses he draws the inference that God has 'a foreknowledge of 
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events .IF It is always towards God that his thoughts move. 
God is all in all; everything is in His hand; and since He is the 
Merciful and Compassionate, the proper attitude towards Him is 
patience (sabr) in the face of His judgements and loyal obedience 
to His commands It is clear that al- Ashtari is a determinist, 
but it is just as clear that his determinism is throughout per- 
vaded with the thought of God. 
3. The Achievement of al- A..shCari. 
Of all the nineteenth- century scholars Wilhelm Spitta does 
most justice to al- rshtarI. Though he shows traces of the 
contemporary admitation of the Muttazila, yet al- Ashcarï remains 
his hero - "a man, who through his conception of religion has 
for centuries had a determining influence on many millions of 
people. "3? The conclusion to which his studies led him was 
that "the whole reactionary movement of the fourth century ", in 
which, of course, al- Ash'ari had the leading part, was "a- regen- 
eration of the Arab religion which had been permeated by inorgan- 
ic foreign elements. "W These foreign elements,. he held, were 
the Greek and other influences in the thought of the J uCtazila, 
who had never been popular, and indeed were said to have claimed 
that they had only cultured persons in their number.t The way 
in which this view is expressed has been affected by German 
racial ideas, but nevertheless there is much truth in Spitta's 
contentions, and they are a suitable starting -point for consider - 
ing the achievement of al- Ashtari. 
It is probable that the :iuttazila were never very popular. 
The accounts of the litina or Inquisition (from-about 218 -31) 
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seem to show that the favout of the people was almost entirely 
given to A4me.d. b. 4anbal in his opposition to the official 
Milt-basin. doctrines ; but too much weight should not be 14 10 on 
this fact since the attitude of the caliphs was probably determ- 
ined by political rather than by purely theological considerations. 
Even assuming, however, that the MUttazila had failed to catch 
the popular ear, we could not conclude that this was due to the 
foreign character of their attitude. Certainly a.ccuet.ntance 
with translations of the Greek philosophers and contacts with the 
thought. of India had opened up new vistas to the Arabs and other 
Muslims of the ak Middle East, but an answering chord was struck 
in themselves and they gave themselves whole- heartedly to the new 
studies. It was in their own way that they set to work on the 
fresh material, 'and the products, such as their Kalhm, bore their' 
own distinctive mark. The Multa.zila represented one side of 
the Muslim spirit, and because of that they were able to constit- 
ute a bulwark of Islam against intellectual invasion by Manichae- 
ism and similar creeds. But, though they were not foreign in 
any obvious way, in the course of this work of defence they had 
become cut off from or lost touch with some of the deepest layers 
of the popular mind, above all the sense of creatureliness, the 
consciousness that the circumstances of one's life are determined 
for one by powers beyond and above humanity. 'In this deeper 
sense the views of the Mtttazila were foreign. 
Spitta makes much of the theologians descent from a pillar 
of the Arab religion in earlier days, Abü Mtsf al- Ash`ari, one 
of the two arbitrators after the battle of Siffin in 36/657. 
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Al- Ash`axï's respect for his illustrious ancestors may indeed 
have made it easier for him to return to the traditional creeds, 
but the primary emphasis must be laid on his own profoundly 
religious nature. His writings attest him a truly spiritual 
man, who has drunk deep of life, and who is speaking in deadly 
earnest about the beliefs by which he himself lives. Conver- 
sion does not come to the academic trifler who looks on life 
from afar without testing his theories in practice. There are 
many points of Istions comparison with St .Augustine of Hippo, not 
the least of them being the tendency to determinism as a result 
of the experiences of conversion. It seems very likely that 
al- Asn`arï was convinced that this change of heart (and the joy 
that we ma suppose accompanied it) had come aboút in him througi 
no effort of his own, - 'God had done something for him that He 
had not done for other men. Thus through his own personal 
experience al- Ashtari would come back to the doctrine that faith, 
and unbelief are created in men's hearts by God. 
It is my opinion - and in a matter of this sort it is 
hardly possible to give more than an opinion - that the essen- 
tial basis of the great influence of al- Ash`arï was his own 
spirituality. He recovered something of the early fervour of 
Islam because he attained to something of the same awareness of 
the majesty and might of God. This alone, however, would not 
have raised him to the eminence on which he stands. Devout 
and saintly men had not been wanting in the previous century with 
many of the qualities ' of al -Asht ari - men like al -I .rith b.Asad 
al- MuhKsibi (about whom we are now well informed through the 
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labours of Dr. Margaret Smith) . 
quite ripe; the Mu tta.zila had not 
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But evidently the time was not 
shot their bolt; the barrenness 
of Reason by itself was not yet manifest. Perhaps, too, these 
men were .not so fully gifted as al-- .:!shrari in some necessary way. 
Besides the suitability of the time two factors combined with al- 
. Ashtari's piety to make him outstandingly influential. 
Firstly, his spirituality was along lines which came very 4 
close to the deep layers of the popular soul. Everywhere in 
the Middle East there seems to have been this strong sense of hav- 
ing one's life determined by superior powers. The Muctazila 
had tried to eradicate it, but.the7 had been unable to go suffici- 
ently deep. Largely because of the experiences of his con- 
version, al- Ash`ari could retain this implicit and explicit aware- 
ness of being controlled by something or other, and interpret it 
as a truly religious sense of creatureliness, that is , of depend- 
ence on God Who is righteous and merciful. What might have been 
and often was the ground of fear. and dismay thus became the source 
of confidence and strength, and a deep religious need of the 
ordinary man was satisfied. In this way al- Ash`ari may be 
said to have regenerated the Arab religion. 
Secondly, he was able to provide an adequate intellectual 
basis. Al- Ashtarï came to the defence of the traditional 
faith versed in all the subtlety of the Mu`tazila. He saw 
that his own experiences, and beyond them the whole vast movement 
of the human spirit which we refer to es "Islam", were primarily 
derived from and mediated by the historic events connected with 
Mutiammad. Reason spoke uncertainly, he realized, whereas the. 
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one thing of which one could be certain w.s that God had spoken 
there in history. For him, therefore, God's words es set down 
in the Qur'an, and whatever else the chosen messenger had under- 
stood of Divine truth, were the supreme certainty. Reason 
might certainly be given a large place, but where Revelation 
and Reason were in conflict, Revelation must come. first. 
While ai -A.sh1 ari's prominence is first and foremost« due to 
his leadership in this regeneration of the religion of the Prophet, 
he also enabled Islam to reach a new level, since now for the 
first time it was a religion with the elements of a solid sub- 
structure of theology. 
4. The Criticism of al -Ash` ari by the l anal ya. 
We are fortunate in possessing three roughly contemporary 
documents of the school of Abu Hanifa, the so- called ,Bayán al- 
Sunna wa- 'l- Jamäca or creed of al- Tab.äwi, the Fla]. Akbar II, and 
the Shar.h al -Filth al -Akbar ascribed to al -a turidï.`}O The last 
of these contains some explicit and incisive criticisms of the 
"Ash'arîya "; I am here proceeding on the assumption that, though 
probably not by al- Mäturidi himself, it reflects his views with 
a fair degree of accuracy. The uniqueness of his position 
will best be understood if we first consider briefly these two 
creeds with which he agrees in so many fundamental doctrines. 
a) Al- Taháw!. 
AbU Jacfar Ahmad b. Au4ammad al- Ta.hâwi died in 321, only 
three years before al- Ash`ari, but as he was born in' 2301 he 
really belongs to the previous generation. In his Bayán he 
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claims to be expounding orthodox Muslim doctrine according to A 
Hanïfa, AY/ YUsuf and Muhammad b. al -Masan al- Shaibáni. 
On the question of Qadar al- Tahâwl takes up the traditional 
positions. God has power over everything, and everything has 
need of Him; everything takes place according to His power and 
His will; men have no will except what God wills for them; what 
He wills for them is , and what He does not will is not .11 When 
Gód created the creatures by His knowledge, "He predetermined 
their fates (oaddara .. agdár) and fixed their terms."14 Later 
in the creed al- Tahawi approves of the Pen, the Preserved Table, 
and what is written on it, and asserts that even if all mankind 
were to join together, they would be Unable to reverse one lots 
of what is written/113 This deterministic view pervades his 
.account of human activity. 
"God created Paradise and Hell before the creatures, and 
created a people for them - for Paradise those whom He willed, 
out .of His grace (faul) , and for Hell those whom He willed, 
from His justice. Everyone does what was intended of him 
and becomes what he was created to be. Good and evil are 
both predetermined for men. The power (isti#á.`a) by which 
the act comes into existence is partly like succour (ta.wfiq), 
which may not be an attribute of any created being, and in that 
case it accompanies the act , and partly of the :nature of sound 
health, physical ability and strength, and good condition of 
the instruments,, and in this case it is before the act... 
The acts of men are God's creation and man's acquisition. 
God does not .impose on man any duties which he is unable to 
perform, and men have ability to perform the duties imposed. 
This is the interpretation of the saying 'There is no might 
and no power save through God.' We say: No one has any 
device, any move, any shift to escape from sin except by the 
the help of God; and no one has any power to achieve obedience 
to God and to persevere in it except by the assistance of God. 
Everything happens by God's will and knowledge, by His - 
decision and determination (aal ' , Qadar). His will is 
supreme over every evil; 'His ylkition is supreme over all 
volitions; Ilis decision overcomes all devices. Nothing 
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exists except what He wills. God does what He wills, and He 
is never unjust. He is holy above every evil and misfortune, 
and separated from every blemish and ugliness. He is not 
questioned about His acts, but they (sc. His creatures) are 
questioned."*. 
Only one point here need be commented upon, the assertion 
that "God does not impose on man any duties which he is unable 
to perform," for this is contrary to what was held by al- Ashtafi.444 
There is no indication of how al- Tahäwi would have answered the 
objection that God has commanded the unbelievers to believe, and . 
yet they have in fact - and in accordance with His will - 
disbelieved. 
b) Fiqh Akbar II. 
The Fiqh Akbar USE comes from the same schoIl as the creed 
of al- TahUwi at a slightly later date, and is consequently very 
similar, though the order - or lack of order -- is different. 
Besides slight developments in the doctrine of God's attributes 
aid off His chángelessness , there is a distinct move away from 
the determinism. of al- Tah8w1. 
There is no mention of. the Pen, and though the Preserved 
Table is alluded to, it is expressly stated that "His writing -is 
of a descriptive, not of a decisive nature" (bi- 'l -wasf lá bi -'l- 
ukm) .4= uïan is throughout spoken of as a responsible being; 
this is something that goes beyond the acceptance of such con- 
ceptions as that of the balance on the Day of Resurrection to 
weigh a man's good and bad deeds, for this traditional idea had 
been accepted also by al- Tahgwi.V. The figh Akbar II maintains 
that God "created the creatures free (sa.lim) from unbelief and 
from belief," and that He "did not compel ('a ba.ra) any of His 
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creatures to bé infidels or faithful, but He created them as in- 
dividuals (ashkhäs) , and faith and unbelief are the acts of Tien. '1 
A few lines later kasb is used to describe this aspect of man's 
activity. Further, man's loss of faith may not be ascribed to 
any evil spirit; these, it *allowed, play a certain part, but it 
is the man's own act that is primary; that is to say, it is only 
,a4'14, -.. 
after the man himself has given up his faith that" Satan takes .itO 
On the other hand, the omnipotence of God is fully maintained. 
Although a man is responsible for his .own acts, in so far as he 
acquires them, yet "God creates them, and it is by His will, 
knowledge, decision and determination that they all exist" 
(mashi'a, film, oada', cedar, or, in parallel passages, tagdir).g° 
Similarly, after God had created men, 
.. He addressed them and gave them commands and prohib- 
itions. Thereupon some turned to unbelief; and their 
denial and disavowal of the truth was caused by God's abandon- 
ing them. And some of them believed .. through the guid- 
a,. -ice and help of God. "2 
To ascribe man's faith and unbelief to God's guidance and 
abandonment respectively in: this way, however, at once raises the 
question: Is God not acting unjustly in treating men thus un- 
equally? - the question that was said to have led to al -Ash arils 
rupture with al -Jubb .' I. There is a trace in al- Tahawi of the 
doctrine that God's action is to be explained partly as grace end 
partly, as justice ;1?. and this is now taken up and developed. 
"In His dealings with men God shows grace and justice (muta- 
faddil, `adil) . i e gives a reward twiee as large as a.man 
has deserved, by grace (tafaddul) , and He punishes for s iii., by 
justice. He forgives, by grace (fad1) . ". 
"God guides whom He wills, by grace (fall), and leads astray 
whom He wills, by justice. - His leading astray is His 
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abandonment, and the explanation of "abandonment" is that He 
does not assist man to do what pleases Him. This is 
justice on His part, and so is His punishment of those who 
are abandoned on account of sin." g 
This doctrine has the great advantage that it avoids "fixing 
evil upon God., Not all of His acts, it is admitted, ere in 
accordance' with strict justice, but those which are not are 
.better than justice requires. What remains mysterious in 
God's operations now is His apparent failure to do good in certain 
cases. In order further to uphold the justice of God's treat- 
ment of unbelievers - presumably it was those who had never 
been summoned to Islam who were chiefly in mind here - the 
theory of a primeval contract was put forward. This was 
elaborated from a verse of the .Qur'd.n, and had already been 
mentioned by al- TahUwi.S 
"God took the posterity of Adam from his loins and 
them with intellect. Thereupon He addressed them 
manded them to believe and to abstain from unbelief. 
Thereupon they recognized His lordship, and this was 
on their part. And in this religion (film) they 
And ,whosoever became-an unbeliever afterwards, deviat 
this and changed, and whosoever believed and counted 
persevered in it and adhered to it.. "§i, 





ed from . 
it true, 
aotory. 
What is said suggests to us questions that are not answered. 
But perhaps this was inevitable from the brevity characteristic 
of a creed al- Ash`ari's creeds are by no means full state- 
ments of his Position. The disorder of some parts of the 
creed would seem to indicate that it is not a unitary composition, 
but has been chopped and changed by various hands. Perhaps 
this may explain the omission of all reference to human power 
(istitaia) . Despite all such criticisms, however, the Fiqh 
Akbar II is clear evidence of the growth and development of the 
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thought of the Haman: schools of theologians, and as such. is of 
considerable importance. 
c) The Shan. al-Fioh al- Akbar. 
With this short work from the school of a1 Tviäturidi, which 
is probably only slightly later than the Fiah Akbar II, we reach 
explicit criticism of the school of al- Ash.`ari. The general 
position is very similar to that of the two creeds which have; 
S 
just been considered, but in certain points it goey(r far beyond 
them. It is curious to note how the writer speaks of himself 
and his friends as the orthodox party - Ahl al-Sunna wa -' 1- 
J a.m .` a - and of the Ash(artya as if they were one heretical 
sect among the many others. 
One of the errors of the Ashta.riya was the determinism which 
was found so pronouncedly in al- lshtari himself. Their view 
is said to be "close to Jabr, indeed to be the essence of Jabr" 
principally because of the account they give of human power. 
If, as the Ash`ariya hold, the power which is able to effect evil 
is not able to effect good, then in doing evil man is' determined. 
(ma bïzr) . The corollary of this, which is likewise held by 
the Ash`arïya, is that God imposes duties on man, which man is 
not able to perform; and this was denied even by a deterministic 
member of the Hanafiya like al- Tahfti. 
The alternative account of human activity has already been 
given a page or two earlier. The question of reward and pun- 
ishment in view Of God's creation of men's acts raises the issue, 
and leads to the enunciation of "al- MM.turidi's" own doctrine, 
namely, that "reward and punishment are according to the use 
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(isti`ma) of the created act, not according to the principle of 
creation. "S With this is connected the doctrine which he 
ascribes to Abú. Hanifa himself that "the power by which man per- 
forms the sinful act is essentially able to effect the act of 
obedience." This means that God creates a power in man, appar- 
ently psychical or mental rather than merely physical), which man 
is commanded to use in a certain way, but which he may use either 
in obeying or in disobeying the command. The power in this 
sense is along with the act, and neither before nor after it, 
"since each part of the power is conjoined with each -part of the 
act. "0 The view of the school is summed up as follows:. 
"The creating is the act of God and consists in the origin- 
ating of the power in man, but the use of the originated power 
4 is the act of man, really and not metaphorically. "t9 
This affirmation of human responsibility is practical as well 
as theoretical, for "al- MAturïdi" is clearly aware of the serious 
effects a1- Ashtarï's determinism is liable to have in producing 
a fatalistic attitude to life and a disregard for morality. 
He replies to the view of the Mujbira that man acts only meta- 
phorically, and not really, as follows: 
"Your doctrine amounts to depriving men of hope and fear; 
they will not fear on account of the evil in their acts, nor 
hope on account of the good in them. This is unbelief, for 
the loss of hope is despair. God has said: Do not despair 
of the mercy of God; and in another verse: *- the party ^t 
Likewise the 
loss of fear is the destruction of the spirit of service 
towards God and the source of disregard of His majesty. "g 
"Al- i,nturidi" a little later goes on to maintain that there 
is no such thing as a fixed ana ineluctable destiny for the indiv- 
idual. In commenting on some statement or tradition that has 
somehow been omitted from the text as we ha'veI it, he says that 
* O61^e our * CBti,.Or 1 , to -,..t - iw.UC e.IiN.2r-p-e,o pi.k 
.-4- 
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the meaning of this is "the misery written on the Preserved Table 
is exchanged for happiness by the works of the happy people (pre - 
s imiably by doing. good deeds) , and the happiness written there is 
exchanged for misery by the works of the miserable people." - 
The exact opposite of this was maintained by the Ashtarïya., and 
therefore, in order to be consistent, they had to admit that men 
like Abú Bakr and `Umar, who had quite definitely once been idol - 
worshippers, but were quite as definitely recognized as having 
become trué believers, and as being in Paradise_, must really have 
been believers even at the time when they worshipped idols. 
"Al-I aturidi" refutes, this by quoting a verse from the Qur'an: 
"Say to those who have disbelieved:. 'If they. desist, what is past 
will be forgiven them' ",6; and arguing that forgiveness becomes 
pointless if they are already believers ; "if the unbelievers were 
believers before they believed, then the advantage of forgiveness 
would disappear, the, word of the Merciful would bb made void. " 
Evidently the Aphta,riya (or some similar group) had raised 
the objection that, in thus affirming- that it was possible for a 
-man's destiny to be reversed, the Hanafi school were countenancing 
change in respect of God, since this revérsal of destiny apparent- 
ly involved a change in His decision about man. This wa.s an 
argumentum ad hominem, for the immutability of God was a character- 
istic tenet Of the Hiana.fiya, finding expression in their doctrine 
that the active 'attributes of God are eternal. "Al -I' äturidi's" 
reply commences by pointing out 'that, while the decision belongs 
to God, what is decided and written down is an attribute of man - 
it is the man who is happy or .miserable - and that therefore 
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change is being ascribed only to man and not to God. In 
further defence of his position he puts forward a fourfold claddi- 
fication of mankind: (1) those whose happiness is determined or 
decided from beginning to end; (2) those whose misery is determined 
from beginning to end; (3)those whose final happiness is determined; 
and (presumably - for it is not mentioned, perhaps owing to a 
faulty text) (4) those.whose final misery is determined. .ß.bú 
Bakr and 'Umar belong to 'the third class. 
The late writer, Abú (TTd.hba., discussing the differences 
between the AshtarIya. and the Ma.turidïya in Al Fawaat al.- Bahiya: 
(1125/1713), has some quite acute remarks about this point. 
After an exposition of the opposing views (which is almost cert- 
ainly based on the Shari al -Figh al- Akbsr), he concludes that the 
difference is at bottom a merely verbal one, depending on the 
interpretation of happiness. For al- Ash`a.ri it means what has 
been written down and known by God from all eternity - in other 
words, a man's ultimate fate; and this clearly does not change. 
On the other hand, Ab'a Hanïf a. (really his school) means by happi- 
ness or misery the actual state of the man which is his accident at 
the present moment; and clearly this may change before his death. eF 
Despite this well- meaning attempt of Pb ß -a tUdhba. to effect a. 
reconciliation, however, it would seem that there really is a 
deep difference between the two positions. The difference is 
perhaps best realized by asking the question: Does it matter what 
a man does at any given. moment? "Al- Maturidi" answered with 
17'. 
an unhesitating "Yes". Ai- Ashrari would probably not have 
answered with a direct "7o"; for the most part he simply avoided 
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the question,. bu,t at the same time discouraged, men from attaching 
any importance to their striving by repeating "You cannot do 
anything except whet God wills." 
On the other hand, "al -Mturidï" differentiated his position 
from that of the Mutta.zile and Qadariya j-ist as definitely rs from 
tl.t of the wlujbira, and AshLariya.. In the particular question 
just considered it has to be remembered that he also held that what 
a man does has been known to God and written down from all eternity, 
presumably he held, like the author of Figh Akbar II, that this 
and writing 
knowledgeAis not decisive, but merely descriptive. 
His opposition to the doctrine of Qadar appears again in his 
discussion'of article 3 of Figh Akbar I, "that what reaches you 
could not possibly have missed you ... " . This, he says, is a 
question "between us and the Qadarlya and Mutta.zila." ; they deny 
that God wills the act of man when it is sin, for they hold that 
sin is from the sinner and Unbelief from the unbeliever, and 
further maintain that, if God willed sin and unbelief and then 
punished men for them, He would be acting unjustly. Such a 
view, he considers, is folly, since God's will is "supreme and His 
volition effective; yet the sin of the sinner does not come about 
through God's will in that He allows or permits it (jä'izan) - He 
quite definitely disapproves of it, and it is contrary to His 
good pleasure.* 
It has to'be admitted that this part of "al- Maturidi's" views, 
if I have interpreted them correctly, is not very satisfactory. 
Of course, in a subject where no. completely satisfactory solution 
has 'been given too much cannót be made of this. Yet the con- 
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clusion of this passage is one of the weakest parts of the whole 
book. He sets out to show that evil may not be ascribed to 
God in particular (or in isolation) , and the proof is that it can 
standneither in a "real relation" to Him, nor yet in an "honorific 
relation" (idc.fst tango, idâ.fa.t ta.kr!m) ; one can o ly. asçribe 
evil to God "in general",-that is, as parts of a greater whole, 
as when one says "everything is from God"; ahything else is im- 
proper and irreverent (murä.<<.. li- 'l- ada.b) , just as, although God 
is creator of everything, it is irreverent to say "0 Creator 
of pigs ."e 
This distinction between God's will and His approval or good 
pleasure is á vital one for those who would maintain the right- 
eousness of an omnipotent God (against the attacks of the Muttaz- 
ila., primarily) , and "al-M .turidi" returns to it later. In 
connection with the discussion about the relation between God's 
will and his command, he supposes his opponent asking whether 
God's will is a. ¡proved or ' d.is approved by Him. Be admits that 
it is always approved, but further maintains that sin and unbelief 
are disapproved. When the supposed opponent asks, "Are you not 
holding both that sin and unbelief are by God's will, and God's 
will is always approved b y Him?)" he replies, "God's will, deci- 
sion, and so forth, are all approved by Him, but the act proceed- 
ing from the tan by His will may. be either approved, as in the 
case of obedience, or disapproved, as in, the case of sin." 
The conclus ion of the matter would appear to be that "al- 
Maturïdi" saw both sides of the argument - God's omnipotence and 
His righteousness - and c Lrng to both of them, but was not able 
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really to reconcile the two. The point is e tricky one, as a 
study of what Abu LUdhb< and modern scholars have to say about 
it will show. The point made by Abo. `T?dhbag is that, while 
al -Ashy a.ri emphasized that will and approval were two separate 
things, the school of Áb11 Hanifa regarded them "as two coalescing 
things (muttatlidâ.n) . But Much depends on the particular 
portion of their writings which is under consideration. In 
the Ibána and the Kitäb al -Loma' al- Ash(ari argues, it would seem, 
from the principle that what God does not will He disapproves ;713. 
but in the creed in the Ma oä,1 -5t he sags that God does not approve 
of evil even though He wills it.lt 
tu.rïdi" 
The emphasis on unity is in line with what'll has 
to say about the distinction within God's will drawn by the cAdliya. 
(who are probably closely related to the l.u.ttazila.) ; on the one 
ha:äd there is the will by which He creates the heavens and the 
earth,4 and on the other hand there is a "will of delegation" 
(mashi'at tafwT(J) by which He entrusts meet with their acts and 
leaves them to themselves. "Al -M Xturidi" considers it gross 
presumption to make a division within the will of God in this way. 
his own view retains only the bare minimum of responsibility for 
man; the power which the doctrine of Çadar ascribes to man is far 
in excess of this minimum and places man to this extent on a, level 
with God - which is unthinkable. 
There is thus considerable justification for. "al- Eturidi's" 
claim that the school of 1b7 Hanfs occupies a middle position 
between the Qadariya and the Lujbira and is uninfected by either 
Qadar or Jabr. This is by no means an innovation of l- 
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MEturidï's" , but has its roots in the doctrines of the school. 
Al -Ta ì .wl asserts that the true Islam is between Jsbr and Qa.dar, 
thought without elaborating,- and the verb 'a bara, is used for 
"compel" in Filth fikbar II.7 There was also the mysterious 
group of the. F'á.fida mentioned. in the Maqfl:gt which rejected both 
jabs and tafwil; the similarity of the terms is a strong argument 
for some connection with the school of Abü I1 nifs , but I have no 
clue as to what it is. Thus, while there are these, roots in 
the past, "al- iti4â.turidi's" is the first clear statement of the con- 
ception of a middle position. In view of the later adoption 
of this claim to be the via media by the . sh(arïya., it is note- 
worthy that "al- 10.turidi ". should immediately pass to accusing 
them of holding one of the extremes.. 
At the same time it must be noted that there is no instance 
of the technical use of kasb or iktisá.b in the Sheri al -Fish sl- 
A.kbar. In view of the fact that it occurs (though - without 
being given any prominence) in both the other Hanafi creeds that 
have been considered , .it cannot be argued. that "al -ii turidi" dis- 
approved of it altogether; but clearly it did not suite fit in 
with his conception of the "use of-originated powers ". 
What can be maintained is that the identification of the doctrine 
of acquisition with the middle position must have been made by 
some later thinker -. possibly al- Beeill2nl.V 
In the long run, however, what matters is not so much. term- 
inology as ideas, and especially distinctions. The great con- . 
tribution of the ranafiya. to Islamic thought in the questions 
covered by the present-study was their continued. insistence on 
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the distinction between responsible human action and jabr or 
Divine compulsion. In this they were carrying on a piece of 
work that had been started earlier among the Ahl al- Ithb-ft, and 
the final result of their labours was the recognition and adoption 
of the distinction by the Ashta.riya wheñ they became predominant. 
Yet there is an element of weakness seemingly inseparable from 
the views of the school of a1- I }inturidi. Their position is 
essentially one of balance, a mediating position, and suffers 
from the defects inherent in that. Their insistence on human 
responsibility and their opposition to fatalism are both connect- 
ed with thé truly Islamic conception of God's righteousness. 
But in balancing His righteousness and his omnipotence there is a 
loss of religious fervour. That at least is the impression 
left when one reads the Shar . al--P iqh al -Akbex after al -Ash` arT's 
Ibrna. And the consequence is that there is .no enthusiastic 
proclamation of God's righteousness as a counterblast to al- 
Ash1ari's fervid declaration of His majesty and omnipotence. 
This is a suitable point at which to end this study. 
Certainly a vista of further debates is dpening up through the 
opposition of these two great schools. But there is this im- 
portant difference. Previous discussions were miinly with 
sectaries who were, or came to be, regarded as outs iae the fold 
of Islam. From this time on, however, the arguments are 
largely against admitted Muslims and within the framework of a 
considerable number of accepted dogmas. 
VI. 
NOTE The Interpretation of Ibä.na. ,p. 66 . 
The Translation of the passage beginning p.66,1.4 should run 
roughly as follows: 
"Another Question: It may be said to them: God said, 
"If We willed, We should give to every soul its ,uidEnce 
; 
but 
true is the saying of Mine, 'Assuredly ,I shall fill Gehenna, 
with jinn and men together.'" (Q.32,13). Now, since that 
saying is true, it follows that He did not will to give every 
soul its guidance (for. His not giving each its guidance is 
dependent on the truth of the saying about the punishment of 
the infidels) ; and since He did not will their guidance, He 
did will their going astray. 
If they say: The meaning of that verse is, "If We Junk will- 
ed, We should force guidance upon them and compel them to have 
it ;" the reply is: If He forced guidance upon them, and com- 
pelled them to have it, would they be truly guided? If they 
say, Yes; the reply is: Then if, when He is the author of their 
guidance, they are truly guided, why do you deny that, if He 
were the author of the unbelief of the unbelievers, they would 
be unbelievers'r This demolishes their argument, for they 
hold that the unbeliever is the sole author of his unbelief. 
Again, it may be said to them: In what manner would guid- 
ance be present in men, if God were to give it to them and to 
will it for them? If they say: By compulsion; the reply 
is: And when God compels them to be guided, are they benefited 
(sc. in respect of the future life) by what they do under com- 
pulsion? To those who say, Yes, the reply is: Then, since 
God has announced that, if He willed, He would give thee guid- 
ance (if it were not for the truth of the saying that He will 
fill Gehenna) , and since, if He compelled them, He would not 
benefit them nor avert punishment from them (just as whet 
Pharaoh said under compulsion when drowning did not benefit 
him) , it follows that there is no sense in your view; for, 
if it were not for the truth of His saying (sc. about filling 
Gehenna), every soul would be given its guidance, and yet 
according to your interpretation the giving of guidance does 
not avert punishment." 
This passage occurs after several where al- Ash`a.ri has been 
showing that God wills man's folly, disobedience and unbelief. 
The kernel of the argument is the connection between the two parts 
of the verse, expressed by the words innamä. .. lammä., which I have 
translated by "dependent" (though a phrase with "condition" or 
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"reason" might be better); it is precisely because it is true that 
God has said He will fill Gehenna, that He has not guided all , but 
has in fact led some astray. 
The opponents with whom he is arguing in the second and third 
paragraphs presumably held that every soul had been guided by way 
of precept and admonition, and then tried to evade the difficulty 
caused by this verse by the interpreting the guidance which has 
not been given to every soul as "compulsory guidance ". In so 
doing thew have really abandoned their own conception of guidance 
as monitory and adopted al -Ash' ari's of guidance as effective for 
salvation, and he proceeds to exploit this inconsistency in their 
view. The point of the second paragraph is that, if man can 
go to Paradise through God's operation, there is no reason why he 
should not go to Hell in similar fashion. 
The third paragraph is rather tricky. The opponents admit 
that this compulsory guidance is beneficial; (if they did not do a 
so, the whole interpretation of the verse becomes unsatisfactory). 
Presumably they had some confused notion of compulsory monitory 
guidance. But they apparently also held the view (first pro- 
pounded by Burghûth) that what a man does under compulsion is not 
effective (either for salvation or condemnation). So al- 
Ash`a.ri's argument might be paraphrased thus: The verse shows 
that guidance is effective; but compulsory guidance is not effect- 
ive; therefore your interpretation does. not make sense. 
This is primarily an argumentum ad hominem, but it is inter- 
esting that al- Ash(a.rï apparently accepts the distinction between 
voluntary action and what is done under compulsion. 
VI. 
NOTE B. The Text of IbEna-.76. 
There is obviously something missing from the text here. 
Two illustrations, murder and marriage, have become conflated; but 
as they presumably had a similar wording , the missing portion can 
easily be restored. (Cp. al- Baghdá.di , TJûl al- Din,142 ,1.14f . , 
and the emendation suggested by Professor Thomson in his review in 
The Moslem World, p.259.) The passage, as emended, will run 
as follows: 
"If they say, No (so. he is not killed at his appointed term) , 
the reply is: Then, what is the term of this murdered man? 
If they say: The time at which God knew that, if he had not 
been killed, ((he would have died; the reply is: Then you 
would say of the woman whom God knew that, if he had not been 
killed)), he would have married, that He knew she was his woman 
(wife) , even if he did not actually marry her.... And silice 
this is impossible, it is impossible that the time to which he 
did not attain should be his term..4 
The text, after the words " actually marry her" in the third last 
line, has the additional sentence: "and since it was known to God 
that, if he had not been killed but had survived, he would have dis- 
believed, ((and)) that ttm Hell would have been his dwelling." 
This seems to be part of some other argument, which has mistakenly 
been inserted here; the "impossibility" does not apply to this as 
it stands, but fits in perfectly with the point about marriage. 
Since the text here is somewhat dislocated, it is perhaps 
worth pointing out that the words immediately following the 
passage translated ( "inasmuch as ..") would fit in better at the 
end of the following paragraph. 
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VII. 
C O N C L U D I N G S TT T? V E Y 
It remains now to summarize and call attention to some of 
the more notable results of the preceding investigations. 
(1) In all the earliest instances studied the doctrine of 
C;adar was linked with the conception of Gorl's righteousness. 
There was no question of a mere academic pursuit of truth, for 
most of those who held the doctrine were of e fanatical and 
puritanical outlook. Nor was there any real interest in 
political freedom, although the doctrine of Qada.r wes in fact 
held. by many who opposed the TTmaiyad tyranny . It wss through 
the idea of righteousness that the doctrine became connected with 
politics , for it was not the authoritarian character of the 
TTmaiyad regime that was attacked but its injustice. The 
general line of thought vee that punishment by God or by man is 
unjust where a man has no power of himself to act and is not re- 
sponsible for his act. By way of exception the motive of 
eel -Hasan al -Basrï Was perhaps rather ethical and religious - to 
show men that they had power to attain righteousness of life. 
In every case, however, there is a logical and natural develop- 
ment of one aspect of Qur'änic teaching, namely, the justice and 
righteousness of God. Extreneous ideas might have been, at 
most, n stimulus of the development, hardly its source; a.nd it is 
worth noting in this connection that the effective idea was not 
that of man's freedom simply, but that of the injustice of pun- 
ishing one who is not free and responsible. 
(2) At a later time among the Mu`tazila the doctrine of 
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Qadar became associated with a rather humanistic outlook. 
This manifested itself as belief in man's !Amer self- sufficiency, 
in his power to control his life and earn Paradise for himself, 
and it was coupled with a belief in the complete competence of 
human reason. The Qur'á.n opposed the attitude of fatalism 
which resigned itself to things as they were and disdained every 
effort to improve them. But the overemphasis of man's power 
to carry out God's commands and to change circumstances led to a 
denial of the Qur' -a7n in other ways - notably of its insistence 
that man was dependent upon God and upon the Divine initiative. 
When man is thus made the source and originator of evil actions, 
the "problem of evil" is simplified. But all the attempts of 
the Muttazila to show that evil could in no way be attributed to 
God only served to make clear the inadequacy of human conceptions 
of justice to explain every particular of the operations of God's 
righteousness. A move away from extreme humanism is to be 
traced in the later Mu'ta.zila of the 3rd century, especially al- 
Jubb ' I , and the conversion of al -Ash` arI is the culmination of 
this process rather than a fresh departure. 
(3) Among the .opponents of the doctrine of Qadar are to be 
found motives which are just as truly qur' änic as the zeal of the 
Qadarïya for the assertion of God's righteousness. To a great 
extent, it has to be admitted, deterministic views proceed from 
sheer conservatism and from the pre- Islamic material which seems 
to have found its way into the Traditions; and even devout and 
upright Muslims frequently seem to have felt no contradiction 
between the Qur' änic and non --Qur' gnic conceptions. But on the 
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other hand the Jahmïya, for instance , were primarily interested 
in the assertion of God's unity (though this in turn may be bound 
up with a. desire for mystical unity with Him) . They did. not 
deny God's righteousness, of course; they merely passed lightly 
over it and emphasized other aspects. In the case of al- 
Ash`arï, again, the experience of conversion as something which 
had been done in him, and not which he had done for himself, led 
him to look upon God as the orderer of man's life and to emphasize 
those aspects of Islam as a religion which had been denied or 
neglected by the Mu'tazila. Such were: God's supreme control 
of all events; men's need for His help in all their acts, and so 
their dependence on Him; the inscrutability of God's ways. In 
the latter point there is a recognition of the limitations of 
Duman reason and its inability to prescribe what God may and may 
not do; reason must rather study what God has in fact done. 
Thus al- Ashtarì's opposition to. the doctrine of Qadar is essenti- 
ally religious and theistic in reaction to the humanism of the 
Mu'ta.zila. 
(4) There is, then, some truth with both sides, but both 
overstated their claims to begin with. In the course of dis- 
cussion both came to admit some of the truth in the other's views. 
Gradually certain points became clear. 
a) The distinction between voluntary acts and those done 
under compulsion had to be recognized even by the opponents of 
Qadar. The monistic Jahmiya. in the early second century had 
attempted to deny this distinction, but by the time of al- 
Bá.gilláni in the fourth it had become the starting -point of 
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simply to be held both at once without being reconciled. But 
al- Ash`ari at least realized that when God creates a human act 
necessarily 
it is notAt e ascribed to Him as its doer, es, in the case of a 
human agent. 
d) In the course of the discussions man's power to act was 
more fully analysed, but there were no clear and generally 
accepted results by the time of al- Ash`ari, though there was 
some advance towards a. recognition of the distinction between 
the mental and physical aspects of acts. There was also a 
movement towards an atomistic account of human activity, but this 
was due to general considerations rather than to specific analysis. 
(5) There are seen to be some curious misconceptions about 
al- Ash`ari. He is often spoken of as the originator of the 
doctrine of ':.asb, and his position is described as a. via media 
on this point and on others, but there is in fact no confirmation 
of these views in his writings, rather a. definite disproof. 
The technical conception of kasb was much employed in the century 
before al- A.sh`ari; he himself seems to have had little use for it. 
And the via media on this question (which consists in asserting 
that kasb is the mean between nadar and jabr, or absolute de- 
terminism) was mainly claimed for themselves by the followers of 
Abtá Hanifa. Not till some time after al- Ash(ari's death was 
a claim of this sort made by his disciples. 
These, then, are the main positions which have been argued 
for in the course of the investigations; but there is a further 
matter which requires some consideration. 
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Underlying nearly all the lucubrations of the early Muslim 
theologians Is one fundamental thought, like a deep steady bass, 
on which the whole superstructure of the harmony rests. It is 
the thought of the powerlessness of men in the face of circum- 
stances, of the nature of his life as determined for him by some- 
thing other than himself, and of his dependence on that other, 
whatever it may be. It is not by chance that Ghail án, when 
distinguishing between primary or compulsory knowledge and second- 
aril or acquired knowledge, asserted that the primary knowledge, 
which no man can avoid having, is the knowledge that the world 
and the lives of the human beings in it are "originated ", the 
product not of themselves but of something else.i Nor is it 
by chance that this same thought of the tbriginatedness" of the 
world is the premiss of most later Muslim arguments for the exist- 
ence of God; starting from this they seek to prove that there is 
one Originator and only one. This sense of being determined, 
then, this feeling of being passive in the hands of some Other, 
wes a thought deep in the consciousness and, more than that, in 
the unconscious of those peoples of the Middle East to whom Islam 
came. Man in this modern industrial age is liable to a similar 
sense of being a cog in a great machine, of himself powerless; 
but it would take generations, perhaps millennia, before the 
feeling of determinedness permeated his inmost being as it had 
that of Muhammad's Arabs and their. neighbours. 
In pr.e- Islamic times this deep underlying feeling found its 
expression in the view that everything is controlled by dahr, 
which is, as it were, a combination of Time and Fate. So far 
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as one can tell, the general attitude was what might be called a 
modified fatalism, rather than an absolute fatalism.. In the 
ordinary affairs of life from day to day man might do as seemed 
good to him, but what he did w2a incapable of influencing the 
final outcome. The hour of his death, and his happiness or 
misery, were already written, and, strive as he .might, he could 
not deflect ineluctable destiny a. hairsbreadth from its path. 
This vaguely- ;defined fatalistic philosophy was not itself the 
all-pervading f eeling,,but was the rational form in which that 
feeling found expression at a particular time. In the fatal- 
istic attitude is included the further thought that on the whole 
dahr is quite regardless of human prosperity or misfortune, and 
that, while for some lucky individuals its workings may be' a.d- 
vantageous, for the most part they are rather the opposite. 
From one point of view, then, the achievement of Muhammad may be 
regarded as a restoration of confidence in the powers that con- 
trol human life. The Qur'an does not question, rather it 
accepts wholeheartedly, the conception of man's life as determined, 
but it makes a new and revolutionary addition. It is not by 
impersonal, unfeeling Time that man's life is determined, but by 
God. God is austere; He is hard towards His enemies and those 
who disobey Him; but He is essentially just and. righteous. By 
sending His prpphets and apostles, above all Muhammad, He has 
given man a chance of attaining to eternal bliss; He is ready to 
help on with His succour and guidance those who are well -disposed; 
He is the Merciful and Compassionate. Therefore, if one is 
prepared to submit oneself altogether to God, one can look forward 
VII. 
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with confidence to the outcome of one's life. 
The results of the impact of the Qur'änic attitude to life 
upon the fatalistic one are complex. The former did not simply 
oust the latter. To a great extent Muhammad did succeed in 
transmuting the old sense of dependence. Outwardly, indeed, 
the transformation was complete, and God was acknowledged by the 
lips of all. But fatalism was too deep- seated (and, we might 
perhaps add, was too good a rationalization of the laziness in- 
duced by the climate) for it to be wholly eradicated. It per- 
sisted, at first underground, later by producing new and hybrid 
flowers in the Traditions. It was strange how few Muslims 
felt the contradiction between the fatalistic teaching of many 
Traditions and the anti -fatalistic teaching of the Qur' án. For 
long it was apparently the pre- Islamic rather than. the Islamic 
element that was foremost in leading men to defend determinism; 
and in the course of time the views of Muslims seem to have be- 
come more deterministic than was logically necessary. Traces 
of fatalism even remained in the practice of Muslims, as in the 
refusal of some to take medicines. 
At this point it seems $ appropriate to ask whether the 
doctrine of i,jmäc , the consensus or agreement of Muslims, did not 
contribute to the persistence of fatalistic thoughts and practices 
Though at different times there were various ideas about whose 
opinions were to be counted, in the case of the theologians under 
review it was taken to be the agreement of all 'Muslims . a Now 
this, it might be held, at once opens the flood -gates to the 
seething ocean of the Muslim world, with all its fatalistic 
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undercurrents - that world where, we may conjecture, even 
among the well -educated the number. of really devout ;Muslims was 
small, while that of half- converted ones, still clinging to the 
old pre -Islamic superstitions, was large . Is not this 
sanctioning of i jmat the betrayal of true religion and its re- 
duction from the level of the saints to that of the average 
sinner? Or did the rot perhaps set in with the acceptance of 
the so- called "sound" Traditions and their promotion to the 
rank of inspired. truth ? = 
Such speculations are, of course, futile, unless they help 
us to understand historical reality more clearly. These two 
questions are similar, and are bound up with one another in that, 
since sound Tradition is universally accepted, it is confirmed 
by ijmKt. The truth of the matter, however, is that these 
things are no so much causes as symptoms. The doctrine of 
ijmat certainly cannot be blamed for what has happened. Its 
formulation served rather to make explicit existing realities, 
such as the domination of the Muslim mind by the thought of man's 
powerlessness. Deep thoughts of this character, uprising it 
may be from what has been called the racial unconscious rather 
than from that of the individual, have a tremendous power of 
inertia. They cannot be eradicated; they persist, for they 
have more than a grain of truth in them;' they can only be trans- 
formed or sublimated. In the long run religious progress is 
the progress of a whole community; individuals only count accord- 
ing to the measure of their impact on the community, either in 
their own or in succeeding generations. In the phase of Islam 
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here studied these laws are exemplified. .1uhammad did indeed 
achieve a remarkable transformation of this feeling of being 
determined. Those who had believed they were the playthings 
of Time now believed (or at least professed to believe) that 
they were the slaves of God the Merciful and Compassionate. 
The stimulus of Arab imperial expansion doubtless helped to over- 
come ingrained passivity. But there were many residual 
factors which were only gradually eliminated. Muhammad him- 
self was still to some extent under the sway of the old concept- 
ions; how much more those who did not have his experiences of 
communion with the Divine? The thought of God's righteousness 
was certainly present in the Qur' .n; but it did not touch suf- 
ficiently deep and primordial sources of power and was not potent 
enough to shift the deadweight of predestinarian feeling. Had 
al- Ash'a.rï or some other great figure been a preacher of righte- 
ousness things might have different. But in the wisdom of 
God that was not to be. The witness of Islam was and is to 
the majesty and omnipotence of God; and this is a testimony of 
which the man -made, self- sufficient civilization of the West 
stands greatly in need. 
XXXXXXXX This study was directed through and beyond the 
immediate subject- matter to the essence of Islam. There is 
some ambiguity, however, as to what is to be understood by this 
phrase. It might be claimed that Islam is essentially the 
total historical phenomenon - all that has been said and tho4h# 
and done by Muslims, and especially what they say, think and do in 
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the present. In this sense the essential Islam consists in 
the general features of that existing configuration of life and 
thought with which the politician or religious statesman has to 
deal. On the other hand, such an understanding of Islam is 
superficial in certain respects, and fails to distinguish between 
the form, the driving power or spiritual energy which has brought 
about all these phenomena in the lives of men, and the matter, 
the nature and circumstances of the races who received the impact 
of that spiritual energy. It seems more fruitful to take as 
the essence of Islam the apostolic proclamation of Muhammad and 
the spiritual power which flowed from that. 
There is much fatalism among those who are Muslims. But 
in the essential Islam of the Qur'an fatalism is strenuously op- 
posed, even though frequent expression is given to the truly re- 
ligious sense of dependence on God for power to act and for pro- 
tection from evil. Striptly speaking, determinism, or the 
belief that man's life is determined for him from without, is not 
part of the "gospel" of 1 uhamma.d but rather a strong and imposing 
feature of the background, not part of his prophetic assertion 
about God but something built into the foundation of culture and 
civilization upon which Islam arose. Yet because this determ- 
inism was presupposed by the fresh religious message and taken up 
into it, it has, as it were, become canonized by close association, 
so that the two are probably now inseparable. Let us not, how- 
ever, confuse the difference between the civilizations of the 
Muslim world and the humanistic, only partly Christian, West with 
the difference between the religions of Islam and Christianity. 
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chief sects of Islam. 
72. Muwaltida here is e conjecture of my own instead of mewji da. 
in the printed text. -Cp. Intis ,r, Index, s.v. i&wahhidst. - 
73 . Milal ,103 - Khawgri j . Ghail ,n is a i u ttazill in I ntig gr, 
127, itiÍunya, 15, etc.; Abii Shimr, as a follower of al- azzám, 
in ila.l ,41 ; see also Dr.Nyberg's note, Inti ßr,211 -3. 
74. Pp.5 (A_hl al- Qadár) , 6, 7, 32, 56, 67, 72, 73f. , 85, 87;. 
. tr. 46, 47, 49., 74, 96, 107, 111, 113, 125, 128. 
85 
75. wait, tr.125. 
76. Maq.489,l.9; 37; 490,1.10; etc.FcS..il-k &LT Or& p. 66- 
77. Ib.na,6 ; tr.47. It might be an attribution to them of 
Christian ideas; John of Damascus held that "evil is due to our 
weakness and the wiles of the devil" (cp. Becker, Christliche 
Polemik, p.1.84. Or it might be based on an idea current 
among the Khawárij that wrongdoing is unbelief, and misbelief 
the worship of Satan; cp.Mao.118. 
78. Ib'gna,32 , 56; tr. 74, 96. 
79. In al-Malatï , Ta.nbiri, 126-135. 
80. P.126. 81. P.133. 
82. P.134. 
83. These cannot be the same as the Mufawwida among the sects 
of the Silica (al- Newbakhtl , 71) , since the the tafwîd the latter 
were concerned with was political. 
84. irI'a.g . 93f . 85. Q.40,47. 
N. III. 
86. Ibana,85; tr.125. Cp.ch.V, sect.f. 
87. Ibn Ç;utaiba, Ms (Qrif , 301, places him at the head of the 
list of Qadariya. The story of Süsan is from Wensinck, 
'1uslim Creed, 53, quoting from Ibn I;ajar al- c_As9alTni, 
Tandhïb al- Tandh!b , X ,225f.- H.Ritter (Isla.m,XXI(1933) ,p.s4) 
quotes Ibn eAs kir , Ta'rikh Dima.sho as saying: "The first 
to discuss Qa.dar was a.n CIrci celled Súsa:n, a Christian who 
became Mb slim, then returned to Christianity; Ma`bad al- Juhan3 
derived from him, and GhailUn from i+ia`bad . " 
88. IyIao.98; in vïila.l,98 he is called "Meg-bad b. &Abd al -Petm .n" ; 
cp. arq,80. Ritter. says that the information about Matbed 
al- Juhanï in Ibn dAsEkir, op.cit. , is to found under the head- 
ing "Matbad b. libda.1117.h b. tU?weimir" or "Macbad b. Ith lid" . 




1. III. 787B - 793A; his introduction and notes to the Kit-db 
al -Intiç .r are also valuable. 
lo. 
2. Cp. EI , art.Muttazila. 
3. There are various reports of the date of his death (c . Muny4 
28) ; the choice is mainly between 227 and 235 (ilïa.o.Index), and 
I have little hesitation in choosing the former of these; the 
statement of al- Malati (Tanbih,31) that three caliphs honoured 
him, al- Ma'mñn, al- Mu`ta.sim and al- Wathiq, presumably means 
that they gave him a stipend, end as there was no reason why 
al- Mutawakkil should alter his attitude towards a very old man 
between 232 and 235, it would seen that he must have been dead 
before 232. 
4. /It IvMunya , 28 . 
5. Al- iviala.ti says he gave an oral refu :-tion of HishNm al- Fuwa.tì 
when he was old and infirm - Tanbih,31. 
6. They were both pupils of Bishr b. Said and Abú 'Uthmb.n al- 
Za ̀ far .ns., according to al- Malati, Tanbih, 30f. 
7. Munyá.,30 ; al- Malati,TanbTh,30. Bishr was presumably im- 
prisoned on political grounds, since he had strong `Alid sym- 
pathies; there was not the same reason for impristning Abu '1- 
Hud ha it . 
8. Cp. Munya and al- Malati's Tanbih passim. 
9. Al- Malati, Tanbih, 31. 
10. Cp. Dr. Pines , Atomenlehre , 1247133; also chapter. V below. 
11. They are given this epithet by Bishr b. al- Muctemir in e poem 
in Munya, 30. The group associated with GhailSn seems to 
have continued to exist, and Abiz Shimr is reckoned a contempor- 
ary of Abu ' l- Hudhail by Ibn al- Murtad6 (Munya,33) , while 
Muhammad b. Shabib and Muwais are assigned to the following 
generation. 
12. There is an occasional mention of kh7 ri ji risings both about 
the time of H .rún and later (cp.Muir, Caliphate, 470, 515, etc.); 
the Mutakallimún of the Khawari j (js c .120) were active about 
this time, but do not seem to have been very influential except 
perhaps in spreading Mucta zilì views - among the Ib .dïya of North 
Africa. (cp. Nallino , Rivista, VII ,455 -460) . Burghúth, even 
if reckoned among the KhawFri j op. p.134 below) , was later. 
13 . Lla.c . 485. 
11. 
14. Professor Guidi, La Lotta tra l' Islam e il Manicheismo; end 
the discussion of this by Dr. Nyberg (OLZ.X.X:KII,425 -41) entitled 
Zum Kampf zwischen Islam und ,ia.nichismus. 
15. This is the argument of Dr. Pines in his Atomenlehre. 
16. Ibn al- I,îur.tsdr in his IVlunya carries the process right back 
to the age of the Companions. 
17. 222f. 
18. See Pines, Atomenlehre, 125ff. ; cp. Maa.276f. , Abu) l- Hudhail. 
19. Cp.'Jyberg, art. on Muttazila in EI; also Junya., etc. 
20. Perhaps we should speak of Mutakellimun (? = speculative 
theologians) rather than of the lu tazila (es al- Ashr-ari some- 
times does in the iViao l .t) , for there were prominent thinkers 
who did not belong to the latter. Our sources are, if any- 
thing, weighted in favour of the Muttazila, owing to such 
factors as al- Ashteri's connection with them and the extent of 
their literary output. The very name "Mu tazila" does not 
seem to have been stabilized till well on in the third century, 
since the Kit27b el- Intiçt.r is still occupied with discussions 
about who was and who was not e 'iiuttazil7.. 
21. Lie taught Bishr b. al- Muttemir, ,unya,31. 
22. lAr7r, too, seems to have lived long enough to criticize 
al- Nazzgm - i4ao.328. 
23. Zum Kempf zwischen Islam and i.enich2ismus, OLZ. KII,p.427. 
24. Mao . 363 ; 277. 
25. Cp. la.o266 , Al- KhaiyFt rebuts the charges that various 
members of. the Mu`tazila had gone beyond the içjmr ̀ , Intiçrr,7R 
26... llis .256. 27. Al- Ba,ghdFd.r, nsúl el- Din,143. 
28. 
29. ;a.c.259; cp.ch.II.1,d (p.18f.) above. 
30. See esp. I lao.260 -66; most of the views are given anonymously. 
31. ag . 243f . ; cp .204 . 
32. >.iac: 274f.; according to Mill ,36 Abu ' L- Hudhail held 
some such view as this. 




34. Ria.c.230,1.13. 35. 243,15; 267,7. 
36. Cp. the use of the phrases cüwat al -Im7n and qúwa.t al-kufr 
in connection with the views of the A.hl al- Ithb7.t in :y aq .259, 9; 
262,6; 263,6; 265,6. 
37. 230,1.12. This passage actually contains two words 
isti- 'a_ and oudra, which might be distinguished in translation 
as "capacity" and "power ". So far as I am able to make out, 
however, these words, and likewise qüwe , are used without any 
difference of meaning; I think an examination of 4ag.230 -33 (or 
of IbEna.,69) will bear this out; thus, on p.232,1. 14f. both 
cüwa and qudra are used in a passage where the heading and pre- 
vious passages }lave istitâ ̀ e . I have therefore mostly trans- 
lated all of them by "power ". There is certainly e difference 
of usage, however, in that isti- 'te is al- Ashtari's own word, 
doubtless'favoured by him and by the upholders of the Divine 
Qadar for its suggestion of submission (as the root TWc means 
"obey ") , whereas güwa. and audra were used to describe the omni- 
potence of God and so could. not fittingly be applied to the 
creaturely operations of man. 
38. ivaq.233; 443. 
39. Mila1,35. This interpretation seems to fit the various 
uses in 00 ,ia.o.232 -42. A confirmation is found in the more 
elaborate analysis of "moments ", made presumably by later 
thinkers of similar views, but never of much importance. One 
form (p.238) has four moments; the first is, as before, the 
moment of power (for "power ", qudra, corresponds to "able ", 
düdir) ; the second is that of will, irä.da ; the third of imagin- 
ation (in the sense of forming an image - tamthil) ; and in the 
fourth the movement or outward act comes into being. 
40. lvir>. 0.234. 
41. 415 -8. Al- Iskgfi adds that where the volition does not nec- 
essitate the object, the object occurs "in the th ±td "; presum- 
ably he is thinking of an end which reouires means; the means, 
the immediate object of volition (confined to the agent's body, 
probably) , occur necessarily in the second moment, but the end 
may not follow the means with 'absolute necessity. Cp.p.89. 
42. 232. The statement on p.230 that he held that the power 
.endures probably only means that he did not hold the atomism 
of al- Katbi( see p. 92below) . Cp. also p.232 Where he is said 
to have held that knowledge and willing could not accompany 
death. 
43. 237 44. Cp.230. 
45. 555; 200; cp.577; the same argument is used 
by al -Nau m 




47. Q.57,3; 1.Lg.b42; cp.148f. 
163f. ,474; also Pines, Atomenlehre, 124. 
48 Cp. ì;Ic.576f. 49. IVIila1,37; cp. i,ïF c.555. 
50. :ii1a1 ,37; cp. M^c. 555, 576. 
51. Kha.wa`tir, , pl. of 
427 foot, 239, etc. 
pretetion, as there 
mention it.) Cp . 
caliph who does not 
kh2tir, something occurring to the mind; 
(I am not quite certain about this inte r- 
is more them this in some of the views which 
tradition quoted above, p.31: "There is no 
have two courtiers ... " (el- Bukhrri , Qadar, 8) 
52. Cp. ..q.428f. ; al- Ba.ghd2di, U úl, 26ff.,154f. - here the 
point is said to be derived from the Indian Bs.r hima.. 
53. a. c . 3 78 . 
54. 389; he said one thing was after another without interval 
fa$l). 
55. da.co .190 ; iViilal , 45. 56. Iuia q .401. 
57. Mun,y a f31. 58. g. 331f . ,405f. ; ìviila.l, 46. 
59. ac .401 -15. Dr.Nyberg suggests that Bishr did not mean so 
much as he is commonly said to have meant, Inti ár,194f. 
60. i,1a .329 . 
61. 229; apparently derived from Ghailan. 
62. See Note A (p.102) . 63. Ma.o.2334, 415. 
64. 246. 65. 250,1.11. 
66. 246; co.573 -7; also the views of el-Naj j -.r (V.4,b below, p. 
121) , which are very like those of Bi shr . 
67. Cp.Maq.262 where 3a.cfar b. Barb speaks of tawflq and tasdid 
as lutfan min altäí A115h. 
68. Mila1,41; Jacfar b. ,iubashshir is said to have 
been a pupil 
too, but shows less trace of it. 
69. 246f.,573. 
70. Jatfa.r uses the distinction ikhti,¡5r 
) ( idtirá.r (40f. , cp. 
245f. ,262) , which ? Pi be derived. from dishrm 
b. el- rlakam, whose 
view he reports in the first passage. 
The parallel passages 
246f. and 573f. have ikhtiyrran and taw 
ca n re+pectively; tawtan 
wes used. by Burghúth (cp.pp.126,149 below). 
71.. ,iac , 576 ,etc . 
The point is perhaps clearer when the 
N. IV 14. 
word "perfect" is used, since strictly speaking when a thing is 
perfect of its kind there is nothing beyond, more perfect, to 
which it can aspire; on the other hsnd, there may be other 
things which are likewise perfect, end these may be infinite 
in number. 
72. vIac.247; the anonymous passage, 248,1.11-15, expresses the 
same view, and ma.J indeed be Ja. fsr's own, since it uses his 
phrase a`la.'L- manFzil. 
73. c . 2 32 , 415. 74. i:!ia. c . 42 9 . 
75. 201f. 76. idunya,42. 
77. 78. 232; cp. a. view on p.231. 
79. 409. 
80. 415; cp.419, where he suggests another refinement. Lon p. 
227 this view-of Jacfar's is said to be that of the 1 ucta.zila 
in general apart from `Abbäd; but on p.513 all the Muctezila 
are said to oppose Ja`far 
81. 513f.; cp .191. E-- - J 82. 356. 
83. 253,1.11f. 84. 201,1.7. 
85. 253f. 86. 254f. 
87. 538. 88. 537. 
89. 249; cp. note 41 above. 90. 230,232. 
91. 404. 
92. 238; the report is from Burgh71th (cp.V.4,c below) and can 
hardly be later than 250 A. H. 
93. 406f. He was one of those , probebly influenced by Ghail2.n, 
who combined some doctrines of the Murji'a with those of the 
Mu`ta.zila. 
94. CT151,50,etc. 
95. Some suggestions are made in Note B (p.103). 
96. Maa.554; cp.548f. CQ. ._¡,. M-7 
97. This is an inference from Mac .199 and 
549f. which is perhaps 
not altogether. justified. Yet the distinction 
was used by 
those of the school of Baghdr.d who criticized 
al- Shanhsm. 
Cp. my article on Acquisition, par.3. 
15. 
98. 201. 
99. ,Tilal,51; Farg,147. 
100. ,.a.ç . 227f . ; cp. note 82 above. 
101. 537f.; cp.246. 
102. 253,1.5. 
103. 253,1.7f. - presumably cAbbAd's in view of the phrase 
lg li -t illatin. 
104. 255. 
105. 250,1.3. 
106. ,Iaq . 199, 549f . ; for Direr see below, V . 4, a. 
107. Al- BaghdEdl,(Fa.rg,163) is horrified et the suggestion, and 
explains it in the second sense. But the very fact that he 
does so tends to suggest that al- Shah.hgm meant the opposite. 
108. Al -K 
i 
bi , according to Faro ,163. 
109. Mao.549f. 
110. 199f. , 551. 
111. 194, 531. 
112. M -c.542 - completely rejects the technical use of 
muktasib, etc. ; he also rejects the similar theory of the "use" 
(is ti ̀ mn) of powers, 235. 
113. 195,539; cp.p.57 above. 




118. Cp. Mila1,55 foot. 
119. idaq.247f.,575; Milal,58 foot. 
120. Mao.247,575; a.ltgf are recognized, Mac.261,263; a. list is 
given, : Iilal,55 foot. The statement shortly before, appa.r- 
N. 
CHAPTER V. 
1. Even the Mu`tazila found support for its views from the time 
of the Companions; cp.Munya, first three tabao t. 
2 " Indeed all the theologians probably belonged to some sect, 
though those later considered "sound" doubtless avoided the 
sects with extreme views. Al- Nawbakhti , writing from the 
i- -1point of view of the ShLta (Fir.ao al- Shica,7) , includes Sufÿa.n 
;al- Thawri, Ibn Abi Laili, Málik b. Anas and al- Shá.fidi, all 
¡pillars of orthodoxy, among the fourth sect of the Murji'a, 
the Shuká.k, which is also known as the Hashwiya. 
3. Close study of biographical notices, etc. , and comparisons 
with views on filth, may yet lead to greater clarity on these 
matters . 
4. E. g. a group of the Rawä.fid, whose principal figure was llisr5.m 
b. al- iiakam (Maq.30 -64, etc.) ; the Zaidiya (Ma.q. 65 -75) ; the 
mutakall imú.n of the Khawári j (Maq .120) ; the group of Murji'a 
under Abú Shimr and Muhammad b. Sha.bib , who stood very close to 
the Mu.ttazila; the JahmIya (see sect.2) ; Dirr, al -Naj jár, 
Burghüth and all the A.il al- Ithbát (sect.3). Al -Ba. hdUdi 
gives a list of the mutakallimún of the Ahl al- Hadith (U äl,254 ) 
which comprises: `Abdallgh b. Satid (sc. al- Kullábi) , al- Härith 
(b. Asad) al- Muhäsibi, tAbd a.l FAziz al- Makki, al- Husain b. al- 
Fall al- Bajali, Abú 'bdalláh al- Ka.rä.bl.sT., Abu 'l- ̀Abbft al- 
Qalánisi; some of these are also mentioned in Mila1,65. In 
the sphere of filth the chief exponents of the use of reason 
were the AshEb al-Pal y, associated mainly with Abú Hanifa. 
The prominence of the Muttazila in our sources is probably 
due to a corubination of causes: (1) the continued existence of 
their school, while others disappeared or were swallowed up in 
orthodoxy; (2) al- A.sh`arï's connection with them, reflected in 
the Mao, -61.t, and the fact that several other early writers on 
sects, like Zurgfl.n and al- Kia`bi, belonged to them _ cp.Pitter.'s 
list of "d_uhammeda.nische HEresiographen "; (3) the nurgbers of 
books they wrote. 
17. 
5. Cp. the arguments for the createdness of the Qur'an from al- 
Tabari's History in Patton's Ahmad b. Hanbal and the Mihna , 
57ff. and 65ff. 
2. Or even denied - as al- Baghdä.di denied the connection (which 
certainly existed) between the views of Abú Hanifa and Gha.ssán, 
the heretic of the Murji'a (Farq,191). 
6. See ch.I,2,c, "Sources for the Hana.fiya ". 
7. Cp.Muslim Creed,108; and above p.22. 
b. Cp.Figh Akbar I, article 2. 
N. V. 
18. 
9 . It is not found in the Wasiyat Abi J anifa or the Pion_ Akbar 
II; it occurs in the creed of at -Tah wi and in those of al- Ash`ari in the Magalät and the Ibána. 
10. Shan, al-Fiqh al- Akba.r,4f. 
11. Mila1,63 12. Cp.sect.4,e below. 
13. Cp. Goldziher, Zä.hiriten, 5 -17. 
15. Mi1a.1,59. 13. Farg,328. 
17. The one exception is the creed of al- Taháwï (ch.VI, sect.4, 
below), and the instance from Mac.41 mentioned in the next 
sentence. 
18. The mention of "Dschabriten" in the translation of al- 
Ashtari's K. al-Lumat ( -fell: Von Mohammed zu Ghazail 57) was 
apparently erroneous, since it was altered in the second edition. 
The Jabariya are mentioned in the closing sentence of the creed 
of al- Tahawi; as he also mentions the Ja.hmïya, he is probably 
using Jabariya in much the same way as Mujbira is used in the 
Shard. al -Filth al- Akbar. 
19. Farg,328. 20. 430,1.2. 
21. 144,1.11 - not in the index; it is in the creed ascribed to 
`-Abdal1Th b. al- Mubà.ra.k. 
22. J7. 23. 11. 
24. 18; 26; 49. 25. 24. 
26. 67. 
27. See next section; the first point ix (from p.11) is specially 
connected with al- Najj2.r (es is noted in Intisár, Index under 
"Mujbira ") , and the last with Dirr. 
28. 69. 
29. This point was formulated especially by Burghüth. 
30. vTao.279, accepting Ritter's conjecture in line 6. 
31. Farq,200. 
32. Only one of them is given any semblance of a name - the first 




acquisition, like the knowledge that the originator and control- 
ler of the universe is not two or more (Ma.q. 136) . 
55. Ma.g.359f. ; 281, etc. 56. 281; 407f. 
57. Intiuä.r.,29. 58. Î:q,.216, 339; Intig-6.r,133. 
59. Miial,63. 60. Mao.206. 
61. Milal,63. 
62. Maq. 166 ,281,487; an anonymous view on p.174 is probably also 
his. 
63. In many respects his views show a stage of development be- 
yond those of pira.r ; and in Mao .415 he is given as the source 
of reports about Abu 'l- Hudha.il, al- NazzKm and later. theologi- 
ans, (though not all the names in the list were necessarily 
mentioned in his report) ; he is said to have had disputes with 
al -Nam, and even to have been his disciple (Fihrist ,179 ; 
al- Magrizi, 350; quoted from Dr.Halkin's note to Farg,195). 
64. Mac.283 -5. 
65. Art.12; cp.Maq.514 - willing; repetitions in 182, 507. 
66. Art.14; cp.Maq.216. 
67. Intis x,133. Sume observations of his about the different 
ways of knowing a thing (Maq.392) have a bearing on this ques- 
tion, and also seem to link up with the MO]iimiya and the Maj- 
hÿul lu of the Yhawár i j (Maq . 96 ; c p . 3 91) . 
zed ai- za,x Z -Sì 
68. This may be'sixrmised from e.rt.1; the word kasb is used in 
dealing with his views on p.566. 
69. Cp. Meo.353. r'0. Implied in art.2. 
2txxxxIxtxx24AmOixtItmAm114x mx2Mximmim }x 
71. Arts.0,5,7. 
72. Art. v; a view parallel to that of Bishr b. el- Mu'tamir. 
73. Art.11. 74. Prts.15,16,5. 
75. Art.B. 
76. Arts.3,4 (istiWa); Ma.q.330 (guwa.). 
77. Maq.359f.,330; 305f.,317, etc. 




78. Al- BaghdädI , Farq , 197; Milal , 63; cp. Maq.284. I here assume that Burghiith is to be identified with Mu4s.mmad b. tlsa al- Sairáfi al- Nazzáml (who reports MuCa.mmar's view of knowledge - 
Má.g. 168,488) , iuhammad b. `Ise al- Nazzg.m (who reports a story about Abu '1- Hudhail - Munya,27,1. 15) , and Abii `Abdalláh at- 
Sairrfi (a pupil of Mu`a.mmar¡-, maligned like his master for e. view about God's knowledge - Inti$5r,53,1.10) ; Burghiith's use 
of the conception of a thing's nature (ta.bc) argues a connection with MuCa.mma.r. See also the note on Muhammad b. Herb al- Sairâfi (at end of the chapter) . 
"9. Ma.g.235,238. 80. Mag.284. 
81. Iaiao . 405 etc. tt i 82. Ma.q . 540f . 
83. Q.29,16. 84. Faro , 97; cp. p. 92 above. 
85. Mao .552. 86. Cp. p.94 above. 
87. Mao .553 . 
89. The latter only on p.488,1.2. 
90. Cp. al- Àshcari's use of ithbt - ch. III , Note B at end. 
91. E.E. in connection with "leading astray" iidlá.l) three sub- 
divisions are mentioned t.262). 
92. 408; cp.p.488 where he says that Dirár's view of the negative 
import of the Divine attributes is the view of the "generality 
of the Muthbita ". 
y3. 540; or al-Kue ni , 262. 94. 541. 
95. 383; see Note A at end. 96. 259 -265. 
97. 408. 98. 488. 
99. 383. 100. 552,554. 
101. A. further small point is the connotation of the term "Ahl 
al -I aqq" ( "the people of truth ") . Besides the single reference 
given in Ma.q. Index , namely, p.472,1.9, the term occurs p.430, 
1.2, p.539,1.3 and p.549,1.5, while on pp.550f. mention is made 
of views held by "Ahl al -ilagq we'1- Ithbát ". It may be that 
Ahl al Iìagq is simply another name for Ahl al- Ithbät ; on p.430 
they appear to be interchangeable. If there is any differ- 
ence, the distinction between khâliq and muktasib pn p.539 
suggests that the Ahl al-lagq e.re the successors of the Ahl 
a.l -Ithbát . 
102. Art .1; Maq.550. 103. 561. 
N.V. 
104. 408, etc. 105. 259 -265, etc. 
106. 551. 107. 552. 
108. 573, etc. 109. 537f. ; 577. 
110. 554. 
22. 
111. They themselves may have been mainly Hsnafis ; Bishr al- 
Marisi, said to have been the teacher of al -Na.j já.r, is given 
a notice in IBn Abi '1Wa.fe.' , Al- Jaw -.hir al -Muff a (I,164), 
a biographical dictionary of IianafTe . 
112. Mao.32; in view of the fact that DirUr had the majlis in 
Basra. before Abu '1- Hudhail, he and Hishgm were possibly about 
the same age; at least it is unlikely that Pirar was younger 
as I suggested in The Origin of the Islamic Doctrine of 
Acquisition) . 
113. 40f.,42f. Sabab is perhaps rather the "motive" or "pur- 
pose" for the sake of which the act is done. 
114. Both Alm '1- Hudhail and Ja(far b. Haab wrote -,bout him; 
JO-far uses the word ikhtiy r (IVIao.246). 
115. 38,1.15; 221,1.8; 492,1.8. 
116. Ma.G .228 , 512 . 
117. Takhliya was said to constitute man's power by some of the 
Ibädiya who were criticized by iTahya b. Abi Tamil and 
Muhammad b. Harb (g. 10 7) . 
118. Ibána.,85; Khushaish in al- Mlslati, Tanbih, 133; cp. ch. III,3,b. 
119. Maá.489,1.9. 120. Mac,.494,1.4. 
121. Meo.41 ,1.4. 
122. Trarrslation in Wensinck's Muslim Creed, 125 1.31.. 
123. P.187. 124. P.186. 
125. iia.o.140. 126. Iritiu2.r,164ff. 
127. 141. 
128. In view of the variations of the text of a.rt . 13 , and its 
proximity to other articles about human activity, it is just 
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technical sense (perhaps rejecting it), since the first word 
is kasb (Wensinck here translates this "ga.in" , end 
uses 
N. V . 
23. 
"acquiring" for a completely different word. 
129. Ì_rts . 9 ,18,20 ; cp. 27. 130. Muslim Creed ,161. 
131. *ù:242x Goldziher, Zá.hiriten, p.70. 
132. Milal ,65. 133. Arts .2,8. 
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uwa.tta' . ' The Liana.fiya regarded him as their third great 
imam after Abú Hanifa. and Abi Yüsuf. . See Ibn Abi ' 1- Wa.fä.' , 
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137. The translation of the concluding words should reed: "not 
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139. Cp.III,1,a., above. 
140. Cp.Massignon, Recueil Textes, 211f. Dedering, 
Introduction to the Tanbih, esp.p.x. 
141. 127 foot. 142. 128. 
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149. 42. 150. 30f. 
151. 22 and Q.57,19; 26. 152. 45; cp.Philíppiens,1,23f. 
153. 31f. ; quotation below fry p.33; tradition is non -canonical. 





1. Muslim Creed,91. 
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children offthe heathen dependent on their own act, and instead 
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N.VI. 25. 
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CHAPTER VII. 
1. q .136 . 
2. Above p.157; cp. Goldziher, Vorlesungen-,53. 
G'4,.etc. eed cric ss'GLr,c 11417,6eA6' / 'Z> . 
S Y ï1 0 P S I S 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
1. The aim of the study is to describe the arguments about 
"free will and predestination" in Islam from about 80 A.H., 
when they started up to the time of al- Ash`a.rï, about 330 A.H. 
2. A discussion of the main sources. 
II. THE OPPOSING TRENDS IN ISLAM. 
1. The Qur'an emphasizes both Divine omnipotence and human 
responsibility. 
2. Tradition contains many conceptions not present in the 
Qur' R n. 
3. There is a contrast between the theistic conceptions of 
the Qur' En and the impersonal and atheistic conceptions of 
Tradition; this is to be traced to the continuing influence in 
Tradition of pre- Islamic fatalistic ideas, since the Qur' án 
firmly opposes the fatalistic attitude, whereas many Trad- 
itions are thoroughly fatalistic. 
III. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE DOCTRINE OF QADAR. 
1. The doctrine of .Qadar was held by the IVlaimûniya and the 
464tiEb al-Su' á1 among the Khawâri j towards the close of the 
first century of the Hijra. It is a logical development 
of the Khárij3 emphasis on righteousness in God and man, 
through such questions as that of the punishment of children 
and others who are not responsible for their actions. The 
opposition to the doctrine among the Khawárij seems to spring 
not from belief in God but rather from a conservative attitude. 
2. The doctrine of Qadar as held by Ghailän and others of the 
Murji'a is again connected with the conception of righteous- 
ness (which likewise brought some of them into conflict with 
the Umaiyads) . Some of these men stand close to the 
Qadar3 sects of the Khawtri j . 
3. The little that is known about the Qadariya as a separate 
sect and about Ma'bad al-Juhani,the reputed originator of 
the discussions in Islam, suggests that they belonged to the 
same circles as Maimun and the others. 
IV. THE IVIU` TAZ ILA. 
1. The Mu'tazila regi4 qgi, with Abu '1- Hudhail. 
S . (as) 
2. The YuLta.zils , far from being pure rationalists, were thor- 
oughly Muslim in many of their conceptions;-but they believed 
in Reason end in rational ideas. 
3. Abu ' 1- Hudheil end the early school of Basra. were concerned 
more with the physic el aspects of metephysice than. with purely 
,religious issues; yet they contributed to these by their ana- 
lysis of human activity and by their general arguments to prove 
God does no' evil. Al- Na.zz2m mede God subordinate to retional 
ideas. 
4. Bishr b. el- Mu'tamir, founder of the school of Bsghdnd., was 
naive in some ways, but stimulated. thought by his theories of 
man's power over generated. effects and of the infinity of ' good -- 
nes s . 
5. .The followers of Bishr, influenced by Basra, were more 
rationalistic then their master. They might be seid to be 
working out the rationalism of al- NezzPm. 
6. In Basra 'Abbt.d criticized the school of Be.ghd<<,d and began 
to make clear the inadequacy Of their rational conceptions. 
This process culminated in al- Jubbr'ï with a growing rea.liz- 
. atioñ of man's incapacity ̀ and God's omnipotence. Al- Ash`axi 
made what was logically the next step, whereas Abiz fi2shim 
turned back rather to older views. 
V. THE UPHOLDERS OF THE DIVINE- QADAR. 
1. Quite apart from the Mu'tezila there was considerable and 
diversified theological activity before the time of el- Ash`erI. 
2. Abú.I3anife is typical of many who United theistic and non- 
. theistic conceptions without feeling eny inconsistency. 
3. The threefold classification of Qeder, Kesb end Jabr was 
only beginning to appear about 300 Ä.H. Before that time 
T;esb and Jabr were not distinguished. The Jahmiya , who 
were subsequently regarded es the chief exponents of Jabr, 
were originally upholders of the Divine Qader whose primary 
aim was to assert the unity and majesty of God. 
4. There was a close approximation to orthodoxy in -the Ahl el- 
Ithbjt . Of their three main members, pir .r was probably 
the author of the conception of Kesb (acquisition), al -N j jar 
of the doctrine that the power eccompanies the act, and 
Burghüth of the distinction between voluntary acts and those 
done under compulsion. They sees to have explained evil by 
saying that God was beyond man's comprehension. 
5. Hish.m b. e1- Jiakem also worked et the. analysis of human act- 
ivity, end made a distinction between choice end compulsion. 
6. The Wasïya or Testament of Abú 'Hanîfe contains third- 
century I3anifï views, similar to those of al- Najjar but slight - 
ly more conservative, yet theistic 'rather than fatalistic. 
7. Khushaish is representative of the anti- intellectual pos- 
ition of A4mad b. Hanbal and his followers. He combines 
theistic and non -theistic conceptions without any misgivings. 
8. The practical rather thani the theoretical side of religion 
is illustrated by al- Kha.rrâz. His mysticism makes him 
sympathetic to fatalistic resignation. He shares in the 
common confusion, but is able to derive truly religious, and 
therefore theistic, ideas from unpromising fatalistic material. 
VI. AL-AilitARI AND HIS CRITICS. 
1. The essential point of his conversion was the recognition 
that Revelation and not Reason is the ultimate source of 
religious truth. Yet he continued to use rational methods 
of a.rgume nt . 
2. He emphasized the omnipotence of God to the neglect of the 
aspect of human responsibility, but insisted that evil is not 
to be attributed to God although He wills it, defending this 
position by various subtle arguments. 
3. He was a leader in the revival of Islam chiefly because of 
his deep spirituality, with which he combined a keen intellect 
and participation in the typical Muslim mentality (the sense 
of dependence). 
4. Al Âsh`ari was criticized by the school of the Hanafiya. 
The divergence of view, which is apparent in the creed of a.l- 
Taháwt and the Fiah Akbar I -, becomes explicit criticism in the 
Share al -Filth al -Akbar Catfiibuted to al- Mz.turïdi) . These 
deal more adequately with human responsibility, and so are 
more balanced, but they lack the spiritual fervour of al- 
Ash'ari. 
VII. CONCLUDING SURVEY. 
The deterministic outlook of Muslims belongs to the frame- 
work of civilization and culture in which Islam developed, 
rather than to the prophetic proclamation. The religious 
impulse did something to transform that background from fatal- 
ism to a more theistic determinism, but in other respects the 
background has largely persisted. 
(30) 
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